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Abstract
This thesis poses two questions: (1) Why should transnational corporations 
(“TNCs”) have responsibilities in global justice, and (2) If the business of 
business is business, why should it care about global justice? My objective is to 
lay the foundation for a coherent theory of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) 
-  one that presents a normative account of the moral basis for, and the constraints 
on, CSR. The conception of CSR here is about the role TNCs ought to play in 
global justice, which is distinct from what business ethics is about.
Addressing the first question, my thesis is that, only when we have a rigorous 
conception of what responsibility is, will we be able to construct an account of 
who is responsible. So instead of asking ‘What does an ideal cosmopolitan just 
global order look like?’ and then trying to “fit in” TNCs, a constructivist approach 
that asks the basic question: ‘What is responsibility?’ is adopted. Moreover, the 
theme of ‘responsibility’ is supported by a notion of ‘global justice as duty’, 
contrary to the predominant rights-based approach to global justice. I then 
articulate a category of corporate responsibility based on capabilities and the 
scope of that responsibility.
Despite its normative intentions, a theory of CSR cannot offer action-guiding 
principles unless it takes into account the real-life business constraints 
corporations face. I address the second question and suggest how we can think 
philosophically about these non-moral constraints on CSR -  chiefly, companies’ 
fiduciary duty to maximise profits and shareholder value. The question is how 
these business considerations fit into our philosophical remit. Contrary to 
normative theories that attempt to “squeeze” everything into ideal theory (e.g. 
theories based on economic rationality), I argue that a full realisation of the role of 
TNCs in global justice should prompt theorists to devote more attention to non­
ideal theory.
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Introduction
This thesis presents a philosophical analysis of CSR and the role of TNCs in 
global justice. It poses and examines two questions: (1) Why should TNCs in 
particular have any responsibilities in global justice, and (2) If the business of 
business is business, why should it care about global justice?'1 The first question 
is concerned with articulating a normative account of the moral foundations for 
CSR, and the second with the business constraints on CSR and how to think 
about them in philosophical terms. In addressing these two questions, the 
objective is to lay the foundation for a coherent theory of CSR.
1. Why CSR?
In the last ten years, CSR has become the byword of business and corporate 
governance, spawning an entire industry revolving around it -  ranging from 
consultancies specialising in CSR, fund managers promoting socially responsible 
investments, social enterprises, as well as prominent UN- and government-led 
initiatives like the UN Global Compact. In the UK, the British government has 
also given its blessing to both the general notion and the label of “CSR”: In 2000, 
formal responsibility for the oversight of CSR across the country was assigned to 
a minister in government under the Department for Trade and Industry,2 and a 
website was set up “to provide a forum where businesses can promote corporate 
social responsibility in a more effective manner”.3 The government has also 
initiated schemes like the Ethical Trading Initiative (to encourage British firms to 
ensure the observance by their overseas suppliers of “core labour standards”), the 
Global Citizenship Unit in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (to enlist 
business support in the conduct of British foreign policy), and the establishment
1 The terms ‘responsibility’, ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ are used interchangeably throughout the 
thesis. See fh 50.
2 Stephen Timms was succeeded by Malcolm Wicks following a ministerial reshuffle in January 
2008.
3 The initiative is mainly targeted at small and medium- sized enterprises with a strong emphasis 
on their role in local communities in Britain.
of a Business Partnership Unit by the Department for International Development 
(to promote business cooperation in meeting goals for reducing poverty in 
developing countries). In an attempt to transition to the next stage of UK 
competitiveness and depend less on the government to set policy, businesses 
themselves are adopting the language of CSR and have formed social 
responsibility-oriented coalitions like the UK Business in the Community 
(“BITC”) and the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum.
CSR has also attracted considerable academic interest. ‘CSR’ is now 
routinely taught as a separate module in most business schools around the world, 
and an increasing number of schools like Harvard Business School and the 
University of Nottingham have separate faculties dedicated to CSR research and 
teaching. Although the majority of academic involvement in the study of CSR 
remains within the business and management faculties, there is increasing 
research interest from other fields. These include business ethicists,4 lawyers,5
f \  7  Reconomists, development theorists, even geographers! Such broad-ranging 
interest is not surprising, considering that CSR engages diverse issues -  ranging 
from descriptive and predictive theories about why corporate entities behave the 
way that they do, to normative ideas about how they should behave. From the 
corporate point of view, CSR engages issues like corporate governance and risk 
management. From the legal point of view, it involves discussions about the 
various types of regulation needed to bring about certain corporate behaviour,9 as 
well as the conceptual and legal issues that attach to more “decentred”10
4 For example, see Freeman (1984), Bowie (1999a), Donaldson et al (2002).
5 For example, see Ward (2003), Hillemanns (2003).
6 For example, see Arrow (1973), Baumol (1991), Sen (1993).
7 For example, see Bendell (2004), Blowfield (2004).
8 For example, see the LSE Department o f Geography and Environment’s project on Global 
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Policy and Practices, Outcomes and Impacts '. 
http://www. lse.ac.uk/collections/geographv AndEnvironment/research/Currentresearchproiects/A 
G GlobalGovemance.htm
9 For example, state regulation, civil society regulation and self-regulation.
10 That is, decentred from the state. See Black (2002).
understandings of regulation. From the development point of view, the history 
and impact of CSR and its associated outcomes is also of importance to those 
who are concerned about global social issues like poverty alleviation, child 
labour, climate change and the environment.
Many -  including businesses themselves -  hold the belief that the future 
of sustainable development must involve corporations, not just state and 
individual action. Hence, for example, the Global Compact was created to 
catalyse corporate action in support of broader UN goals such as the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Millennium Development Goals. Indeed, 
the importance of engaging new actors like corporations to further our global 
social ideals was emphasized even before the dawn of the new millennium:
“The participation of new actors on the international scene is an 
acknowledged fact; providing them with agreed means of participation in 
the formal system, heretofore primarily the province of States, is the new 
task of our time.” (Boutros-Ghali, 1996: 25)
“Globalisation is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its 
fragility... Our challenge today is to devise a similar compact on the 
global scale, to underpin the new global economy... Specifically, I call on 
[businesses] to embrace, support and enact a set of core values in the 
areas of human rights, labour standards, and environmental practices.” 
(Annan, 1999: 2)
The interest in harnessing the capabilities of corporations -  particularly 
large corporations like TNCs -  to further social goals is, in many ways, not 
surprising. There are over 60,000 multinational corporations active today, with 
over 800,000 affiliates abroad (UNCTAD, 2001). According to the Financial 
Times, at least 37 of the top one hundred economies of the world today are 
corporations, the revenues of just five of the world's largest corporations more 
than double the combined GDP of the poorest 100 countries (Utting, 2000). It 
would not be unreasonable to suggest, from these statistics, that TNCs wield an
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enormous amount of economic power and influence today, so much so that it has 
been described as the “new Leviathan of global capitalism”.11 Moreover, statistics 
show that private investment in the developing world spiralled from US$44 
billion in 1990 to over US$167 billion in 1995 (World Bank, 1996), overtaking 
official development assistance (“ODA”), which fell slightly to US$59 billion in 
1995 (OECD, 1996b). A growing number of major corporations are also 
embracing social causes, but not only as a matter of compliance or as a defensive 
response to external pressure. Rather they are taking a leading role in addressing 
social and environmental issues that may seem to be far from, even counter to, 
their core business interests. The statistics show that large corporations have not 
only the capabilities, but also the will, to engage in addressing the global social 
issues of our time.
The increasing role of large corporations in the global social arena is 
compounded by the advent of globalisation and the growing visibility of TNCs, 
whose activities are thought to have a profound and sometimes damaging impact 
on the quality of life in the environment in which they operate. Interest in CSR 
increased dramatically after several very public fiascos involving large 
corporations over issues of, inter alia, corporate governance (for example, 
Enron), the environment (for example, Royal Dutch-Shell Group and the Brent 
Sparr episode), and human rights (for example, Nike and the exploitation of child 
labour in Pakistan) (Owen, 2002). In addition, modernisation and the two world 
wars saw the decline of paternalism, the blurring of class boundaries, and a 
corresponding breakdown in deference to authority -  particularly in the UK 
(O’Mahony, 2004). As a result, it has become more acceptable to question the 
actions of corporations and to be suspicious of any perceived lack of 
transparency. Hence there is a greater legitimacy in demanding transparency 
from corporations than before. Moreover, with increased social complexity, there 
is a growing sense that no single person or agency can have all the answers, or all 
the solutions.
11 This description o f the TNC is Ross and Trachte’s (1990). It is meant to distinguish the TNC 
from the “old Leviathan”, that is, the sovereign state.
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For these reasons, the topic of CSR has attracted a wide range of interest 
from all comers. The rise of the corporation, and its predominant presence in our 
daily lives -  whether we are in London or Cote D’Ivoire -  makes it a central 
object of interest. Its immense power and influence casts it as an enemy of justice 
in cases of oppression and abuse. At the same time, it inspires untold possibilities 
for social justice because its vast capabilities can also be (and have been) 
harnessed to do good. On the other hand, this is not a reason to exhort CSR like 
“rabid egalitarians”.12 While the increasing interest in the topic of CSR and 
number of CSR initiatives have turned it into somewhat of a phenomenon, there 
are those who oppose it on quite legitimate grounds and question why, for 
example, if the business of business is business, it should care about things like 
human rights and the environment. The challenge, therefore, is to develop a 
normative argument that justifies corporate engagement in CSR. This thesis takes 
up the challenge of developing such a theory of CSR.
2. CSR and global justice
Because the topic of CSR is so broad and touches so many disparate and 
sometimes seemingly disconnected issues, there are many paths to developing 
such a theory of CSR. So it is important to get an angle on the task first. In this 
thesis, CSR is defined in terms of the role of TNCs in global justice. In other 
words, the task at hand for developing a theory of CSR is to develop a normative 
argument for why and how much TNCs ought to play a role in global justice. 
Global justice, in turn, is concerned with the way our social world ought to be 
structured -  that is, the principles by which the laws and practices that regulate 
our human interaction are assessed (the ‘justice’ aspect), and the ethical 
reasoning for why we owe moral duties beyond our current social borders to 
distant poor persons whom we have no apparent relationship with (the ‘global’ 
aspect). Put in another way, this thesis is concerned with the issue of global just 
agency -  that is, how global responsibility should be distributed, and why TNCs 
in particular ought to act as moral agents in our ideal of a just global society. In
12 This pithy description is Brittan’s (1993: 20).
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this thesis, particular focus will be given to the global issues of poverty 
alleviation and child labour.
Taking a global justice angle on the topic of CSR is interesting because 
of the issues and challenges that thinking about the corporation as a just agent 
presents -  not only for the study of global justice, but also the way we understand 
agency and the basic political units that legitimately make up a just global order 
and form the basis of modem political theory and political science. Within the 
framework of global justice, there are two particular challenges to developing a 
theory of CSR that stand out. Firstly, there is the problem of conceiving the 
corporate entity as a “moral agent”. There are two parts to this problem: (1) 
There is the issue of construing the corporate entity, not as an aggregate or 
collective of individual agents, or part of some scheme to broaden the individual 
agent’s scope of responsibility, but as a separate singular entity capable of agency 
in its own right. This goes against the traditional way of doing political theory, 
which has traditionally been methodologically individualistic -  it is 
‘methodological’ because it subscribes to the doctrine that we cannot understand 
social phenomena without understanding actions; it is ‘individualistic’ because it 
is concerned with analysing the individual in order to deduce explanations of 
phenomena, since actions must be motivated by intentional states which 
(arguably) only individuals possess (Heath, 2005). Methodological individualism, 
therefore, precludes thinking about the corporate entity as an “agent” in its own 
right. (2) There is the issue of construing the corporate entity as a “moral” agent. 
Even if TNCs were capable of agency in their own right, it does not naturally 
follow that they ought to assume the role of moral agents. The challenge, then, is 
to get a handle on how to think about the moral responsibilities of TNCs -  the 
type of framework that allows us to constme them as agents in their own right, 
the normative reasoning that leads to the conclusion that they have global 
responsibilities towards others, particularly the world’s poor, how far those 
responsibilities extend and what their limits are.
Secondly, there is the problem of thinking about “businesses” as having a 
role in global justice in the light of the non-moral demand on them to maximise 
profits and shareholder value. The question is how these practical business
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considerations can be fitted into our philosophical remit. Some normative 
theories have attempted to “squeeze” everything into a single theory -  for 
example, rational choice theories based on ‘enlightened self-interest’. However, 
these theoretical strategies are problematic in themselves. For example, the 
problem with rational choice theories like ‘enlightened self-interest’ is that they 
concern individuals and individual choices. Thus, applied to corporations, they 
encounter the same objection concerning the moral agency of corporate entities 
and taking theories that have traditionally applied to individuals and applying 
them to corporate entities. We end up, again, questioning what sort of entity the 
corporation is, and whether or not it is capable of moral agency. The challenge 
here, then, is to find a methodology that allows us to think about this non-moral, 
profit-maximising aspect of the corporation: whether it poses a constraint on 
corporations’ global responsibilities, and how this fits together with the moral 
argument that TNCs have global responsibilities.
I believe that these two challenges -  breaking past the methodologically 
individualistic way of understanding agency in political theory, and even if one 
is successful on this count, reconciling the conception of corporations as just 
agents with the prevailing understanding of corporations as non-moral business 
entities -have created a mental barrier to thinking about the role of corporations 
in global justice. This may in part explain why, although recent publications have 
seen a shift in philosophical focus from individual charity13 to institutional 
agency14 to corporate agency specifically15, the global justice literature on 
corporations is still relatively scant compared to the vast resource of literature 
and case studies on CSR. Hence, there is what may be described as a theoretical 
lag. This thesis, then, aims to redress the imbalance. Its objectives are to raise 
what I think are the normative issues that arise from conceiving CSR as the role 
of TNCs in global justice, and to provide some insight into these issues. If, at the 
end of the day, the discussion of these issues helps us to break past the mental
13 For example, see Singer (1972) and (1999).
14 For example, see Kuper (2005c) and Green (2005).
15 For example, see O’Neill (2001), Lane (2005) and Kreide (2007b).
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barrier created by the aforesaid two challenges, then this thesis would have 
achieved what it set out to do.
3. The structure of this thesis
In chapter 1 ,1 begin by setting the discussion about CSR firmly in the context of 
global justice rather than the traditional context of business ethics. This serves to 
outline the intellectual framework for the rest of the thesis. I then take the first 
step to addressing the first question stated in the beginning, namely, ‘Why should 
TNCs in particular have any responsibilities in global justice?’. I present three 
cosmopolitan approaches to global justice that advocate a pluralized 
understanding of global just agency -  that is, agency which is essentially non­
state-centric and includes actors other than states and individuals, like TNCs. The 
three cosmopolitan approaches are the ‘extreme cosmopolitanism’ position, the 
‘strong cosmopolitanism’ position and the ‘weak cosmopolitanism’ position -  
positions represented by Kevin Jackson, Andrew Kuper and Samuel Scheffler 
respectively. The first posits the claim that cosmopolitanism results in a non­
state-based world order, the second that global justice is achieved through radical 
reforms to create a ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ composing of state and non-state 
actors, and the third that a cosmopolitan conception of global just agency entails 
a balance between our special responsibilities and global responsibilities. I 
critically analyse how each of these positions accommodates a role for TNCs in 
global justice, and explain why they are problematic when it comes to locating 
the site of cosmopolitan global justice in which TNCs may feature. My core 
argument is that the three cosmopolitan approaches beg the central questions of 
corporate just agency by adopting at the outset a ‘thinly cosmopolitan’ 
conception of the role of TNCs in global justice -  either because they are not 
practicable, or not genuinely, or not sufficiently “cosmopolitan”. I conclude that, 
instead of asking the question ‘What does an ideal cosmopolitan just global order 
look like?’ and how TNCs “fit in” the ideal picture, a better way of 
conceptualizing the role of TNCs in global justice lies in taking a constructivist 
approach and asking a more basic question: ‘What is responsibility?’. Only when
-  1 5 -
we have a rigorous conception of what responsibility is, I argue, will we be able 
to construct an agent-centred account of who is responsible.
Taking up this theme of ‘responsibility’, I go on in chapter 2 to lay the 
first plank in the construction of a theory of corporate responsibility by critically 
addressing the predominantly rights-based approach to global justice and 
providing arguments for a duty-based theory of CSR. The focus of my critique of 
the rights-based approach is Henry Shue’s rights-based account of the role of 
TNCs in global justice presented in his paper Mediating Duties (1988), because I 
think that it captures most of the things I think are problematic with linking CSR 
and the doctrine of human rights. The issues that I raise revolve around the 
requirement of correlativity between rights and duties, that is, the proposition that 
for every rights claim, there must be a correlative duty to fulfil that claim. The 
thrust of my argument is that Shue’s theory begs the central questions of CSR by 
adopting right from the outset a limited role for TNCs -  as institutional mediators 
of a correlative relationship between distant right-holders and duty-bearers that 
would not otherwise exist, rather than duty-bearing institutional agents in their 
own right. Setting aside the rights-based account of global justice then, I go on to 
develop the case for a notion of ‘global justice as duty’ as the moral foundation 
for a theory of CSR, with critical attention to Onora O’Neill’s duty-based account 
of the role of TNCs in global justice presented in her paper Agents o f Justice 
(2001).16
Notwithstanding, I conclude by pointing out that even those who insist 
on couching global justice in human rights terms must eventually still address the 
question of who must deliver on rights. In this case, our preoccupation with 
corporate just agency brings us -  both rights- and duty- based theorists -  right 
back to the question: ‘Why TNCs?’. Chapter 3, then, draws the foregoing two 
chapters together to focus on the question of ‘corporate responsibility’ -  to 
explain what it is and to elucidate an account of the categories of corporate 
responsibility that underpin the moral claim that TNCs ought to play a role in 
global justice. In this chapter, I focus on constructing a capabilities argument for
16 See fn 50.
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CSR. The capabilities argument is that, in addition to being responsible for 
harmful outcomes that they have directly contributed to, TNCs may be attributed 
with a responsibility to act in cases of global injustice where they are more 
capable than states and individuals to do so. In other words, I argue why can 
implies should, that is, why the fact that TNCs are more capable than individuals 
in addressing global problems leads to the stronger conclusion that they ought to 
address these global problems. In this chapter, I also explain the difference 
between responsibility in the sense of attributability and responsibility in the 
sense of accountability, and why it is important to attribute global responsibilities 
to TNCs rather than just holding them accountable for delivering on these 
responsibilities. In this regard, I critically engage Iris Marion Young’s conception 
of ‘political responsibility’, which I suggest amounts to an argument for 
accountability without attributability.
After laying the normative foundation for a theory of CSR, I then turn to 
its moral content. In chapter 4 ,1 explore the scope of corporate responsibility, or 
what I call the “CSR agenda”. With reference to a UN report (UNDP, 2004) 
recommending the various ways in which the private sector could go beyond 
remedial responsibility (that is, responsibility for righting wrongs that they have 
directly caused) and harness their capabilities innovatively to aid developing 
countries, I take up the task of presenting a normative argument for the scope of 
this extended agenda. I ask: What responsibilities exactly do TNCs have towards 
the very poor? In this regard, I focus my attention on Thomas Pogge’s well- 
known argument for extending the scope of responsibility to cases where there is 
no direct causal culpability: that individuals in rich states have, as a matter of 
human rights, a moral responsibility to ensure that they do not unduly harm the 
distant poor by supporting a global economic order that promotes poverty. Pogge 
calls this responsibility an “institutional responsibility”. Distinguishing between 
institutional and interactional understandings of duty, I test out Pogge’s theory on 
the CSR agenda and critically analyse its usefulness in grounding the CSR 
agenda morally. I conclude that, in drawing the boundaries of corporate 
responsibility, the active distinction is not between institutionalism and 
interactionalism as Pogge suggests, but between ideal and non-ideal theory. I
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then propose and outline one form such a non-ideal approach might take, that is, 
to theorize the business case for CSR. Theorizing the business case for CSR is a 
recognition of the extent to which business considerations like companies’ 
fiduciary duties to their shareholders to maximise profits and shareholder value 
constrain what companies can and cannot do outside their business mandate. It is 
non-ideal, I claim, because it poses an obstruction to the full realisation of the 
ideal that we have constructed so far: the argument that TNCs have 
responsibilities in global justice as a matter of duty.
Chapter 5, then, elucidates the issue further and explains what non-ideal 
theory is. On the one hand, there is the “moral” view that TNCs ought to be 
responsible for some of the global injustices in the world as a matter of duty. On 
the other hand, there is the “strictly business” view that the sole responsibility of 
a company is to maximise profits and shareholder value. TNCs, then, appear to 
face a dilemma -  what I call the “CSR dilemma”. This raises the second question 
stated at the beginning, namely, ‘If the business of business is business, why 
should it care about global justice?’ I argue that the widespread failure in global 
justice to recognise the extent to which what I describe as the “business case for 
CSR” shapes corporations’ choice of CSR issues and delineates the boundaries of 
CSR, causes and/or perpetuates a historical and ideational exclusion of 
corporations in global justice. This, in turn, represents a great loss for the poor. 
The normative challenge for global justice, therefore, is to find a way of 
theorizing the business case for CSR, that is, where the “moral” and the “strictly 
business” views overlap and where companies “do well by doing good”. This, I 
suggest, better reflects the social reality of what TNCs are doing. Drawing from 
the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, I offer some methodological principles for 
doing this. I explain what non-ideal theory is and why I think that it is the best 
methodology for this purpose. Theorizing about the role of corporations in global 
justice, I conclude, involves theorizing the non-ideal.
In this regard, I suggest that there are lessons to be learned from some 
non-idealists, particularly those who emphasize the business case for CSR. In 
chapter 6 ,1 provide a descriptive account of the business case for CSR from the 
point of view of some non-idealists, that is, theorists (for example, economists
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and CSR and business practitioners) who have conducted extensive empirical 
research on how CSR and the economic performance of firms are linked. I argue 
that this account, although descriptive, is important for our normative theorizing, 
because it provides empirical support for the need to theorize the business case 
for CSR in particular, and offers empirical evidence for the need to theorize about 
the role of corporations in global justice in general. Hence, this chapter is devoted 
to the task of laying an empirical foundation for the theory of CSR developed in 
this thesis.
I am aware that the promise to deliver a coherent theory of CSR within a single 
text is a big one. For this reason, a large portion of this thesis is devoted to 
addressing the challenges that developing such a theory might raise. Also, I do 
not ask the reader to rest content on mere abstract reflections, but throughout the 
text as well as in chapter 6, illustrate my arguments with reference to concrete 
developments in practice and to various case studies that detail the role and 
impact that TNCs are making on various global social issues -  with a particular 
focus on poverty and the problem of child labour.
In our time, the pressing task of political theory becomes not only 
offering normative arguments that justify the role of TNCs in global justice, but 
also action-guiding arguments that can generate practical principles to help 
corporations navigate the tightrope between their business and their social 
responsibilities. In an increasingly complex world where corporations are facing 
an increasing number of demands on them from different directions, and where 
their decisions affect an increasing number of people in an increasingly 
globalised world, the ability of a theory of CSR to provide principles that can 
guide corporations in their actions and decisions becomes even more important. 
In this thesis, I hope to offer a systematic account of how we might respond to 
this challenge and begin to think about CSR and the role of TNCs in global 
justice.
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1What is global justice, and how do TNCs fit in? A critical 
review of three cosmopolitan approaches and an 
alternative suggested
What is the role of TNCs in global justice? In addressing the question, our 
answer depends at first glance on what we imagine ‘global justice’ to be. In 
particular, a right conception of what an ideal just global order looks like can act 
like a map that enables us to locate where and how TNCs fit in as agents of 
justice, if at all. In order to begin formulating an answer, then, it seems logical to 
start by asking the following questions: How can we best structure our world in a 
way that best serves human interests?17 What political institutions should we 
choose to sustain or establish in order to best further the claims of each and every 
human being as free and equal individuals? More importantly, what is the 
approach that will shape our answers to these questions? That is, what kind of 
normative reasons can we give for our conception of an ideal just global order, 
and how do TNCs fit in?
This chapter starts the ball rolling by, firstly, providing an argument in 
section 1.1 for locating the discussion about CSR in the context of global justice 
rather than the traditional context of business ethics. This serves to outline the 
intellectual framework for the rest of the chapter.
Within the context of global justice, the particular brand of global justice 
conducive to a discussion of CSR is prima facie a cosmopolitan one. I say “prima 
facie” because, as we shall see, the various ways in which cosmopolitans have 
tried to carve out a conceptual space in political theory that is conducive to a 
conception of global just agency which includes TNCs, are problematic. Broadly- 
speaking, adopting a cosmopolitan conception of global justice means that the 
discussion of TNC engagement in issues of global justice happens within a
17 Although the question is framed provisionally as an instrumental one here, the results-based 
approach is rejected later on (see fn 43).
- 2 0 -
framework of international liberalism that advocates a pluralized understanding 
of agency in global justice which is essentially non-state-centric. That is, what is 
envisioned is an ideal just global order that includes actors other than states and 
individuals, like TNCs. But this needs explanation as well as qualification. There 
is no one distinctive or complete moral conception of cosmopolitan global 
justice, and cosmopolitans themselves are agnostic about much of the content of 
cosmopolitan global justice. An indication of this is that a wide range of 
normative positions might count as cosmopolitan, so long as they espouse as a 
foundational requirement the moral worth of every person as a free and equal 
individual. These positions, in turn, can be constructed in different ways for the 
justification of a range of political structures. So “the bare idea of the 
cosmopolitan is too protean” to settle the question (Beitz, 2005: 18).
This chapter, then, expands on the concept of cosmopolitan global 
justice by examining it through the lens of the topic of CSR. In the following 
three sections 1.2 to 1.4, I provide a critical review of three cosmopolitan 
approaches to conceptualizing an ideal just global order, what I call the ‘extreme 
cosmopolitan position’, the ‘strong cosmopolitan position’, and the ‘weak 
cosmopolitan position’. The first posits the claim that cosmopolitanism results in 
a non-state-based world order, the second that global justice is achieved through 
radical reforms to create a ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ composing of state and non­
state actors, and the third that a cosmopolitan conception of global just agency 
entails a balance between our special responsibilities and global responsibilities. 
In each section, I explain why these three approaches are problematic when it 
comes to locating the site of cosmopolitan global justice in which TNCs may 
feature.
The focus of the discussion trains on the normative reasoning that leads 
to these particular cosmopolitan end-states of the world. My core argument is that 
the three cosmopolitan approaches beg the central questions of corporate just 
agency by adopting at the outset a ‘thinly cosmopolitan’ conception of the basic 
political units that legitimately make up a just global order and form the basis of 
modem political theory and political science. They are ‘thinly cosmopolitan’, 
either because they do not result in practicable schemes, or because they do not
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move away enough from a formally statist position that allows no place for 
corporations, or because they cannot do so without placing a wider arbitrary 
restriction on the domain of global just agency. In other words, the three 
cosmopolitan approaches are ‘thinly cosmopolitan’ because they are not 
practicable, or not genuinely, or not sufficiently “cosmopolitan”. In turn, this 
problem casts doubt over the veracity of the normative reasons that underpin their 
respective constructions of a cosmopolitan just global order that includes TNCs. 
Thin cosmopolitanism, then, represents a feature of the problem with the concept 
of cosmopolitan global justice itself.
Once an account of the problem reflected in the concept of cosmopolitan 
global justice is explicated, it points the way to an alternative conception that 
solves the problem. In section 1.5, I argue that the correct conception of 
cosmopolitan global justice in which TNCs feature should not begin with asking 
what a ‘cosmopolitan just global order’ looks like and then trying to fit TNCs in. 
That is to say, the way to begin thinking about why TNCs should be agents of 
justice in a just global order lies not, in fact, in trying to carve out a conceptual 
space for ‘cosmopolitan global justice’. Instead of staking our claim on various 
versions of global justice -  whether extreme cosmopolitan or strong 
cosmopolitan or weak cosmopolitan (or even anti-cosmopolitan) -  depending on 
which particular agent(s) of justice we wish to promote, I argue in conclusion that 
a better approach to conceptualizing the role of TNCs in global justice lies in 
asking a more basic question: What is responsibility? Only when we have a 
rigorous conception of what responsibility is, I argue, will we be able to construct 
an agent-centred account of who is responsible.
1.1. An alternative framework for CSR
In engaging the issue of CSR, I have intentionally avoided the traditional 
philosophical stomping ground of business ethics. Instead, I have set the 
discussion about CSR firmly in the context of the global justice agenda. The 
reason is that I believe that the notions of ‘business ethics’ and ‘CSR’ should be 
distinguished from each other. The distinction that I have in mind here is between 
how companies ought to behave towards others ethically-speaking, and what
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justice requires of them outside their business agenda. The distinction essentially 
taps on the Rawlsian distinction between ethics and justice. ‘Ethics’ is concerned 
with the way we ought to treat each other -  that is, the principles that govern our 
moral conduct. It is not uncommon for corporations nowadays to engage in some 
form of business ethics rhetoric or another as standard practice. In the business 
ethics literature, several normative theories have been developed to underpin the 
claim that companies ought to ensure that they conduct their businesses morally 
according to what is good. What is “good” is, in turn, arrived at by applying 
Aristotelian virtue ethics (Solomon, 1992a; 1992b), or using Kantian ethics and 
Rawls’ theory of justice to justify a stakeholder theory of the firm, viz., why 
stakeholders in the company should treat each other morally (Freeman, 1984; 
1994; 2002; Bowie, 1999a; 1999b; Donaldson and Dunfee, 1995; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Evans and Freeman, 1993). Business ethics, then, concerns itself 
with the principles that govern one’s moral conduct towards others.
‘Justice’, on the other hand, is not so much concerned with one’s moral 
relations with others, as it is with the way our social world ought to be structured 
-  that is, the principles by which the laws and practices that regulate our human 
interaction are assessed. Given a particular conception of justice then, a theory of 
CSR based on justice asks whether, why and how corporations fit in. The moral 
responsibilities of corporations, in this sense, derive from the demands of justice, 
as opposed to emanating from some ideal conception of a moral corporate entity. 
The pressing question, of course, is what a just theory of CSR that balances the 
normative needs of the poor and the function of corporations to maximise profits 
and shareholder value looks like: Why should corporations be agents of justice in 
our ideal of a just society or world? If the business of business is business, why 
should it care about justice?
Another crude way of distinguishing ‘justice’ from ‘ethics’ is to say that 
discussions about ethics are conducted within the confines of moral philosophy, 
whereas justice is concerned with questions of political theory. I say “crude” 
because, ultimately, justice is concerned, at its most “basic” level (Beitz, 1994: 
125), with the way we stand in certain moral relations to one another. While it 
may be primarily concerned about the justice of the institutional schemes that
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govern our moral conduct and the way society ought to be structured, nonetheless 
the ultimate unit of moral concern is said to be the human individual. In other 
words, the distinction does not mean that justice and ethics are incompatible. It 
merely points to different orders of responsibility lying “within the [same] 
domain of the moral (Pogge, 1992a: 50), and that the concerns of justice are “not 
reducible to individual morality” (Caney, 2005: 2).
There are important reasons why I have presented an alternative 
framework for CSR based on justice rather than ethics here. Firstly, my concern 
is primarily with poverty and development. So instead of talking abstractly about 
doing business “ethically”, the focus is specifically on the role of corporations in 
alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable development in the world’s poorest 
communities. This latches onto the literature on global justice, a lot of which 
focuses on addressing the issue of poverty on a world-wide scale. In this regard, 
the discussion about CSR is domain-specific and company-specific. It is domain- 
specific because, as mentioned, it draws specifically on theories of global justice. 
That is, it is not concerned with domestic justice falling within the boundaries of 
any particular society or state or nation or peoples, but rather with the principles 
of justice that should govern the global domain. We shall return to the idea of 
global justice in the next section.18 The discussion is also company-specific, since 
it is concerned with carving out a role for transnational corporations in global 
justice. That is, it focuses on companies that operate across borders. Case studies 
indicate that they are more likely than small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to be implicated in issues of global justice.
Secondly, recent developments in the study of poverty suggest that 
poverty alleviation engages issues of justice more than it does issues of ethics. 
Today, we know that the causes of poverty are more complex than we thought. 
World poverty is not just the outcome of corruption and the failure of the 
governments in poor countries, but also of the way our social world and its 
institutions are structured. Today, we also know that poverty creates other
18 The term global also signifies a distinction with international political theory - the latter being 
traditionally associated with state-centric approaches and the former referring to cosmopolitan 
approaches.
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injustices -  not only that the poor are poor, but that being poor leads to various 
forms of social exclusion which need to be addressed. This means that the 
poverty agenda must encompass a broad range of mechanisms not only to combat 
poverty itself, but also address its wider consequences. All these facts mean that a 
paradigm shift in our thinking about world poverty is needed: (1) We can no 
longer see the world’s poor as merely “aid victims”, or “discuss our moral 
obligations mainly in [ethical] terms of donations and transfers, assistance and 
redistribution”. (Pogge, 2004: 260). This means moving away from the idea of 
poverty alleviation as merely a matter of foreign aid between agent and recipient, 
and consequently, the idea of CSR as merely a form of individual corporate 
altruism and philanthropy. Instead, we need to be addressing the justice of the 
social structures that create and sustain poverty. (2) We must acknowledge and 
accept that altruism alone is simply not enough. A broader agenda for poverty 
alleviation is needed, one that engages in social change and sustainable 
development, not just assistance and aid. In other words, what is needed is “an 
analysis from the broader perspective of political philosophy” as opposed to 
seeing poverty through “the simple individualist lens of a purportedly ‘practical 
ethics’” (Kuper, 2005c: 170). Accordingly, the same logic that moves the poverty 
agenda from the question of aid to the question of development compels us to 
move the idea of CSR beyond the narrow domain of business ethics, or to 
defining it merely in terms of corporate altruism and philanthropy. Instead, the 
more interesting story lies in analysing the strategic role corporations can and 
should play in developing and securing a more just world society.
Thirdly, a survey of the business ethics literature will show that it appeals 
in almost all instances to ideas about morality that have traditionally been applied 
to human individuals. The concern is that applying these ideas to corporate 
entities leads to all sorts of conceptual problems about the corporate form, 
specifically whether the corporate entity is or can be a moral agent. Some argue 
that moral responsibility can attach, not just to individuals, but to corporate 
entities (French, 1984; Pettit, 2007). Others who adopt a methodologically 
individualistic view, reject any “reified” or “organic” conception of a corporate 
collectivity apart from its individual members (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).
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While such philosophical questions are important in themselves, there seems to 
be an over-emphasis on the ontology of the corporate form (Kreide, 2007b). 
There is a danger that dwelling on these sorts of questions too much detracts from 
the more compelling question of what TNCs should, can and are already doing 
for the global poor. Corporations have demonstrated themselves capable of 
changing their behaviour in response to external demands of the market. 
Moreover, it is widely accepted that the corporate entities have separate legal 
personalities apart from the individual members who make them up under the 
law.19 A company can own property on its own behalf,20 and may sue and be
*71sued in its own name. In the United States, even the question of whether a
99company has rights under the constitution has been raised. A company is also 
immortal (that is, it lasts until it is properly wound up or struck off the register). 
Its identity persists independently of any change in the shareholding of the
9*1
company’s individual members, and it survives even if all its members and 
controllers die.24 So there are many practical reasons why a “commonsense” 
approach to corporate agency should be adopted. In practice at least, the 
overwhelming consensus is of a corporation as a separate entity created by law, 
with its own personality and capacities. Moreover, the increasing role that 
corporations play in the international human rights regime seems to have created 
a climate conducive to the normative discussion of the moral responsibilities of
19 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (House o f Lords); Lee v L ee’s Air Farming Ltd  
[1961] AC 12 (Privy Council on appeal from New Zealand).
20 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd  [1925] AC 619 (House o f Lords).
21 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 (Vice-Chancellor’s Court, England); Daimler Co L td  v 
Continental Tyre & Rubber Co (Great Britain) L td  [1916] 2 AC 307 (House o f Lords). The 
separate personality o f the company is not to be disregarded in this respect even if  it is wholly 
controlled by the persons sought to be made liable: Rainham Chemical Works Ltd  v Belvedere 
Fish Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465:475 per  Lord Buckmaster (House o f Lords).
22 The issue was tested in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Nike, Inc. v Marc 
Kasky (14 October 2002), which involves a company’s rights to freedom o f speech under the First 
Amendment. The case was settled out o f court in September 2003.
23 Abdul Aziz b Atan v Ladang Rengo Malay Estate Sdn Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 165 (High Court, 
Malaysia).
24 Re Noel Tedman Holdings Pty Ltd  [1967] QdR 561 (Supreme Court, Queensland).
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corporations: “Because they affect people’s lives in massive, not marginal ways, 
corporations are being said to bear some responsibility for their actions” (Kreide, 
2007b: 7, 8). Given this, it seems natural to propose an alternative discussion 
about CSR that acknowledges this moral dimension to the corporation, bypassing 
the ontological questions that remain indeterminate, and going straight on to the 
normative consideration of their responsibilities. Casting the discussion in the 
context of global justice and the role of TNCs therein, rather than business ethics, 
allows the discussion to move forward thus -  particularly since, as it has been 
observed, “a corporation does not turn into a moral person simply because one 
recognises its obligations of justice” (Kreide, 2007b: 14).
Given the focus on political justice, then, the central moral question that 
this thesis focuses on is not what duties TNCs owe to the very poor, ethically- 
speaking. Rather, the question it asks is why, on principle, TNCs should be 
agents of justice in an ideal just global order. This, in turn, depends in part on 
how we think an ideal just global order should be structured, what political actors 
it should consist of, so as to best further the claims of each and every human 
being as free and equal individuals -  and why. The central issue, then, is about 
just agency -  specifically, the normative reasoning that motivates the 
identification of different basic political units, which in turn generates theories 
with different normative content. Different theories offer their own perfectionistic 
conception of an ideal just global order consisting of certain political institutions 
that achieve the political ideals that they uphold. Which political institutions, 
however, and why TNCs, is the question.
Within the context of global justice, the particular brand of global justice
Ofconducive to a discussion of CSR is prima facie a cosmopolitan one. At the 
very heart of the matter, cosmopolitanism “is opposed to a view that posits 
principled restrictions on the scope of an adequate conception of justice”
25 See supra fn 17.
26 On a point o f terminology, it is worth noting again that this is why the more traditional term of 
international justice is eschewed in favour o f global justice here. As mentioned previously, the 
former phrase is almost always employed to refer to the ethical relations between states and/or a 
just international order in which states are the only agents o f justice o f moral and political 
importance (Caney, 2005: 2). Cosmopolitans, therefore, tend to favour the latter phrase.
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(Scheffler, 1999: 256). Cosmopolitans, therefore, reject realist or nationalist or 
other state-centric arguments, which argue that the state or a state-based world 
order is or will be (with reform) sufficient to secure the political ideals that 
cosmopolitans invoke, but without the risk of concentrating absolute power in 
non-state-based global political institutions.27 Cosmopolitans argue that global 
political institutions are, in fact, necessary to secure political justice. With 
regard to a theory of CSR, adopting a cosmopolitan conception of global justice 
means that the discussion of TNC agency in global poverty alleviation happens 
within a framework of international liberalism that advocates a pluralized 
understanding of agency in global justice -  that is, a just global order made up of 
not just states and individuals, but various other non-state, non-person actors like 
TNCs (Beitz, 1999b).
So what is cosmopolitan global justice, and how do TNCs fit in? In the 
following three sections 1.2 to 1.4, I provide a critical review of three 
cosmopolitan approaches to restructuring the global basic order, what I call the 
‘extreme cosmopolitan position’, the ‘strong cosmopolitan position’, and the 
‘weak cosmopolitan position’. The first posits the claim that cosmopolitanism 
results in a non-state-based world order, the second that global justice is achieved 
through radical reforms to create a ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ composing of state 
and non-state actors, and the third that a cosmopolitan conception of global just 
agency entails a balance between our special responsibilities and global 
responsibilities. In each section, I explain why these three approaches are 
problematic when it comes to locating the site of cosmopolitan global justice in 
which TNCs may feature.
27 Caney (2005) provides a comprehensive taxonomy o f the traditional state-centric theories. This 
includes three possible camps: (i) those who affirm that states should pursue their national 
interests (an ethical claim) and do in fact pursue their own interests in practice (an empirical 
claim) (“realists”), (ii) those who subscribe to a ‘society of states’ view -  that is, the idea o f a just 
international order comprising of an association or international “society” in which states (or if 
we adopt Rawls’ terminology, “decent peoples”) accept that they have moral duties to other states 
(or decent peoples), and (iii) those who hold the view that nationality carries with it special 
obligations, and that these special obligations have ethical significance (“nationalists”) (7-16). 
Beitz (1999a) posits a similar taxonomy.
28 Although some cosmopolitans, like Caney (2005), endorse the weaker claim that they are 
insufficient because, as he argues, in a transnational democratic culture, a cosmopolitan global 
order should go hand in hand with a global civil society (Caney, 2005: 173).
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1.2. The extreme cosmopolitan position :
A supra-state cosmopolitan court for CSR
Some cosmopolitans argue that a cosmopolitan world view results in a supra- 
state world order. In his article A Cosmopolitan Court For Transnational 
Corporate Wrongdoing (1998), Jackson argues for such a non-state-based world 
governing body to oversee and adjudicate wrongdoing on the part of TNCs 
(Jackson, 1998). The conception of a cosmopolitan court for transnational 
corporate wrongdoing that he presents is of an international court whose function 
is to adjudicate corporate liability at the global level, covering both civil and 
criminal jurisdictions. He posits its functions as follows: (i) to enable victims 
from weak or failed states who are harmed by TNC activities to sue for damages 
which would otherwise be unavailable to them (what he calls ‘compensatory 
justice’), (ii) to adjudicate conflicting judgments from different domestic courts 
and conflicts between regional legal blocs (what he calls ‘procedural justice’), 
(iii) to criminally sanction TNCs for committing internationally recognised 
crimes (what he calls ‘retributive justice’), and (iv) to level the playing field 
between different domestic legal systems with varying abilities to regulate TNCs, 
and to interpret norms and set global minimum standards for corporate behaviour 
(what he calls ‘distributive justice’) (Jackson, 1998: 759, 762). The court is 
envisioned as a supra-state, neutral and objective jurisdiction, free from politics, 
accessible to victims from less developing countries, with the power to interpret 
norms and set global minimum standards for corporate behaviour, as well as to 
impose sanctions such as fines and probation29 in cases of corporate non- 
compliance. Let us examine Jackson’s four points in turn.
Firstly, I am not persuaded that a supra-state world court is necessary or 
advantageous for victims of corporate injustice. I think that domestic legal 
systems are adequate and sufficient to meet the functions that it is hoped such a 
court will serve. Firstly, access to civil courts for victims from less developing 
countries can be obtained without recourse to such a court. For example, the
29 Conditions o f corporate probation may include requiring the firm to publicize its conviction 
and punishment, to have periodic, unannounced reviews of its books and records, interrogation o f  
its employees etc.
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Alien Torts Contract Act (1789) (“ATCA”) grants jurisdiction to US Federal 
Courts over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
1 A
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”. Recent developments have 
seen an increasing number of individuals using ATCA to sue corporations for 
violations of international law in countries outside the US. Although, jurisdiction 
is confined to American courts for the moment, ATCA demonstrates that access 
to the judicial machinery for distant and underprivileged victims is possible 
without recourse to a supra-state court. Moreover, the actual impact of ATCA 
law suits does not lie in winning; more than anything else, it is about forcing a 
settlement with the company in question, and about generating publicity over
international corporate human rights abuses, forcing a political debate about the
•  ^1 issues, and making TNCs focus more stringently on accountability. Thus,
although no action brought under ATCA against a TNC has actually reached a
hearing to date, this is because most cases have been settled out of court. Thus, in
these aims, ATCA has been very successful.
Secondly, the argument that a supra-state world court would provide the
kind of procedural justice envisioned by Jackson is a non-starter. Jackson’s worry
is that determining corporate civil and criminal jurisdiction is “often a
complicated and controversial matter”, and that “the internal governance
structure of corporations are not adequately equipped to deal with the
complicated process of conflict resolution that international ethics demands”
(Jackson, 1998: 759, 773). Thus, a supra-state court would provide TNCs with a
sort of “one-stop” extra-jurisdictional legal recourse to clarify the ethical
standards that they are held to. Furthermore, those who argue for a supra-state
30 In 2004, the US Supreme Court, in response to an amicus brief submitted by the International 
Chamber of Commerce and major American business groups calling for clarification o f ATCA 
because it allegedly “interfered with international investment flows and US foreign relations” and 
was “an unacceptable extraterritorial extension o f US jurisdiction”, ruled that foreign citizens 
would be allowed to bring cases to American courts under ATCA (Sosa v Alvarez-Machian 124 
S. Ct. 2739 (2004)). This has mostly led to human rights cases being brought by foreign nationals 
against TNCs for human rights violations, and it empowers judges to decide which international 
legal standards should apply in particular cases, and whether the conduct in question violated 
those standards.
31 Global Policy Forum articles on ATCA: 
http.V/www.globalpo licv.org/intliustice/atca/atcaindx.htm.
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court point out that parties in international business contracts also benefit, 
because they are not subject to the variances of biased or incapable domestic 
courts. However, these arguments do not prove that a supra-state court is 
necessary for the following reasons: (1) There is already a procedure in place. 
Almost every law student has to study what lawyers call ‘the conflicts of law’ in 
law school -  that is, the procedure of working out which jurisdiction a case falls 
within. (2) The procedure may be complicated, but it is not impossible. No one 
should presume that justice has easy answers. (3) Contractual parties ideally 
function in a free market. If they choose to do business in a state where the 
government and law courts are weak or failed, then they should be willing to bear 
the risk that the domestic courts will be biased or otherwise ill-equipped to 
handle complex issues that arise from their transaction (although, admittedly, 
some corporations use that to their advantage). Moreover, they would presumably 
have lawyers (who are presumably familiar with the conflicts of law) to draft 
contracts that protect them jurisdictionally. It is incumbent on those who argue 
for a supra-state court to prove, in this case, that it is procedurally necessary and 
that the existing legal infrastructure is insufficient. On both counts, this has not 
been proven for the reasons given.
Thirdly, holding TNCs criminally liable for wrongdoings in a supra- 
state world court presumes the existence of an established body of international 
penal law that can apply to corporations.32 At the moment, there are a number of 
tribunals in existence which have international jurisdiction, but only with respect 
to inter-state disputes and human rights violations.33 None of these international 
institutions exercise criminal jurisdiction over corporate crimes or corporations. 
Moreover, where international business law exists, it pertains mostly to
32 This is distinct from the civil law o f torts that tribunals relying on ATCA, for example, draw 
on.
33The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), for example, exercises jurisdiction over disputes, but 
only disputes as between states; it is not open to private individuals or to corporations. Other 
supra-state institutions like the European Court o f Justice (“ECJ”), the European Court o f Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court o f Human Rights exercise jurisdiction over criminal matters, 
but only with regard to human rights violations (or, in the case o f the ECJ, violation o f EU law) 
by member states, not individuals or corporations.
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intellectual property, which falls under non-criminal jurisdictions.34 A supra- 
ciourt for transnational corporate crimes would, therefore, require the creation of 
international criminal legislation that can apply to corporations which does not 
yet exist (for example, international anti-bribery legislation), and/or the 
implementation of existing criminal legislation against corporations which does 
mot yet apply internationally. It is also worth noting that the abovementioned 
international tribunals exercise their jurisdictions only on the basis of treaties 
entered into by states (for example, under the UN Charter), and even then, their 
jurisdictions are only invoked by virtue of the parties’ consent. In other words, 
tlheir jurisdiction is consensual, not compulsory. So even if the problem of the 
lack of international corporate criminal legislation could be overcome, it would 
be difficult to imagine any corporation submitting themselves to criminal liability 
voluntarily in the same way. So perhaps, in the final analysis, the biggest problem 
that the proposal for a cosmopolitan criminal court for corporate wrongdoing 
faces is not necessity or viability -  although these are big problems in themselves 
— but simply one of motivation. Why would TNCs voluntarily subject 
themselves to the jurisdiction of a criminal court?
Finally, there is an argument that a supra-state world court for 
transnational corporate wrongdoing will level the playing field. The idea here is 
that corporate liability that currently falls under domestic legal systems operate in 
“a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and sometimes multilateral arrangements which 
are subject to numerous political tensions and diplomatic conflicts, requiring 
compromises and negotiations that frequently interfere with the objectives of 
justice, fairness and due process of the law” (Jackson, 1998: 757). Conversely, a 
supra-state court would, ideally-speaking, be able to render judgment at a level 
above often politicized issues waged between sovereign states. There are two 
assumptions behind this argument. Firstly, it assumes that politicking is a bad 
thing. But why should this be the case? There has been no evidence provided to 
suggest that political and diplomatic power struggles lead ultimately to injustice.
34 For example, the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Bern Convention for the Protection o f Literary 
and Artistic Works, and the Madrid Protocol Concerning the International Registration o f Marks.
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If anything, it adds another layer of checks and balances, and any allegations of 
injustice caused in this way would be legitimate grounds for a mistrial or an 
appeal. Secondly, it assumes that a supra-state court will be free from politicking. 
But why should such a court be any more or less free from politics than any other 
global political institution? Contrary to Jackson, international law is “politics by 
other means” (Jackson, 1998: 772). A transnational court is not exempt from 
politics simply because its jurisdiction transcends borders. If anything, the court’s 
inception would most certainly have to be a cooperative venture as between states 
in the first place and, if the model of the ICJ and other regional courts is anything 
to go by, its jurisdiction would have to be subject to state consent. What it will 
give is an alternative voice to individuals in developing countries, an alternative 
course of action against alleged wrongdoings by corporations. This does level the 
playing field to a certain extent. But it would be naive to claim that the legal 
process in such a court would be free from politics.
In any case, Jackson never intended his proposed cosmopolitan court for 
transnational corporate wrongdoing to wield absolute power in corporate 
disputes. Indeed, he emphasizes that it is to be “supplemental” to the domestic 
courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms (Jackson, 1998: 772). However, 
he is vague on how this balance of power is supposed to be struck. Also, this 
means that it is unlikely that a case would reach an international court without 
having gone through the domestic legal system first. So state sovereignty will 
always be an issue, and it is hard to imagine how the cosmopolitan court for 
transnational corporate wrongdoing would be non-state-based. Moreover, there 
are other legitimate practical questions to ask about such a supra-state court, for 
example, whether and how it would have the “teeth” to enforce its judgments 
against corporations. For all these reasons, I argue that the empirical case has not 
been made for a supra-state cosmopolitan court for transnational corporate 
wrongdoing. Such a court is, for the reasons given, both impractical and 
unnecessary to achieving justice. Thus, the extreme cosmopolitan approach is 
‘thinly cosmopolitan’ here because it does not result in a practicable scheme.
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Moreover, we need to be aware of what the normative trade-offs are of 
such a proposal. In question here is a cosmopolitan line of reasoning that focuses 
on the creation of a “community of law” that takes the form of “a borderless 
world through the establishment of laws, rules, procedures, and institutions that 
will gradually supersede particular sovereignties and political loyalties... a world 
in which global standards of justice are virtually applied universally, without 
restriction by particular states or local laws” (Dahbour, 2005: 203). According to 
Jackson, the advantage of such a supra-state world court is that it approximates 
equality in relations of power between states, and avoids the forms of social 
organisation that sustain the exploitation of weak states. A normative political 
theory that advocates an extreme cosmopolitan position would, it is argued, 
address these “considerations of political sociology” which political theory 
cannot evade (Nielsen, 1983: 609). However, it is equally possible that an 
extreme cosmopolitan position would conversely make the problem of 
domination by certain hegemonic states worse. If this were the case, it would at 
the same time erode the sovereignty of other states. The point here is that state 
sovereignty itself has value: the principle at stake in developing the sovereignty 
doctrine and upholding the legitimacy of states it that of peace, of preventing war 
and conflict between different communities (Dahbour, 2004). However, a 
cosmopolitan theory of global justice that seeks to transcend the state -  in this 
case, by the establishment of a supra-state world court -  would be de-legitimizing 
state sovereignty in the name of cosmopolitan principles of human rights. So the 
proper question to ask is this: Why is state sovereignty a less important goal than 
cosmopolitanism?
Adopting a cosmopolitan worldview necessitates moving away from a 
categorically state-centric position. But, as I have argued in this section, the other 
extreme which claims that a cosmopolitan conception of global justice results in a 
supra-state or non-state-based world order -  in this case, a cosmopolitan court 
governing transnational corporate wrongdoing, whether civil or criminal -  is 
problematic; in fact, most cosmopolitans explicit reject this claim (Caney, 2005: 
165). Between the two extremes then -  that is, statism and a supra-state world 
order -  there lies a spectrum of possibilities for a middle ground to be struck.
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Herein, I think, lies the site of cosmopolitan global justice. Let us consider two 
such cosmopolitan positions.
1.3. The strong cosmopolitan position:
Plurarchic sovereignty and responsive representation in the UN
One methodology used by philosophers to locate this cosmopolitan middle 
ground is to distinguish between two forms of cosmopolitanism: Samuel 
Scheffler discriminates between ‘extreme’ and ‘moderate’ views of 
cosmopolitanism (1999b), Simon Caney between ‘radical’ and ‘mild’ 
cosmopolitanism (2001) or ‘ambitious’ and ‘modest’ cosmopolitanism (2005), 
and David Miller between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ (1998). Here, I shall adopt the 
terms ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ cosmopolitanism. Weak cosmopolitanism is the belief 
that there are global principles of justice that generate moral obligations between 
all individuals regardless of their proximity to each other. Strong 
cosmopolitanism goes one step further and claims additionally that there are no 
state- or nation-wide domestic principles of justice: “state boundaries can have 
derivative, but they cannot have fundamental, moral importance” (Caney, 2005: 
105).35 How do these distinct cosmopolitan approaches translate into conceptions 
of a just global order? And how do TNCs fit in?
An active advocate of the strong cosmopolitan position is Andrew Kuper. 
In his book Democracy Beyond Borders (2004a) and several other places, he 
argues for an extended model of representation for the core organs of the UN that 
is strongly cosmopolitan (see also Kuper, 2004b; 2005d; Ruggie et al, 2004). His 
starting point is a quote by the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali:
“The participation of new actors on the international scene is an 
acknowledged fact; providing them with agreed means of participation in 
the formal system, heretofore primarily the province of States, is the new 
task of our time.” (Boutros-Ghali, 1996: 25)
35 The quote is Charles Beitz’s (in Caney, 2001: 976), who affirms this radical view.
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Kuper’s response to this task is to suggest a new model of representation 
for the UN that, in his view, is more in keeping with the phenomenon of 
globalisation. In his proposed model, the core organs of the UN - the General 
Assembly and Security Council -  are extended so as to formally include not only 
states, but also regional and inter-governmental organisations, and non-state 
actors like international NGOs, TNCs, trade unions and professions. These non- 
state actors would first have to fulfil a set of practical criteria, whereupon each 
group would appoint a representative to sit on the Assembly or Council, the 
number of representatives totalling no more than 600 or 24 respectively. His 
proposal also lays out new election procedures and veto powers to enable 
decision-making and interaction between the representatives and institutions 
within this more complex UN structure. By including these non-state actors 
alongside state actors on a formal rather than the present consultative status 
conferred on some, sovereignty is dispersed not only vertically but also 
horizontally (Kuper, 2000). That is to say, in addition to a vertically multi­
layered institutional scheme consisting of states and regional and inter­
governmental organisations, the division of labour also extends horizontally over 
a plurality of organisations not defined by state or other territorial lines.
Kuper’s radical proposals to reform the structure of the UN are strongly 
cosmopolitan because, if implemented, these reforms effectively tie the hands of 
states from exercising their veto purely along the lines of national interest - or, at 
least, their veto power is significantly circumscribed. In other words, it shifts the 
boundaries of justice away from the state both by being inclusive of certain non­
state actors, as well as exclusive of any “domination by a majority coalition of 
illiberal and anti-democratic states, by hegemonic rich and powerful states, o r... 
by a fitful combination of the two” (Kuper, 2004a: 171). In more formal terms, 
Kuper’s new model is strongly cosmopolitan because it results in a legally 
sanctioned political framework in which all of the properties of sovereign
36 Kuper lists these criteria as (i) basicness (i.e. concerned with basic human interests), (ii) 
inclusiveness, (iii) distributive subsidiarity (i.e. concerned with some kind o f global shared 
interest better pursued at a global level o f governance), (iv) democratic control (i.e. 
democratically run), (v) permanence, (vi) non-deception (i.e. transparent), (vii) audit, (viii) non­
dependence (i.e. receiving funding from a variety o f sources), and (ix) non-partisanship (i.e. no 
conflict o f interests with their UN role).
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statehood are relaxed, as opposed to just one or two. According to the properties 
identified by Caney (2005: 149-152), it is a political framework in which 
membership is not ‘territorially defined’, where the political units lack 
‘comprehensive authority’ (that is, authority over all issues, not only some), and 
no political institution has ‘absolute and final authority’.
Twin cosmopolitan arguments work together to underpin this radical 
transformation of the UN for Kuper: ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ and ‘responsive 
democracy’. ‘Plurarchic sovereignty’ is the argument that the tasks of political 
governance, and hence the division of responsibilities, should be divided along 
functional rather than territorial lines. Kuper offers several bases for this 
argument. Firstly, the phenomenon of globalisation has significantly changed the
“xnnature of global interaction. Many issues now transcend territorial boundaries - 
for example, crime on the internet, environmental protection, the problem of 
child and sex trafficking. Hence, the spheres of actions are also different, what 
Kuper calls “non-territorial spaces of interaction” are playing an increasingly 
significant role in human affairs (2004a: 31). Hence also, our conception of a just 
global order must change in order to put in place non-territorially-based political 
agents who are able to better regulate these non-territorially-based spheres of 
action. The re-construal of political identities along functional rather than 
traditional territorial lines merely reflects the re-construal of the spheres of action 
in a globalised world.38 In a changing world with changing needs, the idea of 
sticking to a global order based only on states is no longer traditional but, rather, 
“arbitrary” (Kuper, 2004a: 165).
37 David Held identifies five ways in which the notion o f self-governing states is “disjunct” from 
the reality of an increasingly interdependent world because o f globalisation: (i) The development 
and expansion o f international law, (ii) the increasing power and influence o f  international 
institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, the UN, the WTO, the EU, over people’s lives, (iii) the 
impact o f supra-national military institutions like NATO, (iv) the way in which cultures are 
increasingly influenced by other cultures, compounded by increasingly borderless media and 
communications networks, and (v) economic globalisation, particularly in financial markets and 
the multi-national operations o f TNCs (Held, 1995).
38 The phrase “reconstrual o f political identities” is attributable to O’Neill (1997).
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On the other hand, do the winds of globalisation necessarily call for 
radical reform of the global basic structure? Traditionally, the non-territorial 
spaces of interaction that Kuper identifies have been filled by inter-govemmental 
organisations and global civil society (made up of NGOs, social movements and 
other non-state, issue-based actors). For example, trans-border crimes like sex 
and drugs trafficking, money-laundering, intellectual property crime, and 
terrorism are addressed by inter-govemmental agencies like Interpol. The UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which has 21 field offices and 500 staff 
members worldwide, coordinates research and supports states in responding to 
the inter-related issues of drugs trafficking, international terrorism and 
corruption. Many states are, in turn, party to multilateral UN conventions and 
protocols that regulate how these trans-border crimes should be addressed. UN- 
led initiatives like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which is made up of governmental representatives and independent scientists, 
also play a supporting role in providing information and assessment to aid policy­
makers in their decision-making on environmental issues. Many have, in 
addition, pointed to the success of global civil society in lobbying international 
institutions and states on global issues ranging from corruption to climate change 
to child labour. These organisations “have as their primary purpose the promotion 
of social and/or environmental goals rather than the achievement of economic 
power in the marketplace of political power through the electoral process” 
(Murphy & Bendell, 1999: 6). Indeed, campaigning bodies actively representing 
the interests of individuals, consumer associations, charities, single-interest 
groups and NGOs are credited with being the main driver for the rise in CSR 
(Owen, 2002; O’Mahony, 2004). These modem strategies are particularly 
significant where the state is weak or otherwise incapable of tackling the issues. 
In other words, the trans-border issues that Kuper is concerned about seem to be 
addressed by the current global just agency structure already.
In reply, other strong cosmopolitans like Simon Caney (2005) argue that 
the current status quo of ‘state and state-based bodies plus global civil society’ is 
not enough. It is insufficient because formal governance and power still resides in 
one group of actors -  states -  and “a statist order possesses certain deep structural
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features that frustrate cosmopolitan ideals” (Caney, 2005: 172). The problems are 
familiar and well-covered in the literature, including the collective action 
problem and the asymmetry of power between states. And these problems bear 
out in practice. Caney highlights the observation that the majority of NGOs 
accredited as consultants by the UN and WTO are from developed or 
industrialized countries, such that the voice of the most disadvantaged is least 
able to make itself heard. Thomas Pogge, too, has long held the view that trade 
agreements entered into by members of the state-based WTO, which are intended 
to liberalize international trade, in fact protect rich countries at the expense of 
poor countries (Pogge, 2002). The IPCC itself also been accused of climate bias, 
that it is motivated by pre-conceived agendas and political factors, on the grounds 
that scientists are quick to find what they are looking for if it means getting more 
funding from governments.39 These are but a few examples, but they weigh 
convincingly in favour of the strong cosmopolitan position: Given the apparent 
problems and uncertainties surrounding a state-centric global order, a formal 
system that does not concentrate power in one group of actors, but instead divides 
power between states and global authorities, will lead to more equitable and just 
outcomes.
Nonetheless, one might still reply that a cosmopolitan solution does not 
necessarily point its way to the radical ‘system of functionally plural sovereignty’ 
that Kuper has proposed. Before one takes that leap, there are three questions one 
needs to ask here: Firstly, are the kind of functions played by the non-state actors 
in question functions that are necessarily exercised by them as formal members 
of the UN? Secondly, are the issues in which these non-state actors can play a 
role in resolving issues that cannot be resolved apart from the UN? Thirdly, even 
if we answer ‘yes’ to the previous two questions, do they necessarily point to a 
blanket reform of the UN’s membership?
39 The debate is ongoing. As a sample of the opposing sides o f the debate, see: 
(sceptics) Open letter to the UN Secretary-General, 12th December 2007: 
http://www.n ationalpost. com/news/story.html?id=l 64002 
(anti-sceptics) Richard Black’s article for the BBC: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/! /hi/sci/tech/7092614.stm
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With regard to the first question, Kuper offers two examples, in separate 
places, of the functions that specific non-state actors exercise. First of all, he 
points to the role of certain non-state actors in plugging the “serious 
informational deficit” within the UN (Kuper, 2004a: 176). He argues that NGOs 
and TNCs are better placed, being on the ground and in the field, and face fewer 
conflicts of interests to access contextual information and to create and maintain 
up-to-date information databases on pertinent social issues, particularly within 
difficult “failed states” and “grey markets” (Kuper, 2004a: 176-177). 
Presumably, the end result is that UN action is always falling behind the ongoing 
situation. Hence, he argues for the inclusion of such “grassroots” organizations in 
the UN formal structure.
The question here is: Is it necessary for these non-state actors to be formal 
members of the UN in order for them to be the kind of grassroots-level 
information providers that Kuper thinks they can be? Article 71 of the UN 
Charter already empowers the Economic and Social Council of the UN 
(ECOSOC), which coordinates and oversees several major UN agencies 
including the Commission on Human Rights, to “make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence”. Under this Article, several NGOs now have 
accredited consultative status in one UN initiative or another, and Kuper himself 
recommends that the scheme be expanded in the short- and medium-term (Kuper, 
2004a: 175-176).
Of course, not all non-state actors exercise an informational function only. 
In a separate example, Kuper highlights the hitherto unacknowledged role that 
TNCs and NGOs have played in conflict resolution. For example, they were able 
to take effective action to curb hostilities in the war in Angola: Because the war 
was fuelled in a large part by trade in ‘conflict diamonds’, De Beers -  which was 
the world’s major corporate buyer and seller of diamonds -  entered into an 
agreement to restrict trading in these diamonds. The agreement was in turn 
initiated by the INGO, Global Witness. This agreement played a central role in 
resolving a chief cause of political instability in this situation (Kuper, 2004a: 172; 
2004b: 12-13). Similarly, corporate interests have provided some of the strongest
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incentives to resolve the conflicts in other areas as well. Given that non-state 
actors like these already play a central role alongside states in reducing and 
resolving conflict, despite not possessing characteristics of states like military 
capabilities or the capacity to tax, Kuper argues that they should be represented in 
the decision-making structures that aim at conflict resolution and maintaining 
peace.
However, can the above example not be used to show instead that the 
non-state actors in question are capable of acting outside the domain of the UN? 
Thus the second question: Are the issues in which these non-state actors can play 
a role in resolving issues that cannot be resolved apart from the UN? Kuper 
might reply by arguing that their representation alongside states in decision­
making structures that aim at conflict resolution and maintaining peace would 
lead to better coordination and more immediate responses to volatile situations 
(Kuper, 2004a: 173). However, all that these examples show is that specific 
situations call for a specific combination of actors exercising specific functions. It 
is not clear from the examples that it should result in a blanket reform of the UN. 
Kuper himself admits that some governmental functions may still “be best 
exercised within territorial demarcations” (Kuper, 2004a: 31). If this is so, then 
the question becomes which functions and which issues call for the kind of multi­
player institutional configuration that he has in mind, and which non-state actors 
to include for which issues. Without further guidance than the set of practical 
criteria that Kuper has laid out for non-state participation, there is a danger that 
the ‘plurarchic model of representation’ for the UN will be as “arbitrary” as the 
state-based model of representation for the UN. Hence, ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ 
cannot justify the radical reforms that Kuper has proposed.
The normative weight of Kuper’s argument for political globalisation, 
then, falls on his second argument, ‘responsive democracy’ (Kuper, 2004a: 75- 
136; 2004b). ‘Responsive democracy’ is the idea that democratic representation 
goes beyond the traditional electoralist and statist models. Rather, what it is after 
is “substantive representation”, that is, representation that is responsive to the 
public interest and where citizens have “a degree of ongoing, systematic and 
active control over their elected representatives”. In other words, the issue is
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more about “overall control over governance and its outcomes than about 
whether any particular agent is elected or not” (Kuper, 2004b: 16).40 Kuper also 
points out separately that it cannot be assumed that a state-based system best 
secures the interests of each and every person as free and equal individuals, 
because “the interests of all human individuals and those of the same persons 
assumed to be grouped as members of states do not necessarily coincide” (Kuper, 
2004a: 14-18). We only need to think about the specific interests of minority 
persons in a democratically-elected state for an example of this.
Substantive representation requires a complex division of labour between 
state and non-state actors. A multi-institutional system serves two purposes: it 
provides a framework in which states and non-state actors can check and balance 
one another, while at the same time collectively improving the level of 
substantive responsiveness globally. In other words, political globalisation leads 
to responsive democracy. Descriptively-speaking, it does no more than to capture 
the “system-centric” (as opposed to “agent-centric”) way in which political 
institutions function and interact in order to secure democratic representation of 
the interests and views of the public. Normatively-speaking, however, it provides 
a democratic argument for the pluralized system of governance that Kuper has 
proposed. The argument is that such a pluralized system best allows citizens to 
exercise control over the social, economic, and political forces that structure and 
govern what they can do in life -  what Simon Caney alternatively terms 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Caney, 2005: 156-159).
The concern here is that responsive democracy is only ‘thinly 
cosmopolitan’. While it provides the normative justification for a system of 
global governance that formally includes non-state actors, it does not actually 
explain why one non-state actor should be included but not the other. Kuper 
seems to identify NGOs and TNCs as the main contenders in the ‘non-state 
actors’ category for his expanded vision of UN representation, but his reasoning
40 This echoes Caney’s argument (2005: 152-164) for what he calls the ‘rights-based’ 
justification, which maintains that people must have the right to exercise control over the social, 
economic and political forces that govern what they are able to do. This is contrasted with what 
he calls the ‘intrinsic’ approach, which he rejects, which maintains that people must have the 
freedom to decide who governs them and where the boundaries o f  justice fall.
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is based entirely on the empirical assessment of their capabilities. Empirically- 
speaking, as we know, there are several functions that NGOs and TNCs can and 
do exercise which, in conjunction with state action, lead to just outcomes. 
However, these empirical reasons cannot be generalised. Instead, they represent 
specific values discoverable in TNCs and NGOs alone. The principles expressed 
by these values, therefore, justify the inclusion of TNCs and NGOs in the 
‘plurality of powers’ envisioned by Kuper, but they are not principles that can be 
deployed to justify the existence of the ‘plurality of powers’ itself. Nor can they 
be used generally to identify the other basic non-state political units that make up 
an ideal just global order. This is compounded by the problem that what 
constitutes a “non-state” actor is itself ambiguous (Alston, 2005b: 14-17).
Furthermore, because these principles apply to specific actors acting in 
specific spheres of action, they also suggest ad hoc constellations of state and 
non-state actors that are contingent on circumstances rather than on principle. So, 
rather than providing justification for radical reform of the global basic structure, 
the end result is in fact contingent on “what combination of actors produces the 
highest level of systemic responsiveness overall to the best interests and 
judgments of the public” at any given time (Kuper, 2004a: 165). Accordingly, the 
principles do not provide a complete answer to the question ‘Why TNCs?’ either. 
The answer, as things stand, turns out to be merely a phenomenological one, 
insofar as it is based on how we conceive the social world according to our 
experience. According to the phenomenological argument, TNCs should be 
included in a strongly cosmopolitan global structure because they can and have 
contributed to the achievement of global justice in specific ways. But our 
perceptions of the world can change. Not too long ago, corporations were treated 
with “visceral loathing” by theorists of justice and development (Kuper, 2004b; 
2005d). Yet, today, they are hailed as potential agents of justice by both. 
Moreover, as we have seen, these empirical reasons are no answer to the question 
‘Who else?’. Therefore, the argument is ‘thinly cosmopolitan’, because while the 
strong cosmopolitan argument for including TNCs in the radical vision for 
reform of the UN proposed here succeeds in moving away from a staunchly state- 
centric position, the normative reasoning for why one set of actors should be
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included but not another turns out, in the end, to be bounded by what we see and 
know of our present world, instead of resting on cosmopolitan principles that can 
be deployed generally.
For these reasons, the strong cosmopolitan approach that underpins 
Kuper’s expanded model of representation for the UN is ‘thinly cosmopolitan’ 
because it moves away from a state-centric position while placing a wider 
arbitrary restriction on the domain of global just agency. It is “arbitrary” and 
“restrictive” because it has as its foundation not universal principles of justice or 
any sort of normative basis, but is rather historically contingent on what we know 
about our social world. In other words, there are no generalisable principles of 
inclusion that make Kuper’s strongly cosmopolitan model of representation truly 
cosmopolitan, in the sense that it can apply to other non-state actors, not just 
TNCs and NGOs. Hence, it is ‘thinly cosmopolitan’ because it is not genuinely 
cosmopolitan in this sense.
Given the problems with the strong cosmopolitan position, is there an 
alternative cosmopolitan approach that can pick up the gauntlet? On this note, we 
turn to the weak cosmopolitan position.
1.4. The weak cosmopolitan position:
Balancing special and global responsibilities
Weak cosmopolitanism begins with an idea that all cosmopolitans, whether weak 
or strong, accept: that each person has equal moral worth. Pogge sums up the key 
features of this notion as follows:
“Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, 
individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons 
-  rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural or religious 
communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only 
indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, 
universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living 
human being equally -  not merely to some subset, such as men, 
aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality, this special
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status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone 
-  not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like.” (Pogge, 
1992: 48-9)
Individualism, universality and generality form the three pillars of 
cosmopolitan global justice. Where weak cosmopolitanism departs from strong 
and extreme cosmopolitanism is that it does not go further to make the additional 
c laim that the recognition of the universal moral worth of every individual as free 
and equal persons entails the correlative view that individuals ought to treat all 
others equally without exception. Nor does it make the claim that accepting these 
basic moral tenets of cosmopolitanism entails political structures that reflect and 
institutionalise a flat hierarchy of moral obligations across the board, one that 
does not distinguish between the needs of a stranger and one’s own child,41 a 
distant person and a fellow countryman -  in other words, a truly non-exclusive 
‘world without borders’. On the contrary, those who espouse weak 
cosmopolitanism recognise that we sometimes desire to prioritise individuals 
whom we have a special relationship with, and indeed, make the moral claim that 
we owe special duties to these persons as a matter of justice -  while at the same 
time acknowledging the equal moral worth of every individual, near or far to us. 
Justice, then, must take into account both the demands of social and global 
justice.
According to this formulation, weak cosmopolitanism is committed to 
two very diverse values: compatriotism and universal equality (Scheffler, 1995a). 
Each reflects tendencies that pull us in different directions. Each reflects a 
different conception of the individual’s normative responsibility -  one seeks to 
delineate and restrict the size of one’s moral world according to particularistic 
types of relationships, while the other seeks to expand it to apply to everyone 
equally without restriction. Both are equally supported by the different social 
contexts within which they arise -  one by a commonsense understanding of 
human social interactions and the phenomenology of agency (for instance, we
41 Although this particular contrast could alternatively be argued along the lines o f public/private 
justice.
- 4 5 -
tend to prioritise things and people that are closer to us)42, the other by an 
awareness of the growing interdependence between individuals of the world and 
the far-reaching impact of their actions in an increasingly globalised world. Both 
generate responsibilities that are morally salient and required of us as a matter of 
justice, whether this takes the form of social justice or of global justice. The task 
of weak cosmopolitanism, therefore, is to find ways to jointly accommodate the 
two conflicting responsibilities, to find that elusive cosmopolitan middle ground 
where they meet: “Caught between powerful universalistic and equally powerful 
particularistic tendencies, [weak cosmopolitanism] define[s] a widely held 
intermediate position which seems increasingly to require defence.” (Scheffler, 
1995a: 34)
Hence, we return to the question of the cosmopolitan middle ground. The 
question here for weak cosmopolitanism is this: How do we reconcile our special 
duties with our more expansive global duties, and what does a global order that 
balances the two look like? How should the division of political labour be 
deployed? As we have seen, different cosmopolitan theorists have approached the 
question differently, and accordingly assigned the categories of normative 
responsibility along different lines. On one extreme, there are those like Kevin 
Jackson for whom the idea of a cosmopolis of different political actors cannot be 
detached from the need for a supra-state world government that transcends the 
boundaries demarcating the different spheres of political action, state and non­
state (in section 1.2). Then, there are those like Andrew Kuper who, like Thomas 
Pogge, reject the “righteous idiocy” of the extreme position (Pogge, 2002b: 89), 
but who nonetheless hold on to the strong position that universal equality only 
makes sense in combination with the political demand for a pluralistic global 
order that can collectively represent all sections of global society (in section 1.3). 
As we have seen, both the extreme and strong cosmopolitan positions succeed in 
diluting the dominance of state sovereignty in our political thinking, but have
42 To elaborate on this, the phenomenology of agency states that we tend to give primacy to the 
things that are near rather than remote, spatially- and temporally-speaking, because we feel that 
we have more influence over them. Similarly, we are more willing to make sacrifices for our 
families, friends, communities and comrades because they are spatially closer, and because the 
social context in which we find ourselves situated ordinarily interprets such acts as good or 
virtuous (Scheffler, 1995a).
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been less successful at presenting a vjable alternative conception of just global 
agency to replace the traditional state-centric models -  importantly, in our case, 
one that provides the normative justification for why and how TNCs fit into our 
global imaginations, if at all. Does the weak cosmopolitan position do any better?
To get an answer, we turn to the work of Samuel Scheffler, who has 
treated the question of locating the cosmopolitan middle ground in great length 
and detail. In Boundaries and Allegiances, a collection of his essays on the topic 
over a period of ten years, Scheffler systematically takes the reader from the 
dilemma facing cosmopolitans that we have laid out here, to a defence of what 
turns out to be, as elaborated below, a weak cosmopolitan position. However, 
contrary to the radical revisionist propositions of the extreme and strong 
cosmopolitan positions, he is more cautious in suggesting that cosmopolitanism 
has any ready answers. He concludes early on that
“the most immediate effect of coming to see the global perspective as 
morally salient may be, not to present us with a developed, non-restrictive 
conception of normative responsibility, but rather to generate doubts 
about our practice of treating the individual agent as the primary locus of 
such responsibility... and we are unlikely to find a solution to the political 
problem without attaining greater stability in our thinking about 
normative responsibility more generally” (Scheffler, 1995a: 44, 47).
For Scheffler, the cosmopolitan objection to realist, nationalist and other 
state-centric theories -  what he calls the ‘distributive objection’ -  is not that the 
demands of global justice should negate all claims of special responsibility 
(whether these be to one’s family or fellow countrymen etc.), or even that one 
can never take precedence over the other (Scheffler, 1995b; 1997; 1999a). 
Rather, the purpose of focusing on the normative pull of global perfect 
egalitarianism and contrasting it with the starkly inegalitarian character of our 
special interests, is to show up the tension between our global responsibilities and 
our special responsibilities. The problem is, for most people, these tensions are 
not mutually exclusive; they merely represent different moral values -  that of
- 4 7 -
justice and equality, and of personal friendship and compatriotism -  that we find 
ourselves simultaneously drawn and committed to. If conceptualised in a 
vacuum, these values are in conflict. But when placed together in the context of 
our internal moral outlook, they are in fact not incompatible in the minds of most 
people. Hence, the tension between the two cannot be resolved by theory taking 
one side or the other, nor can it be eliminated.43
However, according to Scheffler, it may be made “less problematic” by 
“resolv[ing] such problems, to our own satisfaction at least, when we fix on a 
course of action, or design a policy or institution, or identify a set of principles, 
that will enable us to claim, in good faith, to have found a way of doing justice to 
both” (Scheffler, 1999a: 94). The only way to do this, and still remain 
cosmopolitan, is to assert that our local attachments and special affiliations must 
be “balanced and constrained” by our global responsibilities and the interests of 
other citizens of the wider world (1999a; 1999b: 115). This is the weak 
cosmopolitan position. For Scheffler, weak cosmopolitanism is what he calls 
“traditionalism with a cosmopolitan inflection” (Scheffler, 1999b: 275). By this, 
he means that even a citizen of the world must legitimately be allowed special 
relationships and affiliations with particular persons or groups of persons and 
owe them some things, as a matter of justice, that he/she does not owe to non­
members.44 But these special relationships may consistently co-exist with one’s 
moral standing and responsibilities to other human beings in general; one does 
not need to replace the other. Rather, to say that one is concerned about justice is 
to say that, in addition to the principles of social justice that govern our particular
43 The need to choose between our social responsibilities and our global responsibilities can, o f  
course, be eliminated by taking one side to the exclusion o f the other. The first would result in a 
state-centric theory, which can take the form o f either realism, or nationalism, or a conception o f  
the world as a ‘society of states’ (supra fn 27). The second would result in an extreme or strong 
cosmopolitan position, which we have discussed in the previous sections. A third way o f  
eliminating the dilemma is to say that it does not matter because we ought to choose an approach 
-  any approach -  that achieves maximum human welfare. This is the consequentialist approach, 
which Scheffler rejects as going against our commonsense understanding o f normative 
responsibility (Scheffler, 1999a). The consequentialist position is also unhelpful for our purposes, 
because it does not make any explicit claims about just agency, or provide any non-derivative, 
normative reasons why TNCs should play a role in global justice.
44 Of course, it is not just concerns o f justice that constrain our particular relationships, but also 
factors like commitment, adherence to behavioural norms etc.
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relationships, one also subscribes to the principles of global justice. These global 
commitments, in turn, circumscribe and direct how and to what extent we act on 
our domestic commitments.
Is this the only way of resolving the tensions between global and special 
responsibilities? In the first place, if the boundaries of our special responsibilities 
are much narrower than those of our global responsibilities, should they not 
constrain our global responsibilities, instead of the other way round as Scheffler 
has posited? That is to say, should it not be the case that the expansive scope of 
our global responsibilities is somewhat curtailed by the necessary investment of 
scarce resources to our special responsibilities? It is unlikely that this is an 
unintentional lapse. Rather, I think that it reveals a conservatism on Scheffler’s 
part, by which weak cosmopolitanism is defined not in terms of how to move 
away from a state-centric position, but in terms of finding cosmopolitan solutions 
to the problem of preserving the domestic domain against the pressures and 
demands of global justice. The goal, therefore, is not to make us better world 
citizens, but to protect our special interests from the things that threaten to pull us 
away from our commitments to family, friends and countrymen. Scheffler’s 
conservatism is, in fact, not uncommon. Both academics and practitioners alike 
“genuflect in this way before the altar of ‘State’ sovereignty” (Alston, 2005b: 4). 
Philip Alston, for example, points out that the continued practice of defining 
actors in terms of what they are not (referring to the prevalent usage of the term 
“«o«-state actors”) underlines the old-fashioned assumption that the state, not 
individuals, is the primary actor in international human rights around which all 
other entities revolve.45
45 Alston suggests a few reasons for this cognitive bias, viz., why academics and practitioners 
alike have been reluctant to rethink the role o f the state and expand the analytical framework (in 
this case, o f international law) to take into account the role non-state actors: “an intrinsic lack of  
imagination; a natural affinity with the status quo; a deeply rooted professional commitment to 
internationalism... premised on the continuity o f the system o f sovereign equality; a reluctance to 
bite the hand that feeds; or simply the conviction that respect for that system has taken a great 
deal o f time and human suffering to achieve and that it continues to offer a better prospect than 
any alternative that has so far been put forward.” (Alston, 2005b: 21).
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In this case, Scheffler’s formulation of the weak cosmopolitan position is 
still cosmopolitan, because it gives weight to our special responsibilities without 
precluding the needs and demands of global justice. By emphasizing the need to 
balance the two, he departs from a strictly state-centric position, which places all 
weight on our special responsibilities as the only source of independent reasons 
for moral action. However, Scheffler’s weak cosmopolitan position is only ‘thinly 
cosmopolitan', because the conservative approach with which he addresses this 
balancing act suggests that, if it is actually operationalised and translated into 
principled judgments and action-guiding policies, more weight will be given to 
our special responsibilities in the trade-off. Is there another weak cosmopolitan 
interpretation that avoids this charge of thin cosmopolitanism?
Martha Nussbaum suggests that there is. She agrees with Scheffler that 
“[n]o one of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition denie[s] that we can 
and should give special attention to our own families and to our own ties of 
religious and national belonging” (Nussbaum, 1996: 135). However, she adds 
that “the primary reason a cosmopolitan should have for this is not that the local 
is better per se, but rather that this is the only sensible way to do good” 
(Nussbaum, 1996: 135-136). In other words, our special responsibilities are 
justified because acting on them contributes to the wider good of all humankind. 
For example, ‘love thy neighbour’ is not a good principle in and of itself, but it is 
good because it promotes peace-seeking behaviour towards others further away 
from us. That is to say, there are no independent reasons for promoting the 
interests of the people we care specially about that are not derived from the 
global interests of humanity as a whole. Social justice is a servant of global 
justice, according to Nussbaum, and it is the bigger global picture that is of 
ultimate concern here.
On the one hand, Nussbaum’s position is still a weak cosmopolitan 
position, insofar as it is “weaker” than the strong cosmopolitan position that we 
have seen, which claims that we ought to treat all human beings equally without 
exception. On the other hand, it represents a “thicker” form of the weak 
cosmopolitan position than Scheffler’s because, instead of advocating balance 
and constraint between two equally competing norms of justice, it treats as
- 5 0 -
fundamental only the substantive norms of global justice. At this level, there is no 
balancing act to be performed, because there is no dilemma. Any comparison 
between social and global justice can only be justified on practical or 
instrumental grounds. But on a basic level, the principles of global justice take 
precedence. Nussbaum’s interpretation of weak cosmopolitanism is, in this sense, 
“more” cosmopolitan than Scheffler’s interpretation.
However, Scheffler rejects Nussbaum’s argument on the grounds that it is 
“implausible” and “flies in the face of the experience and conviction of many 
people” (Scheffler, 1999b: 118, 119). He points out, quite validly, that it is 
“pathological” to attach nothing but instrumental value to all of our personal 
relationships (Scheffler, 1999b: 121). We do not love our own children, for 
example, because it promotes the virtue of parental love universally, but because 
we love our own children period. Scheffler argues that we should be careful 
about exaggerating the conceptual incompatibility of our social and global 
responsibilities, but rather embrace them -  as most people do in reality. He 
suggests that, instead of escaping the problem by what could be perceived as a 
conceptual slight of hand -  that is, the bifurcation of social and global justice in a 
way that does not gel with our commonsense understanding of the problem -  we 
should face it plainly and acknowledge that its resolution will require 
“considerable social imagination and ingenuity, psychological sophistication and 
sensitivity, and political determination and skill” to resolve (Scheffler, 1999b: 
124). And why should we not? Our everyday experience tells us that life is full 
of such contradictions; we hold up simultaneously seemingly contradictory 
sentiments like hope and death, love and hate etc., yet we are still able to execute 
decisions, moral or otherwise, based on these conflicting values. They may entail 
difficult decisions, perhaps a long and painful process of moral wrangling, but 
most of us do manage to strike a balance between them.
The only issue with balancing acts is that they must tip to one side or the 
other eventually. The test of a normative theory comes when a specific situation 
calls for a principled judgment based on theory. Scheffler presents the situation 
as a tractable balance between our special and our global responsibilities, but as 
we have seen, closer analysis suggests that, when push comes to shove, the
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balance falls in favour of special responsibilities in Scheffler’s account. Weak 
cosmopolitanism, as it turns out (according to Scheffler, at least), is not radically 
revisionist but basically conservative. In itself, there is nothing inherently wrong 
with this conclusion, but neither is there anything distinctive about it. Even anti­
cosmopolitans and state-centric theorists do not deny that we have global 
responsibilities in addition to our special responsibilities, only that our 
responsibilities have to be differentiated -  that is, we owe more to some than to 
others (Miller, 2002; Pogge, 2002b). For example, David Miller, who is a strong 
critic of cosmopolitanism, posits weak cosmopolitanism as merely the claim that 
morality is “cosmopolitan in part” (Miller, 1998: 166). That is to say, our 
obligations to distant persons may be restricted either in type or in scope: one 
may owe only certain types of obligations of justice to those who do not stand in 
a relationship with him/her,46 or one may owe obligations of justice to some but 
not all those who do not stand in a relationship with him/her.47 But he points out 
that one can accept this normative position, and still hold a state-centric position 
like he does. In other words, the weak cosmopolitan position does not necessarily 
translate politically into a cosmopolitan global order. In this case, the question of 
TNCs’ role in global justice does not even arise because the boundaries of justice 
never quite transcend the scope of one’s special responsibilities.
Scheffler’s weak cosmopolitanism, then, is anodyne. At best, it retains the 
state-centric status quo without giving us an account of why and how TNCs 
should play a role in global justice -  or, for that matter, any other non-state agent. 
At worst, it is unable to normatively underwrite all the pressing reasons that call 
for global reform. It is emblematic, I think, of the kind of obstacles faced when a 
normative theory that seeks to expand the scope of agency gets overly caught up 
in what a cosmopolitan global order looks like or how to justify it. Even if the 
above interpretation is misguided, and Scheffler turns out to be less conservative
46 For example, Miller suggests that we may owe a distant person a duty o f care if  we have the 
capability o f relieving their distress, but not an other type of duty if  to do so would lead us to 
deny our particular identities as members o f a community or association.
47 For example, Andreas Follesdal has suggested that the British may have obligations of  
distributive justice to other members o f the European Union but not to, say, Malaysians (in 
Caney, 2001:975).
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than we think, the questions remains: How should the balance be struck? Again, 
in the absence of a definitive answer, it is not clear how weak cosmopolitanism 
translates into principles that can guide us on how we should organise the world 
for the sake of justice, let alone give us normative reasons why TNCs should play 
a role.48
Again, there may be nothing wrong with this conclusion. It may be that 
the biggest contribution of the weak cosmopolitan position to our political 
thinking is that it leads us to the conclusion that TNCs have no role to play in 
global justice. But is the conclusion premature? Is there really no space in our 
political thinking for TNCs? There seems to be a compelling empirical case for 
the role of TNCs in global justice to warrant pressing the normative question 
further. Perhaps the problems with the various cosmopolitan approaches 
highlighted so far in this chapter are, as Scheffler concludes in his earlier works, 
a blessing in disguise -  not only because they force us to challenge the 
conventional wisdom in political theory of treating the individual (and the state) 
as basic political units, but because they cause us to re-think our thinking about 
normative responsibility in general (Scheffler, 1995a). To conclude our analysis, 
then, I wish to briefly explore an alternative approach to the issue of TNCs in 
global justice.
1.5. An alternative approach to CSR
In this chapter so far, I have provided a critical analysis of three main 
cosmopolitan approaches to extending global just agency in our normative 
thinking -  in this case, to include TNCs in the picture. To recapitulate, my core 
argument is that the three cosmopolitan approaches have begged the central 
questions of global just agency by adopting at the outset a ‘thinly cosmopolitan’ 
conception of the basic political units that legitimately make up a just global 
order and form the basis of modem political theory and political science. 
According to the argument, the three cosmopolitan approaches are ‘thinly
48 Another interesting possibility is, o f course, if  we think that the balance tips in favour o f  our 
global responsibilities. Given that the scope o f our global responsibilities is always bigger than 
that of our special responsibilities, will there still be the need for the kind o f balancing that 
characterizes weak cosmopolitanism?
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cosmopolitan’ because (i) in the case of extreme cosmopolitanism, it moves away 
from a formally statist position that allows no place for corporations as agents of 
global justice in their own right, but to such an extreme position as to take the 
implausible position of denying any value to state sovereignty and is, not to 
mention, also unnecessary and impracticable; or (ii) in the case of strong 
cosmopolitanism, it cannot move away from a formally statist position without 
placing a wider, empirically-contingent restriction on the domain of global just 
agency, or (iii) in the case of weak cosmopolitanism, it does not move away from 
a formally statist position at all, or otherwise has no story to tell about TNCs. 
Given this analysis, the crux of the problem, it seems, is two-fold: Firstly, a 
. legitimate cosmopolitan position must move away from a strictly statist position, 
but not too far. Secondly, the cosmopolitan middle ground envisioned must be 
able to generate a normative account that is generalisable -  that is, it must be 
capable of identifying specific non-state agents of global justice (like TNCs) 
while not excluding potential others.
With regard to the first arm of the problem, the relevant methodological 
question here is this: Why should cosmopolitan global justice be constructed in 
this way -  that is, as an extension from the statist position -  in the first place? 
Why define it in relation to states and not start with the world as a whole, with its 
own distinctive form of justice whose principles may well “differ in content and 
foundation” from those that have traditionally applied (Beitz, 2005: 21)? The 
methodology of making fine distinctions between strong and weak 
cosmopolitanism may lend some definition to the cosmopolitan middle ground, 
but it may still be too superficial to enlighten us as to, say, the moral reasons for 
TNC action, or what the scope of action should be, its limitations etc. As Beitz 
puts it: “We need a better grasp of the content of these apparent reasons and of 
the processes by which reasons of these kinds may be integrated when it is 
necessary to make judgments about how to act. The result may be something like 
‘weak’ or ‘strong’ cosmopolitanism, but more likely it will be some third 
conception, more richly described, that we have not yet clearly anticipated” 
(Beitz, 2005: 19, emphasis is my own).
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Approaching the question of cosmopolitan global justice from a fresh 
angle may lend some solutions to the second arm of the problem as well. The 
issue there is the lack of generalisable principles of inclusion (of non-state actors) 
in some of our theories of cosmopolitan global justice. The question then is 
whether there is some feature of the problem that will show us the way to an 
alternative solution? Perhaps the solution is not to begin with a “grand theory” of 
‘cosmopolitan global justice’ that asks what a ‘cosmopolitan just global order’ 
looks like, or which cosmopolitan approach or what cosmopolitan principles can 
be applied to a particular division of political labour in the first place. That is to 
say, perhaps the way to begin thinking about why TNCs should be agents of 
justice in a just global order lies not, in fact, in trying to carve out a conceptual 
space for ‘cosmopolitan global justice’ or to provide the specifications for a 
cosmopolitan just global order, and then trying to fit TNCs into the cosmopolitan 
picture that we have painted. Perhaps, in the interest of generalisability, it is not 
even to ask ‘Why TNCs?’, but ‘Why any non-state actor?’. If this is the case, 
then the foregoing analysis suggests that a conception of cosmopolitan global 
justice will not be able to drive this agenda for the reasons given. What we need 
is a new approach to the concept of global just agency.
One alternative approach suggested by Saladin Meckled-Garcia (2008) is 
to take a constructivist approach towards the question of global just agency. 
According to Meckled-Garcia, constructivism is “a method for elaborating moral 
principles that apply to a given sphere of human action” (Meckled-Garcia, 2008: 
3). In other words, rather than imposing a big-picture conception of an ideal 
cosmopolitan just global order on the distribution of political responsibilities, his 
approach is to construct this ideal social world and its duty-prescribing principles 
from ground up, based on the particular agents themselves and the values 
reflected in the particular dimension of political reality in question. The 
methodology of this approach, then, is to firstly “partition the moral world” in a 
way that reflects the categories of agents or types of agents that have what he 
calls the ‘moral powers’ to affect the achievement of global justice, each adding 
value to our social world in different ways within their own context. Then 
secondly, within each domain, to design principles expressing these distinct
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values that can guide the actions of specific agents within their specific sphere of 
action. For example, if the focus was on TNCs as agents of justice and on 
poverty, a constructivist theory of CSR would have to specify the distinct values 
towards poverty alleviation that TNCs serve, and describe the principles that 
justified claims on TNCs in this respect. According to him, the advantage of this 
approach -  what he calls the ‘domain-restriction’ of principles -  is that it 
generates an agent-centred theory of justice that is more contentful because, 
rather than grasping at abstract (cosmopolitan) principles that postulate an ideal 
state of affairs, it actually knuckles down to the job of specifying the agents 
responsible for achieving this ideal. In contrast, “purported principles... that do 
not specify relevant agents must at least be said to be incomplete -  they are not 
really principles at all, but descriptions of a desirable state of affairs” (Meckled- 
Garcia, 2008: 8). It is this “subject-specifying quality”, in Meckled-Garcia’s 
words -  the ability to specify who is responsible to who and for what -  that 
makes our moral principles action-guiding.
Thus, this subject-specifying quality tells us both ‘Why TNCs?’ and, 
more generally, ‘Why any non-state actor?’ -  namely, because they have the 
requisite ‘moral powers’ to affect the achievement of global justice. Thus, it 
solves both arms of the problem that we saw earlier with the cosmopolitan global 
justice approach. As the term ‘constructivism’ suggests, our use of the concept of 
global just agency, when guided by this domain-restricted / subject-specific 
conception of agency, “constructs an essentially human reality that solves the 
problem from which the concept springs” (Korsgaard, 2003: 117). The 
conception of the world as “partitioned” is correct not because it describes a 
piece of external reality or some desirable outcome, or because conceiving it this 
way leads to just outcomes. What makes it correct is that it solves a problem 
reflected in the concept of cosmopolitan global just agency. By explicating an 
account of the problem here, it points the way to an alternative conception that 
solves the problem -  that is, a domain-restricted conception of global just agency.
It is proper to note, however, that Meckled-Garcia does not think that 
TNCs or other non-state actors can be potential agents of justice. According to 
his argument, the “morally powerful” agents that he has in mind would need to
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make more than a short-term impact. They would also need to possess the 
capability of continually adjusting to background conditions, in order to maintain 
a pattern of (in this case) fair distribution over the long-term. Such agents, he 
claims, only include such “authoritative bodies” with the power to “assign rights 
and impose duties on all agents” (Meckled-Garcia, 2007:12). Moreover, their role 
in global justice must be primary, in the sense that the value that they add to 
global justice should not crowd out the other ways that they add value to our 
social world. He goes on to claim that only states satisfy these criteria: only states 
have the moral power to assign rights and impose duties domestically, and to 
seek agreements with other states internationally. I disagree with him on this 
particular point, and develop a capabilities argument for CSR later on in chapter 
3. What is pertinent for the current discussion, however, is his constructivist 
approach, which I adopt with qualification here.
Regarding Meckled-Garcia’s constructivist reasoning, I think that there 
are two important gaps. Firstly, it is not clear how the principles that guide the 
actions of the specific agent in the specific domain in question are generated. For 
instance, what is it that “justifies” the moral claims on TNCs towards poverty 
alleviation? To be sure, the answer to this is guided by the value(s) that TNCs can 
serve in this domain, which we have seen examples of. But this only describes 
the end-value which the principle is meant to aim for. It does not in itself 
generate a moral theory that can normatively underpin the principle. Secondly, 
Meckled-Garcia indicates separately that, because “different agents have 
different moral powers, and are consequently bound by different primary 
principles”, any such underpinning moral theory would be “in [an] important 
sense ‘deontological’” (Meckled-Garcia, 2008: 6-7). In other words, depending 
on which agent acting in which capacity was under consideration, the principle 
would regulate the “relationships of duty” between that agent and the 
beneficiaries of his/her actions -  what they owe to which others, and how much. 
It is not clear, however, how subject-specificity necessarily leads to a 
deontological understanding of agency here. Even if  we accept that the claims 
about the values that TNCs serve towards global justice justify them doing 
something about it on moral grounds, nothing in the argument makes the moral
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reasons for CSR deontological, that is, right based on the act of doing something 
alone regardless of the outcome. Meckled-Garcia himself acknowledges that 
there are certain natural, non-assignable human rights that are not captured 
deontologically.
What if the conception that is at work in Meckled-Garcia’s constructivist 
account is not, in fact, the subject-specifying quality that he proposes, but a 
theory of responsibility? I say that because he goes on later to argue that, for a 
violation of such a right to count, there must be an appropriate agent who is in 
breach of their duty correlating to that right: “a theory of rights must presuppose 
a theory of responsibility” (Meckled-Garcia, 2008: 15, 24). Moreover, a theory of 
responsibility would not only be able to normatively underwrite the duties owed 
by specific agents, but also the human rights claims (justified separately) imposed 
on the agents in question. It is also a legitimate moral theory capable of 
generating the principles of justice that would govern the agents’ response to 
these claims of duty and rights. And it would explain the deontological 
understanding of agency that Meckled-Garcia wishes to get at.
The point is that domain restriction is not the only way to deploy a 
constructivist approach to the question of global just agency. I argue in this thesis 
that one can also construct a theory of CSR based on the notion of 
‘responsibility’. The idea here is that, by latching onto the notion of 
responsibility, we will be able to develop a conception of global responsibilities 
that can, in turn, give us the principles to underwrite a theory of CSR and is at the 
same time generalisable to all potential actors. In other words, instead of staking 
our claim on various versions of cosmopolitan global justice, my argument is that 
an alternative constructivist approach may lie in asking a more basic question: 
What is responsibility? The reasoning here being that, only when we have a 
rigorous conception of what responsibility is, will we be able to construct an 
agent-centred account of who is responsible. Only then, will we be able give an 
answer to the question ‘Why TNCs?’. This is not to say that domain restriction is 
not a valid way of approaching the question of global just agency, but that the 
notion of responsibility gets at something more fundamental that underpins 
Meckled-Garcia’s moral partitioning of the world.
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My suggestion is, like Meckled-Garcia’s proposal, to construct a coherent 
theory of CSR from ground up, but in a different way, and to see where this leads 
us. It does not position itself on any middle ground or offer easy taxonomies of 
cosmopolitanism, nor does it extrapolate conceptually from any state-centric 
position. Rather, the hope is that, by asking more specific questions about the 
moral responsibilities of one type of potential agent of global justice, we will 
develop a better sense of where our cosmopolitan affiliations lie, if at all. For 
example, it is entirely possible that we arrive at the conclusion that TNCs are not 
implicated in global justice at all and should not have to play the role of just 
agents, which might then cast a shadow of doubt over the need for a 
cosmopolitan just global order. Or we might conclude that there is room for a 
cosmopolitan just global order, but that it does not include a role for TNCs. This, 
too, is entirely possible, since cosmopolitans can subscribe to the moral 
conviction that the basic political units of our existing global order and their roles 
need to be reconsidered, without necessarily subscribing to the institutional claim 
that one form of global political institutions or the other is required to bring about 
a just global order: “cosmopolitans are fundamentally committed to the moral 
claims but are not thereby necessarily committed to the institutional ones” 
(Caney, 2005: 5).49 Or, for that matter, we may conclude that states alone should 
be the primary bearers of global responsibilities.
~  ~
These are, of course, matters that require further enquiry, and will become clearer 
in the later chapters. The aim of the present discussion has simply been to agitate 
a realisation that the notion of cosmopolitan global justice alone is unable to 
normatively underwrite a theory of CSR. We saw this from the critical analysis of 
the three cosmopolitan approaches to conceptualizing an ideal just global order in 
this chapter, namely, the ‘extreme cosmopolitan position’, the ‘strong 
cosmopolitan position’, and the ‘weak cosmopolitan position’. The criticism was
49 Beitz (1994: 126) points out that the reverse is not always true, however. Whilst “one need not 
adopt the point o f view of moral cosmopolitanism to adopt a cosmopolitan view about world 
political institutions”, it would be “hard to think of anyone who has defended institutional 
cosmopolitanism on other than cosmopolitan moral grounds”.
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that the three cosmopolitan approaches were only ‘thinly cosmopolitan’, either 
because they did not result in practicable schemes, or because they were not 
genuinely or sufficiently “cosmopolitan” for various reasons. Once an account of 
the problem reflected in the concept of cosmopolitan global justice was 
explicated, however, I argued that it pointed the way to a new (normative) 
approach and conception of global just agency that may solve the problem -  
namely, a constructivist approach that was not based on the thin ideals of 
cosmopolitanism, but on more basic foundations grounded in the notion of 
responsibility. This suggestion is picked up in the next chapter, where the case 
for ‘global justice as duty’ as the moral foundation for CSR is developed.
- 6 0 -
2Global justice as duty: Beyond the human rights case for 
CSR
In the last chapter, it was suggested that, instead of asking the question ‘What is 
an ideal cosmopolitan just global order?’, a better way of conceptualizing the role 
of TNCs in global justice lay in taking a constructivist approach and asking a 
more basic question: ‘What is responsibility?’. Only when we had a rigorous 
conception of what responsibility is, it was argued, would we be able to construct 
an agent-centred account of who is responsible. Only then, would we be able to 
give a moral answer to the question ‘Why TNCs?’. This aim of this chapter, then, 
is to develop the case for a notion of ‘global justice as duty’ as the moral 
foundation for a theory of CSR.50
However, an observer would not be faulted for thinking that it is talk 
about rights, rather than responsibility, that is the “ethical lingua franca” in the 
discourse about global justice (Tasioulas, 2007: 75). The role of TNCs in global 
justice itself has also always been closely tied to human rights. Two UN 
initiatives in particular illustrate this:
(1) The UN Global Compact (the “Compact”). First proposed by the then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, the UN Global Compact was envisioned as a 
compact between business leaders and various UN agencies to “initiate a global 
compact of shared values and principles” and “give a human face to the global 
market” (Annan, 1999: 1). In its codified form, the Compact derives its 
desiderata from, among other places, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and, in its first two principles, seeks the cooperation of TNCs in “the protection
50 The terms ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ and ‘obligation’ are used interchangeably here. However, 
note that Pogge (1992b) distinguishes between ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ by reserving the term 
‘duty’ for fundamental obligations and using the term ‘obligation’ to refer to obligations 
simpliciter (that is, non-fundamental obligations).
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of international human rights” and “mak[ing] sure they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses”.51 Interestingly, a fundamental rationale of the proposal 
was stated as the increasing influence of TNCs because “power brings with it 
great opportunities -  and great responsibilities”. I say interestingly because I 
think that the mixed language of “rights” on the one hand and “responsibilities” 
on the other reveals the dichotomy of moral arguments for CSR engagement on a 
global level that is central to my argument.
(2) The Norms On The Responsibilities O f Transnational Corporations And  
Other Business Enterprises With Regard To Human Rights (the ‘Norm s”). More 
recently, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights unanimously approved a draft of a comprehensive set of international 
human rights norms specifically targeted at and applying to corporations. While 
the Compact is not binding on corporations, the Norms are intended to evolve 
into a binding instrument and are seen as complementary to the Compact 
(Hillemanns, 2003).54 In its Preamble, the drafters recall the Universal
51 The Global Compact: Corporate Citizenship In The World Economy. UN Global Compact 
Office:
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/.
The Global Compact’s ten principles cover human rights, labour standards, environmental 
practices and recently, anti-corruption, the tenth principle adopted at The Global Compact 
Leaders Summit at the UN Headquarters on 24th June 2004 (The Global Compact Leaders 
Summit, Final Report. UN Global Compact Office (October 2004): 
http://www.globalcompactsummit.org/docs/2004SummitReport.pdf).
52 Ibid.
53 Norms On The Responsibilities O f Transnational Corporations And Other Business Enterprises 
With Regard To Human Rights. UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection o f Human 
Rights. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/l 2/Rev.2 (26th August 2003):
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Svmbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En.
54 As far as I can tell, and given the often long and tortuous road between initial actions by a sub­
commission and its adoption by another UN agency, the Norms are as yet not legally binding on 
corporations. At its 56th meeting on 20th April 2004, the Commission on Human Rights decided to 
recommend that the Economic and Social Council request the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) to compile a report setting out the scope and legal status o f the 
draft’s initiatives and standards, and to identify outstanding issues (Report To The Economic 
And Social Council On The Sixtieth Session O f The Commission, E/CN.4/L.1 l/Add.7, 2004/116 
(22nd April 2004):
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf).
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Declaration of Human Rights as a natural starting point, proclaiming it “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”.55 The first 
section, on “General obligations”, states that
“States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment 
of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in 
international as well as national law, including ensuring that transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights. Within 
their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to 
promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect 
human rights recognized in international as well as national law, 
including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other 
vulnerable groups.”56
The statement is telling because it reflects several paradigm shifts that 
have occurred in the discourse on global justice, and that in turn have 
repercussions on the way CSR (defined here as the role of TNCs in global 
justice) is conceived, namely:
This report was compiled in cooperation with the Global Compact Office (GCO) for submission 
to the Commission at its 61st meeting, although by then, it seems that the escalating human rights 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, had taken priority on the Commission’s agenda.
However, in the said report, both the OHCHR and GCO were in agreement on the value o f having 
an agreed framework o f universal human rights responsibilities o f business at the international 
level (Consultation On Business And Human Rights: Summary o f  Discussions, OHCHR, in 
cooperation with the GCO (22nd October 2004):
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/human rights/business human rights summary report.p
df).
Moreover, even if corporations are not legally bound by the Norms, the responsibilities set out 
therein have already generated extensive comments from human rights watch groups and legal 
commentators, and it seems to be an accepted view that they will provide detailed guidelines with 
respect to CSR for companies as well as government bodies regulating corporate behaviour. In 
other words, despite its non-legal status, there will be considerable pressure on TNCs to comply 
with the Norms (Hillemanns, 2003).
55 Supra fh 53.
56 Supra fn 53.
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(1) Rights-based approach. That the responsibilities of TNCs in global justice 
stand in a correlative relationship with what is assumed by the drafters to be 
universal human rights. Human rights, then, is like a ‘one size fits all’ model that 
applies to various different situations facing businesses (Hillemanns, 2003);
(2) Rule o f law. That what “human rights” entails is elucidated by formal and 
informal institutions -  including legally binding treaties, non-binding guidelines, 
existing international practice, and self-imposed company codes of conduct -  
although it has been vehemently (and, in my opinion, correctly) argued that the 
rights themselves are justified in political theory apart from their institutional 
form (Tasioulas, 2007);
(3) State-centricism. That states, not TNCs, are and should be the primary agents 
of human rights / global justice;
(4) Constrained CSR. That TNCs have human rights obligations only insofar as 
corporate entities created under a state’s rule of law or its constitutive individuals 
can be said to have international legal obligations.
Hence, in order to make a case for ‘global justice as duty’ as the moral
cn
foundation for a theory of CSR, the dominance of ‘global justice as rights’ must 
first be challenged. To my mind, there are philosophical reasons to be concerned 
about each of these four trends. After laying the groundwork in section 2.1 by 
presenting a political theory perspective on the current state of affairs, I go on in 
section 2.2 to explain what the problems with it are. The main worry underlying 
my concerns is the ascendancy of the doctrine of human rights as a justification 
for the role of TNCs in global justice (see point 1 -  “rights-based approach”). 
This chapter is devoted to disentangling the close alliance between human rights 
and CSR in international politics. The focus of my critique is Henry Shue’s 
account of the role of TNCs in global justice in his paper Mediating Duties
57 Indeed, this is the title o f Thomas Pogge’s latest book Freedom From Poverty As A Human 
Right (2007).
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(1988), because it captures most of the things that I think are problematic with 
linking the doctrine of human rights and CSR. Also, as his book on Basic Rights 
(1996a) exemplifies, Shue is a huge proponent of the rights-based approach to 
global justice. To state briefly here in response to the points listed above, I think 
that a conception of global justice that is based on a doctrine of human rights 
limits the role of TNCs. Specifically, the way that rights-based accounts of global 
justice have incorporated institutions like TNCs into their theories limits what 
they can and should do to liberate the world’s poor from extreme poverty. I think 
that TNCs can and should be primary, not secondary, agents of global justice 
alongside states (see point 3 -  “state centricism”). Specifically, this means that 
their engagement in CSR is not merely a response to state-imposed legislation 
and other corporate governance measures or pressures, but emanates from a 
particular conception of corporate moral responsibility that transcends the rule of 
law (see point 2 -  “rule of law”).58 For these reasons, I think that rights-based 
accounts of global justice are inadequate for the purposes of pushing for a bigger 
role for TNCs in global justice.
Furthermore, I also argue that purely rights-based accounts of global 
justice are insufficient for identifying TNCs as agents of global justice in the first 
place. If the weight of the UN and other international pressures are to be brought 
upon TNCs to engage in issues of global justice, often at great expense to 
themselves, then we need a substantive account of why TNCs, in addition to 
individuals and states, owe a moral duty towards the world’s poor. My contention 
is that if the moral principles guiding the distribution of global responsibilities 
must ultimately still be argued in order to tie human rights to TNCs, then we need 
to ask what the doctrine of human rights adds to the story that cannot be provided 
by a purely duty-based account of CSR. In my estimation, not a lot.
58 Regarding point 4 (“constrained CSR”), which I discuss in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6 , 1 
agree that the role of TNCs in global justice should be constrained in order to take into account 
their business considerations. But I also think that these constraints can be established without 
recourse to the metaphysics o f the corporate form or the particularities o f stakeholder 
relationships. Neither does it require us to accept an abridged set o f distribution principles. In fact, 
I think that they do not necessarily need to be “squeezed” into ideal theory at all. Instead, I think 
that they can be incorporated into a political theory o f CSR by the non-ideal theorization o f the 
business case for CSR. But this is a separate discussion altogether for later on (see chapters 5 and 
6).
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The question that follows naturally is whether a duty-based account of 
global justice can do all the normative work that a rights-based account cannot. In 
section 2.3, I ask two specific questions in this regard: (i) Is ‘global justice as 
duty’ adequate and sufficient to ground a theory of CSR?, and (ii) Does ‘global 
justice as duty’ present TNCs as primary agents of global justice? I argue ‘yes’ 
on both counts. The moral foundation for CSR, I argue, is founded ultimately on 
the notion of ‘global justice as duty’, and this is reason to look beyond the rights 
argument for CSR.59
2.1 Two approaches to the question ‘Why TNCs?’
As recent trends indicate, academic thinking and practice seems to have corralled 
around the doctrine of rights as the moral foundation for extending global just 
agency to non-person, non-state actors like TNCs. Whether corporate moral 
agency concerns environmental sustainability or access to healthcare or labour 
issues or, in our case, alleviating poverty, the label “human rights” is prevalently 
attached, with the assumption that it somehow confers a moral imperative on 
TNCs to take action to uphold the cause in question (at least, for those who argue 
for just agency beyond the state and individual). Even corporate executives are 
not immune to adopting the language of rights when talking about CSR. 
Recently, the President and CEO of Philips stated with regard to healthcare that 
“[i]n the 21st century, access to quality healthcare is a basic human right... 
Universal access to quality healthcare is not only an ethical goal in itself; it is 
also an essential condition for economic development and social welfare”.60 In 
addition, the theoretical literature is a fertile field for academic debate on global 
justice and human rights: for example, whether or not freedom from poverty is a 
universal human right, and the nature of the interests that entails -  whether it be
59 The specific grounds of TNCs’ moral responsibilities, as well as the scope o f their duties, are 
argued in chapters 3 and 4. Here, my sole intent is to argue for the sufficiency o f ‘responsibility’ 
as a concept to ground a political theory of CSR, against the prevailing backdrop of ‘human 
rights’.
60Speech by Gerard Kleisterlee, President and Chief Executive Officer o f Royal Philips 
Electronics, at ASEAN Symposium on Access to Healthcare in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (3 
September 2007) (emphasis is my own):
http://www.wbcsd.Org/p lugins/DocSearch/details.asp?tvpe=DocDet&ObiectId=MiYvMzO.
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the assured right to individual well-being (for example, Tasioulas, 2007) or mere 
subsistence (for example, Shue, 1996a) -  as well as the measures needed to 
obtain this right (for example, Caney, 2006).61
The dispute is not whether the issues that CSR addresses are issues of 
human rights or not -  clearly, some of them are. The argument is about the 
starting point for moral deliberation, and my concerns in that regard are purely
fS)action- and agent-centred : Are human rights a sufficient moral reason to 
convince large corporations that they owe a moral duty towards the world’s poor? 
What kind of corporate action does a rights-based approach to CSR demand, and 
is this adequate? Given these considerations, should global justice be based on 
the doctrine of rights? My object here is to bring into question the type of moral 
reasoning behind why and what actions justice demands of TNCs with regard to 
CSR.
Two preliminary observations here: (1) Firstly, although a pluralized 
theory of distributive responsibilities (as opposed to state-centric theories) does 
not carry a commitment to any particular world political organization, there is an 
enduring assumption among cosmopolitans that the agents most capable of 
fulfilling those responsibilities are institutions, not individuals63; (2) secondly, 
because of the pervasiveness of the language of rights in international political 
thought, human rights claims have quickly become the moral basis on which to
61 The recently published collection o f essays on Freedom From Poverty As A Human Right, 
edited by Thomas Pogge (2007), provides excellent up-to-date analyses o f the various debates.
62 Moral reasoning based on action is concerned with why justice demands that agent X should do 
action Y, independent o f the outcome Y produces. This is contrasted with moral reasoning based 
on results, such as utilitarianism, which advocates corporate agency on instrumental grounds 
(O’Neill, 1986: especially chapters 4 and 5) -  for example, because corporate entities, with their 
greater resources and capacities for coordinating individual action or information-gathering, are 
more efficient in achieving poverty-alleviating outcomes, or because the corporation provides a 
psychological buffer whereby individuals can support firms that are socially responsible without 
having to confront the realities o f poverty themselves (Shue, 1988). Results-based ethical 
reasoning actually avoids the question of agency, which is what we are concerned about here. It 
does not make explicit claims about agency because its sole aim is to seek out choices or actions 
that maximise utility, whether these are pursued by individuals or states or TNCs or other entities 
(O’Neill, 1986: 34).
63 Charles Beitz, for example, states that “any theory o f human rights with pretensions to political 
relevance certainly must be institutional...: its requirements, that is, should apply mainly to 
institutions and practices rather than to individuals” (1999: 289).
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ground the agency of particular institutions. But we should be careful that the 
first argument does not slip into the second. The question why X and/or Y owe(s) 
a moral duty to the distant needy (issue 2) is a separate and distinct question from 
whether X or Y is better equipped to take action to meet these needs (issue 1). 
I&sue 2 is a question of moral justification, whereas issue 1 a question about 
expediency. So while the doctrine of human rights may ground corporate agency 
with respect to issue 2, it does not necessitate corporate action with respect to 
issue 1.
However, this analysis is only true in the context of a moral discourse on 
rights. On a rights-based account, the unit of concern is the individual human 
being who is the potential beneficiary. And it is his/her human interest that forms 
the basis for moral action; whether this action should be taken up by an 
institutional or individual actor entails a separate argument. Therefore, a 
conflation of the two questions would be taboo. On a duty-based account, 
however, the unit of concern is the institution or individual who is the potential 
contributor. The fact that corporations are more politically capable than 
individuals can be a reason for saying that corporations, not individuals, should 
assist the world’s very poor.64 In this case, the two questions would rightly be one 
and the same.
The point of this little exposition is to establish that there is more than one 
way to answer the question ‘Why TNCs?’. The debate between rights-based and 
duty-based accounts of global justice is not a new one. Historically, the two 
discourses have been the main contenders for practical reasoning about moral 
agency and why we owe a moral duty towards the distant poor -  that is, until the 
ascendancy of rights talk eclipsed the debate. A reason for shifting the attention 
back on the ‘rights versus duties’ debate is that this is precisely where the 
divergence occurs with regard to practical reasoning about a different sort of 
agency -  in this case, corporate agency -  in global justice. As interests that apply 
to all human beings qua human, human rights is a natural language to use when 
talking about human agency or the agency of the states that represent them. But
64 The move from ‘can’ to ought’ is discussed in the next chapter (chapter 3).
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human rights resonate less intuitively when it comes to non-person, non-state 
actors like TNCs. However, because rights talk has dominated the field for so 
long, we need to reach back in time a little to resurrect an old debate, in the light 
of new actors and new questions.
Conceptually, the single most significant factor that differentiates rights- 
based and duty-based approaches to global justice is correlativity: correlativity is 
“by far the most fundamental structural feature of action-centred ethical 
reasoning” (O’Neill, 1986: 99). The differentiation comes about because 
correlativity applies to rights-based approaches but not duty-based approaches. 
Correlativity, in this case, refers to correlativity between rights and duties, and it 
is the proposition that for every rights claim, there must be a correlative duty to 
fulfil that claim. The question of correlativity is activated when a rights-based 
approach is taken towards global justice, on the notion that justice is only 
achieved when the right that is claimed is met by a correlative duty to fulfil that 
right. On the other hand, the question of correlativity does not arise in a duty- 
based approach to global justice, since it does not appeal to the notion of rights 
for its normative footing. So while both approaches eventually necessitate a 
discussion about the principles of allocation of duties among various agents, the 
difference between them is that rights-based approaches additionally require that 
these duties correlate to the human right in question.
Given that correlativity is the single most distinguishing factor between 
rights-based and duty-based approaches to global justice, the question is this: 
What is it about correlativity that makes rights-based approaches more 
compelling than duty-based approaches? It seems to me that, unless we can show 
how the discussion about correlativity adds to our moral understanding about 
why TNCs ought to take action to address poverty, then we need to reconsider 
why we should base our argument for corporate engagement in CSR on the 
doctrine of human rights at all.
On an abstract level, correlativity is not a problem -  talking about rights 
and obligations is akin to talking about two sides of the same coin since, for
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example, where A has a right against B to refrain from or do X, then B has an 
obligation to A to refrain from or do X. On a less abstract, practical level, 
however, it appears that correlativity becomes less straightforward because, at 
this level, agency (which is what we are concerned about here) becomes an issue. 
At this level, rights and obligations are no longer abstract conceptions, but must 
be tied to specifiable individuals or agents who can take action about them. In 
other words, the question is no longer what rights or correlative duties there are 
or are needed, but more exactly, ‘who owes what to whom?’.65 Put in another 
way, the question whether or not correlativity between rights and duties holds is 
conditional on whether or not there exists an ethical relationship between the 
right-holder and the duty-bearer.
In this vein, correlative duties are either perfect or imperfect. If they are 
perfect, then they are owed by specifiable individuals against whom the right to 
performance can be claimed or enforced. Negative duties -  that is, the duty not to 
unduly interfere with another’s human right -  are by definition perfect duties, 
because they are necessarily universal duties. In order for non-interference to 
work, everyone must have a duty to refrain from causing harm to another 
person.66 However, the more compelling discussion revolves around positive 
duties -  that is, the duty to benefit others or protect their human rights -  because, 
unlike negative duties, which require us only to hold back action, the fulfilment 
of positive duties entails the expenditure of scarce resources, whether that be 
money, time, energy or emotions. Positive duties are perfect where the duty- 
bearer and the right- holder are closely tied, either causally or associatively. 
Family members, or members of a nation-state or society, for example, are said to 
have such a special ethical relationship. Perfect duties can also be owed where 
there is a causal relationship between parties -  for example, if X causes harm to
65 Indeed, practical reasoning seems be turning on this most practical o f issues -  see, for example, 
the recently published collection o f essays on Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver On 
Human Rights?, edited by Andrew Kuper (2005).
66 There are debatable exceptions to this rule -  for example, when doing so causes harm to 
oneself or one’s family. Also, this is not to discount the opportunity costs that may be incurred 
from fulfilling a negative duty. However, these issues are bracketed here, since our focus is on 
positive rather than on negative duties.
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be inflicted on Y, then X owes Y a duty to compensate him/her for the harm 
caused. In many cases of CSR, this would be a straightforward case of corporate 
responsibility -  the dispute is usually factual (whether there is causality) and/or 
legal, rather than normative.
The problem arises, of course, when there is no apparent ethical 
relationship between the duty-bearer and the right-holder. This is the case when 
correlative duties are imperfect. The existence of the right in question, or the need 
to take action about it, is not disputed here; but action that is not based on an 
ethical relationship cannot be allocated to any specifiable duty-bearer and so its 
performance cannot be fulfilled. Correlativity between rights and duties, in this 
case, does not hold. Unless the right-holder can identify or specify an agent 
against whom his/her right is held, her right amounts to little more than mere 
rhetoric, a “manifesto right”.
It should be pointed out that correlative duties can also be either wide or 
narrow. While imperfect duties arise because there are not specifiable duty- 
bearers, wide duties arise where there are no specifiable right-holders. They are 
often two sides of the same coin: the claim that no one has a duty to feed X 
(imperfect duty) may be based on the claim that Y cannot be expected to feed 
everyone (wide duty), and vice versa. In both cases of imperfect and wide duties, 
correlativity does not hold; in both cases, there exists a “correlativity gap” 
between the right-holder and the duty-bearer.
Why would a correlativity gap arise? The problem of imperfect and wide 
duties is that human rights, while themselves universal, unfortunately do not 
entail universal duties in a non-ideal world. So while everyone is a claimant to a 
human right, which is by definition universal, not everyone owes a correlative 
duty to meet the human right of another -  it depends, as we have said, on how 
closely tied they are. One might ask, does our common humanity not tie us 
together? In an abstract sense, yes. However, on the less abstract, practical level 
at which we are conducting our analysis of agency, the answer is no. The 
problem of ethical relationships at this level is summarized by Onora O’Neill as 
follows:
-71  -
“No agent or agency can have obligations to provide services, help and 
benefits for all others. Nobody can feed all the hungry, so the obligation 
to feed the hungry cannot be a universal obligation, and most of those 
who are hungry have no special relationship in virtue of which others 
should feed them, so special obligations will not be enough to remedy 
poverty and hunger. Hence it seems that obligations to provide food, or 
other material needs and services, can at best have subordinate status in 
ethical deliberation in which the notion of rights is fundamental. This is 
the heaviest cost of the shift to the discourse of rights.” (1986: 101-102)
This does not mean that the problem of imperfect duties is merely a 
problem of scarce resources. Rather, it means that, because of the unequivocal 
reality of scarce resources and the constraints that it places on action, one will 
always need to justify one’s expenditure in benefiting others, in order to plug the 
inevitable correlativity gap that arises. The way rights-based theorists do this is 
by claiming that there is an ethical relationship between the right-holder and the 
duty-bearer.67
So, for those who advocate justifying CSR on grounds of human rights, it 
is not enough to establish that a human right exists; correlativity with duty and a 
specifiable duty-bearer must also be established. In the absence of this ethical 
relationship, any action to alleviate poverty is a matter of charity or optional 
beneficence, subject to the uncertainty and vicissitudes of individual preferences 
and values. So the question for CSR here is prima facie this: Can TNCs play any 
role in plugging the correlativity gap? That is to say, can TNCs somehow 
intervene to tie specific duty-bearers to specific right-holders? Or do they have 
bigger roles as institutional agents of global justice in their own right?
67 According to this view also, action may be limited by scarce resources, but it is not limited by 
relational distance. Rather, on a rights-based approach, an individual owes a moral duty to a poor 
person where an ethical relationship between them can be established, even if  that poor person is 
not part o f the same society and he/she has never met them. This is essentially the argument for 
global justice -  that our moral duties transcend state borders -  as opposed to the more traditional 
views of (domestic) distributive justice.
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2.2 CSR: Beyond human rights?
In this section, a critical analysis of the notion of TNCs as institutional mediators 
that plug the correlativity gap between individual agents and individual 
beneficiaries is presented. The focus of my critique is Henry Shue’s account of 
the role of TNCs in global justice presented in his paper Mediating Duties (1988), 
because I think that it captures most of the problems that arise from linking CSR 
and the doctrine of human rights, particularly with regards to the need to establish 
correlativity.68 It is also the most explicit rights-based account of global justice 
that intentionally attempts to carve out a conceptual space for corporate actors 
and corporate action, rather than assuming that TNCs will be part of any 
extended network of just agents.69 I shall briefly introduce my argument here, 
before going into it in more detail.
The thrust of my argument is that Shue’s theory begs the central questions 
of CSR by assuming right from the outset a limited role for TNCs -  as 
institutional mediators of the correlativity gap rather than as institutional agents 
in their own right. This, I argue, limits what they can and should do to liberate the 
world’s poor from extreme poverty. Once this limiting assumption is removed, 
the nature and boundaries of basic political units that the principles of global 
justice coordinate might look quite different, but as I go on to argue, so might the 
principles themselves. The conclusion I wish to push here is that, in the final 
analysis, Shue’s rights-based approach still begs the question: Why TNCs? I 
argue that, in order to answer this question, Shue’s central preoccupation with 
correlativity, which is endemic to rights-based approaches, needs to be taken out 
of the equation -  for example, by adopting a duty-based approach which does not 
entail the need for correlativity or plugging any “correlativity gap”.
68 Although Shue’s 1988 paper is the focus o f my analysis here, many useful inferences and 
nuances can also be gleaned from his other works, both pre- and post- this paper. See, for 
example, Shue (1977), (1983), (1984), (1996a) and (1996b).
69 Or not: Pogge, who advocates a non-state-centric version o f moral cosmopolitanism, only goes 
as far as to propose a multi-layered scheme o f agency that is still defined along territorial lines 
(“vertically dispersed agency), rather than along functional lines (“horizontally dispersed” 
agency) (Pogge, 1992a: 99-100; Kuper, 2000: 656-657). According to this demarcation o f basic 
political units, non-state alliances like neighbourhoods, towns, counties, provinces, states, regions 
etc. are included, but not other transnational political bodies like TNCs.
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Shue’s argument (1988) for incorporating institutional actors like TNCs 
into our conception of global justice agency is two-fold. On a practical, strategic 
level, TNCs play a role in global justice by being efficient coordinators of 
cooperation on human rights action between distant individuals. So, for example, 
instead of each of us donating a computer to a poverty-stricken distant 
community, it would be more efficient for us to do our part by creating incentives 
for companies that can do this on a larger scale and more efficiently to embark on 
such a project, say, by investing in them based on extra-financial criteria like 
their involvement in community development initiatives. The individual’s 
positive duty here is an indirect duty, the duty to create and support institutions 
that directly fulfil human rights. I say “duty” perhaps prematurely here because, 
philosophically-speaking, the moral imperative to do this must still fall on “a pre­
existing, right connection” (Shue, 1988: 699) between the individual contributor 
and the distant poor beneficiary being established. That is to say, in order for a 
duty to exist, correlativity must first be established in Shue’s argument.
This is where TNCs come in again. On a philosophical, moral level, Shue 
envisions TNCs playing a role in global justice in rights-based theories by also 
being institutional mediators of the ethical relationship between the potential 
right-holder and the potential duty-bearer. This ethical relationship, in turn, 
underpins the notion of correlativity in a rights-based approach. The idea is that 
the interposition of TNCs creates a relational bridge between two parties, 
particularly when the two parties are not closely tied. Other examples include the 
market and the stock exchange -  these institutions connect consumers and 
investors like you and me with farmers, manufacturers and the disenfranchised 
poor who, although they do not interact directly with us, feel the effects of our 
economic decisions acutely. After all, as Shue argues, relationships are social, not 
natural, facts. They can be created, chosen, manipulated and controlled. Hence, 
we can design and create positive-duty-performing institutions or modify existing 
institutions that currently ignore rights and their correlative duties. These shared 
institutions can be used to foster a sense of community between individuals who 
would otherwise feel as if they did not have any ties with each other, and thus no 
rights or duties towards each other which they had to acknowledge. In other
- 7 4 -
words, the demand for correlativity is conditioned not only on prior existing 
relationships but also on future possible relationships built on shared institutions. 
In this “conceptual space” (Shue, 1988: 702) that Shue has built then, this is the
nr\
role that he envisages TNCs playing in global justice.
But what exactly does this conceptual role for TNCs look like in the real 
world? One possible interpretation is that Shue is thinking that people like 
shareholders in large companies ought to be morally linked to people like the 
third world farmers and textile-producing families who supply their goods to 
these companies that the said shareholders have invested in. Another example 
would be that people who are consumers of goods produced by large companies 
ought to be morally linked to the young children who have devoted their 
childhood to producing these goods, or to the people who have lost their homes 
in order to make way for factories producing these goods. But if this is the case, 
then the possibilities for arguing a conceptual link are endless, particularly in an 
age where the world’s population is increasingly interdependent. This, I think, 
leads to a weak form of correlativity. Strong correlativity occurs where the right­
holder is closely tied to a specifiable duty-bearer against whom the right can be 
claimed, whereas weak correlativity merely requires a type of duty-bearer to be 
specified. Indeed, Shue seems to concede this point when he concludes that “the 
demand to be shown “why it is Benny who owes just this to Al” [is not] a 
demand to be shown that a special relationship already exists before a special 
relationship is created... Benny may owe just this to Al only if a new institution 
is created or an existing institution is modified so that people like Benny owe this 
much to people like Al” (Shue, 1988: 702). Again, the problem of imperfect 
duties kicks in. Unless a right claimant can identify a specifiable agent who owes 
the correlative duty, then her right amounts to nothing more than rhetoric. So I 
am not sure how useful weak correlativity is to the human rights camp in 
practice.
An alternative interpretation of Shue’s argument is this: If, by creating a 
new conceptual space of ever-evolving ethical relationships, Shue means to do
70 Other potential institutions that Shue identifies as being able to play this role include powerful 
national governments, international organisations and regimes like the OPEC and the IMF.
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away with the concept of correlativity altogether instead, then it turns out that 
rights-based theories are no different to purely duty-based accounts of CSR. Shue 
says, “[i]t is crucial, however, not to attach too much significance to whether a 
duty is perfect or imperfect -  there is in particular absolutely no difference in how 
binding they are... All that follows from Benny’s duty being imperfect is that if 
Benny prefers not to help Al, he is at liberty to help anyone else like Al. He is, 
however, most definitely not at liberty to help no one whose rights remain 
unfulfilled” (Shue, 1988: 703, emphasis is my own). In other words, the 
imperfectness of a duty does not negate the existence of Al’s right and Benny’s 
duty. If this is the case, then the claim that every duty is a correlative duty will 
almost always be true, whether it is a perfect or imperfect duty. In a world where 
correlativity is apparently (according to Shue, at least) so easily established 
through various institutional mediators, the notion of correlativity becomes 
insignificant.
If this is indeed Shue’s interpretation, then one must question what further 
argument the doctrine of human rights provides that cannot be provided by a 
purely duty-based account of CSR. The problem with the second line of 
argument (that is, that correlativity is not necessary to establish the duty to fulfil 
rights that remain unfulfilled) is that it is what duty-based theorists claim as well. 
Duty-based approaches to global justice also claim that, although X cannot be 
expected to feed everyone, X should still feed someone (where duties are wide); 
conversely, although no one person has a duty to feed Y, someone still should 
(where duties are imperfect). What is fundamental in both cases are the duties 
rather than the rights. The difference is that, in the case of moral reasoning based 
on duties, they do so without the need to appeal to the language of rights. As 
Onora O’Neill succinctly puts it, “imperfect obligations remain obligations” 
(O’Neill, 1986: 103). Thus, in the absence of the question of correlativity, Shue’s 
institutional defence of rights-based approaches (that is, against the charge that, 
because of the limits on just action that the scarcity of resources imposes, 
correlativity will always be a problem) arrives right back to the original question 
of duty allocation.
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In any case, whether it is weak correlativity or no correlativity, using 
TNCs to plug the correlativity gap limits the role of TNCs in global justice. 
Shue’s argument rests on “the design and creation” of new duty-respecting 
institutions or “the modification or transformation” of existing duty-ignoring 
institutions (Shue, 1988: 703). But what does this really translate into in practice? 
Where TNCs are concerned, the only feasible way that I can see this being 
implemented is to create new laws or to revise existing laws governing how 
corporate relations between remote individuals are to be defined, for example, as 
between investors or consumers of a company and the company’s sub-contractors 
and suppliers. Aside from whether this can be done, my concern is that this 
relegates the corporate entity to the position of being merely an “empty vessel” 
whose role in global justice is to be a carrier of these legal relations between 
individuals simpliciter. The corporation itself does not bear any moral duties per  
se. Its actions are not in themselves moral, but are there to facilitate individuals' 
moral actions. It is, in this sense, a secondary agent (as opposed to a primary 
agent) of global justice.71
Why is this limited view of TNCs’ role in global justice so objectionable? 
To begin with, it is hard to reconcile with the relatively proactive role envisioned 
by the UN for companies with regard to addressing issues of global justice, that 
is, to fulfil “the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure 
respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national 
law”.72 Some might object to this vision anyway, on grounds that corporations 
are constrained by their business obligations to their shareholders to maximise 
profits and shareholder value -  but that is a different sort of limitation from what 
we are talking about here.73 The limitation that we are talking about here is a 
conceptual one, a limitation on the role of TNCs in global justice that arises from
71 The distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ agents of justice is O’Neill (2001)’s. Her 
unique conception of TNCs as agents o f justice in this framework is discussed below in section 
2.3.2.
72 Supra fn 53. Emphasis is my own.
73 The issue of the “moral” versus the “strictly business” views (the CSR dilemma) is covered in 
more detail in chapter 5.
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trying to plug the correlativity gap, which in turn originates from the need for 
correlativity in the first place (that is, with rights-based approaches to global 
justice). The problem with it is not that we ask too much of corporations, but that 
we ask too little. Large corporations do not merely “connect” people. They are 
capable in their own right of initiating aid programmes, entrepreneurship 
schemes, importing their technological know-how, building schools and hospitals 
in poor countries etc. The conception of TNCs as institutions that merely mediate 
positive duties is, on the whole, too subservient to the status quo of individuals 
(and states) as primary agents of global justice. There is more TNCs can do on 
the behalf of poor individuals than is envisioned in Shue’s theory, and we should 
not demand of corporations less than they can give. For these reasons, I think that 
rights-based accounts of global justice -  at least where Shue’s theory is 
concerned -  is inadequate for the purposes of pushing for a bigger role for TNCs 
in global justice, that is, as primary rather than secondary agents of global justice.
Ironically, Shue’s original intention was to precisely break away from the 
philosophers who “thought in hopelessly individualistic terms”, by positing 
TNCs in the picture (Shue, 1988: 696). The problem is that, he did not go far 
enough. Conceptually-speaking, his notion of TNCs as mediating institutions is 
still hopelessly trapped in a methodologically individualistic framework. As 
mentioned previously, methodological individualism is a doctrine that says that 
we cannot understand social phenomena without understanding actions. Since 
actions must be motivated by intentional states which (arguably) only individuals 
possess, we must analyse individuals (the “micro” foundations of social 
phenomena) in order to deduce “macro” explanations of the phenomena (Heath, 
2005). Shue’s theory is methodologically individualistic because it is concerned 
ultimately with correlativity as between individual right-holders and duty- 
bearers, with TNCs as an intermediary -  rather than TNCs as institutional agents 
in their own right.
Without going into the metaphysics of the corporate form, I see no reason 
why we should accept this framework and suddenly impose on the theory of 
global justice a structure of interpretive social science that is committed to 
individual action only. What about action by TNCs as institutional agents of
- 7 8 -
justice in their own right? If we are able to envision states, which are themselves 
collectives, as basic political units in our political theories of global justice, why 
not other collective (but separate) entities like TNCs? It seems to me that, instead 
of talking about new ethical relationships created by institutions that stand 
between potential individual right-holders and potential duty-bearers, and that are 
designed expressly to allocate previously unallocated duties -  duties and rights 
which exhibit weak correlativity at best -  we should be talking about what moral 
duties institutions like TNCs have -  for example, what responsibilities a TNC 
that exploits poor workers has towards them, or what responsibilities a TNC has 
towards its investors and consumers -  relationships that retain strong 
correlativity. The issue, then, should turn on what the moral relations between the 
potential duty-bearing institution and the individual rights claimant are, rather 
than attempting to generate what seem to be ad hoc close ties through 
institutional means.
But even then, it does not follow from the positing of institutional agents 
of global justice that we can posit TNCs in particular as primary agents of global 
justice. To do so would be to rely on a built-in assumption that TNCs are one of 
the institutions in the running as primary agents of justice in the first place, which 
brings us back to the question ‘Why TNCs?’. Intuitively, while the talk of human 
rights resonates with the idea of those rights being fulfilled by individual or 
statist agents, the connection does not come as naturally when we think about 
corporations or corporate agents. Theoretically-speaking, the principles of duty 
allocation must still be argued, in order to answer the question ‘Why TNCs?’. 
Even rights-based theorists concede that fact: “The allocation of the duties will 
have to be done according to principles that, after argument, seem reasonable... 
But justifying a particular principle and the assignment it dictates is a task for 
another occasion, even though what has been said so far can be neither fully 
practical nor fully persuasive until that task is completed” (Shue, 1988: 703).
My contention here is merely that, if the distribution of responsibilities 
must ultimately still be argued in order to tie human rights to TNCs, then we need 
to ask whether engaging the doctrine of human rights adds normative value to an 
account of responsibilities as compared to just going on a purely duty-based
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account of CSR. From what we have seen, it does not seem like a lot. To 
summarise my critique so far, the way rights-based theorists like Shue have 
incorporated TNCs into their framework of pluralized global just agency revolves 
around the central concern of establishing correlativity between rights and duties, 
which turns on how closely tied the rights claimants and duty-bearers are. As I 
have argued, using institutions like TNCs to mediate this ethical relationship 
generates weak correlativity on one interpretation (that is, correlativity that only 
requires the type of duty-bearer to be specified, not the specific duty-bearer). On 
another interpretation, it negates the need for correlativity altogether (because the 
rights and duties of specific individuals exist whether or not correlativity can be 
established). Moreover, I have also argued that viewing TNCs as mediating 
institutions in this way unnecessarily limits the role of TNCs to being secondary, 
rather than primary agents, of global justice. For these reasons, I think that rights- 
based accounts of global justice are inadequate for a theory of CSR.
Even if these problems were only specific to Shue’s argument and not 
generalisable to all rights-based accounts, the question ‘Why TNCs?’ still 
remains. All rights-based accounts must eventually still return to the issue of duty 
allocation, as we have seen. For this reason, rights-based accounts of global 
justice are also insufficient for a theory of CSR, because they still entail a 
philosophical enquiry into the moral bases for corporate responsibility. If this is 
the case, and given the problems elucidated here, why bother with rights-based 
theories then? As demonstrated later on, human rights are not required to 
determine what roles TNCs should play in global justice. In a duty-based 
approach, the criterion to determine these moral reasons is set by providing a 
normative account of the moral basis for CSR, rather than talking about human 
rights.
But perhaps it is the case that, despite these conceptual problems, there 
are other reasons to present a human rights case for CSR. After all, it seems 
natural to ask why, despite the philosophical problems highlighted here, rights- 
based theories have nonetheless dominated the discourse on global justice and 
CSR for so long. The predominance of the language of rights and rights-based 
reasoning in discussions about CSR has various sources. It is partly historical and
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partly political. International cooperation has historically relied heavily on the 
discourse of rights (no matter how flimsy). The first evidence of corporate 
activism that appeared in the 19 century was over the issue of slavery: boycotts 
of companies participating in the slave trade or the shipping and sale of slave- 
grown products, the eventual abolition of slavery -these were all done on the 
basis of claims about the rights of man, thus launching the world’s first 
international human rights movement (Oliveiro and Simmons, 2002). In the 21st 
century, the authority of these claims has continued. The UN is committed to 
several declarations and conventions on human rights, in particular the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UNDHR”) and the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (“MDG”). It is unsurprising then that the agenda of the UN 
Global Compact, being a UN initiative and indeed the world’s largest global 
corporate citizenship initiative, should be to exhibit and build the social 
legitimacy of business around the UN’s own commitments to human rights as 
enshrined in the UNDHR and MDG. Moreover, the concerns of corporations 
themselves are often also tied to that of their lobbyists. International non­
governmental organizations (INGOs) like Amnesty International, for example, 
whose agenda is focused on human rights issues, are increasingly well-organised, 
with a growing international membership and greater media coverage, and have 
become a very real force in trying to lobby or compel corporations to cooperate 
in advancing human rights (Owen, 2002; O’Mahony, 2004). Historically- 
speaking, therefore, a grand movement to secure respect for human rights has 
always underpinned the evolution of CSR.
In terms of politics, no one denies that the concept of universal human 
rights is an ennobling one. It invokes universal standards, and therefore reaches 
each person on a very individual and deep level. This makes ethical deliberation 
conducted in terms of rights accessible to everyone, whether it be policy-makers, 
corporations or the man on the street. For this reason, it also makes good 
publicity for companies. But good rhetoric is still rhetoric. Moreover, as we have 
seen in this section, the “reifying vocabulary” for individuating rights obscures 
underlying correlativity problems (O’Neill, 1986: 118). Philosophically-
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speaking, I hope to have shown here the reasons why we should reject a rights- 
based approach to a theory of CSR.
2.3 Global justice as duty
The question that follows naturally is whether a duty-based account of global 
justice is (i) adequate and sufficient to do all the normative work to ground a 
theory of CSR, and (ii) presents TNCs as primary agents of global justice? 
Although the rights-based approach has been discredited on both counts here, it 
does not naturally follow that the duty-based approach is poised to take up these 
tasks. For that, we turn to the arguments for a duty-based theory of CSR.
2.3.1 Is ‘global justice as duty9 adequate and sufficient
to ground a theory of CSR?
As far as this question is concerned, the debate is really centred around the more 
general issue of imperfection in rights-based and duty-based theories. But as we 
shall see, the practical importance of poverty alleviation through CSR does 
become significant in the debate.
There is no avoiding the fact that duty-based theories sometimes face the 
same problem of imperfect duties as rights-based theories do -  but with a 
difference! Where duty is based on contribution to harm or a special relationship 
(for example, spousal or parental duties), the duty-bearer in question is usually 
easy to specify, relatively-speaking. But imperfect duties become a problem 
when the causal or relational links are complex and not as straightforwardly 
traceable. Alternatively, there may be cases whereby there is no specifiable duty- 
bearer or claimant, but the existence of a duty is claimed on other philosophical 
grounds, such as capability (O’Neill, 2001) or political responsibility (Young, 
2003; 2006). In these situations, it may be the case that no one particular actor 
has the duty to feed X, but political responsibility dictates that someone should 
(the problem of imperfect duties); or it may be the case that a particular actor is 
capable of feeding someone, but this does not mean that he/she should feed 
everyone (the problem of wide duties).
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So far, so imperfect: the gap between claimant and duty-bearer seems 
impartial between rights- and duty-based reasonings. However, further reflection 
reveals several points of difference. Firstly, while the imperfection that arises in 
rights-based theories is captured by a correlativity gap, the imperfection that 
arises in duty-based theories is not a correlativity problem. Another way of 
putting it is that an appeal to some right must be able to demonstrate a correlative 
duty, even if it is an imperfect duty, but duty-based reasoning allows for 
imperfect duties without corresponding rights. The significance of this in terms of 
just action is that, where duties rather than rights are fundamental, imperfection 
leads to different outcomes. Where rights generate imperfect duties that cannot be 
allocated to a specifiable agent, just action will depend on the charity or optional 
beneficence of agents, which in turn depends on preferences and values.74 
However, when duties are fundamental, just action is required by justice even
n  c
where duties are imperfect. In other words, if the ‘from whom’/ ’to whom’ 
questions are not answered, then on the rights-based account, I have no 
specifiable duty to meet an unfulfilled right, because the right cannot be shown to 
be correlative to any duty on my part. But on a duty-based account, my duty 
survives even if there is no specifiable right-holder; conversely, even if the duties 
cannot be allocated to me or any other specifiable agent, they remain duties at 
large as a matter of justice. Hence, “deliberation in which obligations rather than 
rights are taken as fundamental would not need to draw so sharp a distinction 
between obligations with and without assignable bearers and claimants” (O’Neill, 
1986: 103). Just action, in this case, is not subject to preferences and values, but 
falls within the purview of justice and is constitutionally demanded by justice. In 
this sense, a theory of justice that treats obligations as primitive is more action- 
guiding.76
74 I present this here as an undesirable outcome. However, note that some theorists like John 
Tasioulas (2007) do not see a problem in casting imperfect duties as matters o f altruism, charity, 
mercy, gratitude. Tasioulas merely sees them as falling outside the domain o f justice.
75 Although imperfect duties may still be met by charity in this case.
76 Although, as O’Neill points out, neither rights-based or duty-based approaches to justice can 
guide action with the same precision as results-based approaches, since “neither offers an 
algorithm for identifying an optimal action for each context” (1986: 104). The objections to
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This then leads us to the pragmatic question: Of what good is an 
imperfect duty to a petitioner, even if it exists independently of any appeal to 
rights? His/her claim is still a demand for others’ action, albeit a demand of 
justice. If a petitioner is unable to obtain duty-fulfilling just action on the part of 
any specifiable agent, does his/her claim amount to mere rhetoric as in the case of 
manifesto rights claims? This line of argument is, in my opinion, misguided. It 
mistakenly picks up the rhetoric of the rights discourse, in which universal rights 
do not secure universal duties, yet whose appeal is accessible across social, 
political and ideological boundaries. The concern with rhetorical rights claims is 
that a discourse about justice conducted through the recipient’s perspective skims 
over hard questions about correlative duties: “an appeal to rights can be heard so 
widely [only] because it depicts the holders of rights only under the most 
indeterminate descriptions, as abstract individuals with unspecified, unmet needs 
or desires or preferences and with unspecified plans and potential for action” 
(O’Neill, 1986: 117). The fear for the petitioner here, in this case, is that this 
“potential for action” based on a rights claim is not fulfilled because the potential 
bearer of the correlative duty is not specifiable. So even if the right itself can be 
established, respect for rights cannot be secured.
However, unlike the rights discourse, an appeal to duty has as its audience 
not a universal pool of right-holders, but rather a determinate pool of duty- 
bearers who meet a particular set of principles of duty allocation (whatever these 
may be). For this select pool, the key question that a duty-based approach to 
global justice asks is ‘Who owes what to whom?’. The pragmatic significance of 
this shift from a recipient perspective to a donor perspective is that the onus is no 
longer on the suffering petitioner who must passively accept that his/her right 
may lie unclaimed or unenforced where there is no specifiable duty-bearer. 
Rather, the onus is now on the potential duty-bearer who has the power to bring 
about change, and whose just action can be actively and legitimately claimed 
based on the principles of justice. This is the difference between a rhetoric of 
rights that addresses the right-holder but not (or only correlatively) the duty-
consequentialist reasoning for our present purposes have already been explained previously (see 
fn 43 and 62).
- 8 4 -
bearer, and a discourse of duties that addresses directly those whose action can 
institutionalize and secure respect for rights: “It is powerful agents and agencies 
who command and benefit; but the rhetoric of rights speaks mainly to the 
powerless” (O’Neill, 1986: 120).
Nonetheless, one may still come back with the following objection: even if 
our principles of duties are able to specify who the duty-bearers are, there remains 
the problem of wide duties, namely, the question ‘to whom’ these duties are owed. 
This guidance gap keeps cropping up in CSR in particular: companies may 
reasonably ask, even if they accept that they have a moral imperative to be socially 
responsible, to whom exactly should they be socially responsible towards? This is 
the reverse case of duties without correlative rights -  that is, when there is no 
specifiable right-holder -  which can occur even when obligations rather than rights 
are treated as ethically fundamental. In response, I am not convinced that the 
question of ‘what’ and ‘to whom’ duties are owed amounts to an argument against 
the case for global justice as duty, since the same questions apply when we talk 
about human rights. What is important is that fundamental duties will 
simultaneously secure some rights. Or, more accurately, the institutionalization of 
duties in our policies and laws will simultaneously secure the rights that we are 
concerned about -  “[t]o will the end is to will the means” (Sen, 1984; Shue, 1984:
7794) -  without the pitfalls of rights-based approaches.
On an institutional level at least, duty-based models of social regulation are 
not a foreign idea. Already, many of our attempts to legislate corporate governance 
-  for example, company law, law of contracts, insolvency law, even criminal law -  
emphasize the duties of the company (as a separate legal entity with its own legal 
personality) towards other individuals. While some of the claims against the 
company are undoubtedly predicated upon some right that others hold, they are not 
prior in the sense that the articulation of these rights is not a necessary pre­
condition for enforcing or claiming the duties in question, whether fiduciary or 
otherwise. For example, it is possible to argue for the obligations of a company in 
liquidation towards its creditors without reference to the rights of the creditors.
77 Although Shue maintains that these duties are correlative to their rights rather than fundamental.
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This is not to say that institutional duties can be equated with moral duties, but 
merely to defend duty-based moral arguments from the criticism of practical 
irrelevance. Given the arguments on the whole so far, there seems to be no reason 
therefore to retain a rights-based model of CSR. In fact, if the arguments here have 
been persuasive, there seems to be more reason to push for a duty-based model of 
CSR instead, one that extends the responsibilities of TNCs in existing legal 
jurisdictions to include their moral responsibilities towards others as well.
2.3.2 Does ‘global justice as duty’ present TNCs 
as primary agents of global justice?
This question concerns the “division of labour” between the plurality of agents of 
global justice, and how TNCs fit into the scheme of things. As we have seen, even 
rights-based theories of justice must eventually address the question of duty 
allocation and the principles that govern the assignment of duties (correlative to 
rights) to agents of different of varying types and capabilities. By now, I hope to 
have established that it is duties rather than rights that are “the active aspects of 
justice” (O’Neill, 2001: 42). One of the concerns about rights-based approaches to 
global justice (according to Shue’s theory, at least) was that they limited the role of 
TNCs in global justice. The criticism there was that rights-based theories relegated 
TNCs who had the potential to be primary agents of justice to the role of secondary 
agents instead, and this was objectionable because, among other things, it was too 
subservient to the status quo of individuals and states as the primary agents of 
justice. The question we turn to now is whether duty-based arguments for the 
plurality of agents of justice avoid this sort of “hidden statism” (O’Neill, 2001: 
43).
At first glance, it seems that they do. In her 2001 paper Agents o f Justice, 
Onora O’Neill soundly criticizes the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UNDHR”) firstly for taking a “non-universalist view of the allocation of 
obligations” by treating states as the primary agents of justice tout court, and 
secondly for not making this “wholly explicit” (41, 42). The problem, it seems, lies 
in the disparity between the cosmopolitan rhetoric of contemporary discussions of 
justice and the statist nature of contemporary practices of justice, both of which are
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by and large rights-based. Because rights-based theories say little or nothing about 
the allocation of duties, rights-based policies are similarly opaque about the 
allocation of the obligations of justice. This, according to O’Neill, has led to a 
situation whereby human rights initiatives like the UNDHR simply sidestep the 
question of duty allocation by privileging states as the primary agents of justice, 
while at the same time espousing cosmopolitan aspirations: “A cosmopolitan view 
of rights is to be spliced with a statist view of obligations” (O’Neill, 2001: 42). As 
we have seen from the beginning, the same can be said about the UN Global 
Compact and the Norms, which pursue a policy of inclusion aimed at TNCs, while 
at the same time positing states as the primary agents of justice. In other words, 
these rights-based initiatives assume a picture of “global citizenship” that is in 
reality exclusively made up of “a plurality of bounded states” rather than a 
plurality of different agents of justice (O’Neill, 2001: 42).
The expectation, of course, is that duty-based approaches, which have as 
their starting point the allocation of duties among various agents rather than 
appeals to human rights, will provide “a more robust view of the plurality of agents 
of justice” (O’Neill, 2001: 38). In reality, however, the momentum created by this 
move away from state-centric views is not carried very far in the end. Of special 
interest to us in the present case is Onora O’Neill’s (2001) attempt to broaden the 
role of non-state agents in global justice, since she has consistently argued for a
752deontic approach to global justice and specifically addresses the role of TNCs. 
O’Neill’s first step is to create a bifurcated system of agency consisting of primary 
and secondary agents of justice. Primary agents of justice are defined as agents 
who may construct or assign powers to other agents. Secondary agents of justice 
are defined as agents whose contribution to justice is meeting the demands of 
primary agents and are (at least partially) controlled by primary agents. Her next 
step is to posit TNCs in this framework. On the one hand, she seems to pick up the 
concern about state centricism and TNCs’ limited role in rights-based theories of 
global justice by arguing that TNCs have the capabilities to contribute to greater
78 She also discusses briefly other non-state actors like international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) and what she refers to as global social movements (GSMs) -  that is, “social, 
political and epistemic movements that operate across borders” (O’Neill, 1988:47).
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justice, to be more than secondary agents of justice -  especially in weak states. In 
other words, O’Neill portrays TNCs as more than mere law abiders. They may, for 
example, insist on decent labour or environmental practices in the absence of any 
law that requires them to do so -  and indeed, she points out that they already do so 
in practice.
On the other hand, she resists elevating TNCs to the role of primary agents 
of justice, a role which she reserves exclusively for states -  even when they are 
weak. The result is a conception of the role of TNCs in global justice as more than 
secondary agents but not quite primary agents, one that lies somewhere along a 
spectrum in between the two, made up of a broad range of non-state actors with a 
broad range of capabilities: “But once we look at the realities of life where states 
are weak, any simple division between primary and secondary agents of justice 
blurs. Justice has to be built by a diversity of agents and agencies that possess and 
lack varying ranges of capabilities, and can contribute to justice... in more diverse 
ways than is generally acknowledged...” (O’Neill, 2001: 50). Like the rights 
theorists, therefore, it would seem that although O’Neill prioritises duties when 
contemplating the role of TNCs within a more pluralized understanding of just 
agency, her notion of TNC responsibility is still subservient to the status quo of 
states as primary agents.
There are a few possible reasons why this might be so. The first reason 
could be that O’Neill is appealing to a prevailing notion of the nation-state in 
political theory: that states are “the best primary agents available” because they 
work within a defined bounded territory, within which they legitimately exercise a 
monopoly of the use of coercion to those who are within that territory and against 
outsiders (O’Neill, 2001: 38). The worry here seems to be that, although TNCs 
may acquire “selected state-like capabilities”, still they do not possess “the range 
of capabilities held by states that succeed in being primary agents of justice” 
(O’Neill, 2001: 46). Examples of these capabilities that TNCs are missing include 
securing the rule of law, the collection of taxes and the provision of welfare - all of 
which O’Neill says are necessary for securing the full measure of justice. Hence, 
the conclusion is to agree that TNCs can and should do more, but to qualify that by 
saying that they are not able to do as much as a successful state could: “[ajlthough
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TNCs may be ill constructed to substitute for the full range of contributions that 
states can (but often fail to) make to justice, there are many contributions that they 
can make especially when states are weak” (O’Neill, 2001: 50).
I think that this “middling” conception of the role of TNCs in global justice 
is the result of an exaggeration of the differential between the capabilities of states 
and TNCs. When we say that states are better equipped than TNCs, it is not 
enough to simply state that as a proposition. The question we should be asking is 
what exactly are they better equipped to do? If the argument is that TNCs cannot 
do all the things that states can, then my response is that this is not what we are 
asking them to do when we posit TNCs as primary agents of justice; we are not 
asking TNCs to become states. To do so would be to appeal to an in-built 
assumption that primary agency consists of the whole range of capabilities that 
only states possess. The argument is open to a tautologous interpretation, because 
whatever capabilities that TNCs lack but that states possess will be taken to define 
the scope of primary agency. This is my conceptual objection to O’Neill’s 
argument.
The empirical objection, of course, is that justice does not require that 
TNCs possess all the capabilities that states do. TNCs are called upon to do 
different things in their role as primary agents of global justice, and more often 
than not, they are called on to do so directly, not through the medium of the state. 
The question that a non-state-centric conception of agency should be asking is this: 
What exactly are the specific developmental goals that are being hoped will be 
achieved, and do TNCs possess the capabilities to achieve these goals? As I 
illustrate in greater detail in chapter 4, the private sector can harness its capabilities 
innovatively to aid developing countries. These include not just foreign 
development investment (FDI), but also the capability of creating new markets at 
the bottom of the pyramid, growing domestic enterprises and business networks, 
setting standards, and promoting broader cooperation with government and civil 
society initiatives. If we recall the definition of a “primary agent”, it would seem 
that TNCs do in fact possess the capabilities to construct or assign powers to other 
agents in order to operationalise these goals. By appealing to the characteristics of 
a nation-state to flesh out her conception of a primary agent, O’Neill is confusing
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the issue of what constitutes a basic political unit and what constitutes a primary 
agent.
The second possible reason for O’Neill’s constrained conception of TNC 
agency could be that she is indeed appealing to the prevailing status quo of states 
as primary agents of justice. According to this view, only when states fail as 
primary agents of justice, or when they are too weak to act as primary agents of 
justice, do other agents and agencies become important agents of justice. The role 
of TNCs is, in this sense, an interventionist one, which is activated only when 
states are weak or failed. Again, there are conceptual and empirical objections to 
this argument. Firstly, an interventionist role does not necessarily preclude TNCs 
from primary agency, if our understanding of a “primary agent” is consistent with 
O’Neill’s own understanding. It is merely an appeal to the chronology of action by 
various agents (that is, TNCs only intervene when states fail or become weak), 
rather than constitutive of the character of that agency itself. Secondly, it is 
important to realize that capability is not the only moral basis for corporate 
responsibility. As I mention in the next chapter (chapter 3), there are other moral 
instances where TNCs’ responsibility towards others is activated - for example, 
when they have contributed to the harm in question themselves. In this case, justice 
demands that TNCs take action on moral grounds which are not conditioned on the 
existence of a weak or failed state.
At the end of the chapter, I have made the case for why we should think of CSR 
and the role of TNCs in global justice in terms of ‘duties’ rather than ‘rights’. I 
have also countered the arguments why TNCs should not be primary agents of 
justice. As we saw, not only were theories that prioritise duties rather than rights 
more poised to guide corporate action, they also envisioned the possibility of 
TNCs as primary agents of global justice. But, even if one does not accept the 
conception of global justice as duty, we saw that an appeal to the doctrine of 
human rights must eventually still address the issue of allocation of duties. And it 
is to this task of filling out the categories of corporate duties that we turn to next.
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3Why TNCs ought to play a role in global justice: The 
capabilities argument for CSR
This chapter picks up the question left unanswered in the previous two chapters, 
namely, ‘Why TNCs?’. In chapter 1, it was argued that the answer to this question 
should not be sought by “fitting” TNCs into the various “grand theories” of what 
an ideal cosmopolitan just global order looked like. Instead, I argued that a theory 
of CSR should be constructed from ground up, by building a theory of 
responsibility that would lead to answers regarding the global just agency of 
specific actors like TNCs. Taking up this theme of ‘responsibility’, Chapter 2 then 
laid the first plank in the construction of a theory of responsibility by addressing 
the predominant rights-based approach to global justice and providing arguments 
against a rights-based theory of CSR. Instead, the case for ‘justice as duty’ was 
presented. Notwithstanding, I concluded by pointing out that even those who 
insisted on couching global justice in human rights terms must eventually still 
“shift [their] approach to human rights, from a recipient-centric articulation of 
rights to an agent-centric approach, focusing on identifying those with the 
capacities and obligations to deliver on rights” (Kuper, 2005b: xi). Hence, our 
preoccupation with corporate just agency brings us - and that includes both rights-
• • • 70and duty- based theorists -  right back at the issue of responsibility.
This chapter, therefore, draws the two arguments together to focus on the 
question of ‘corporate responsibility’ -  to explain what it is and to elucidate an 
account of the categories of corporate responsibility that underpin the moral claim 
that TNCs ought to play a role in global justice.
3.1 The notion of ‘responsibility9
The construction of a theory of corporate responsibility must start with asking what 
‘responsibility’ means. There are several ways of looking at the notion of
79 Again, ‘responsibility’, ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ are used interchangeably here (see fn 50).
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‘responsibility’. In a mundane sense, we might say that inflation is responsible for 
higher food prices, for example. This sense of responsibility identifies a causal 
process or sequence of events, but it is not the sense of ‘responsibility’ that we are 
interested in here. The sense of ‘responsibility’ that we are interested in here is 
responsibility in a moral sense, or ‘moral responsibility’. Questions of moral 
responsibility are most often questions about the criteria for moral assessment, and 
they can arise in different ways.
For example, we might say that a parent has a personal responsibility to 
care for his/her sick child. If the child dies as a result of a failure to provide such 
parental care, then we might say that the parent has no one to blame but 
him/herself. This may in turn depend on associated questions of freedom, 
voluntariness and choice (Scanlon, 1998) -  for example, whether the parent’s 
failure was due to the lack of resources to seek medical help or buy life-saving 
medicine that was beyond his/her control. These questions of moral responsibility 
pertain to responsibility in the sense of attributability.80 Responsibility in the sense 
of attributability involves substantive claims about what we are or are not required 
to do for each other, which in turn depend on whether or how much we think a 
particular agent should be him/herself responsible for a particular outcome. In 
other words, judgments of substantive responsibility are sensitive to the particular 
agent’s choice in voluntarily bringing about the particular outcome and, indeed, 
his/her freedom and opportunity to choose (Scanlon, 1998). What is so special 
about violations of the morality of choice is that there is both a personal aspect and 
an internal aspect to responsibility in this sense. It is personal because one of the 
central ideas in judging whether someone can be attributed responsibility for 
his/her choice of action is “whether the action discloses something about the nature 
of the agent’s self’ (Eshleman, 2004: 11). In other words, one’s actions not only 
depend on, but also reveal, one’s choices. It is personal because it reveals some 
inner attitudinal state or value commitment properly belonging to the actor and can 
be traced back to him personally. It is also internal because “the reasons one has 
failed to respond to are grounded not just in some value that others also recognize
80 Scanlon describes them as “judgments o f substantive responsibility” (1998: 248).
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but in their own value as rational creatures” (Scanlon, 1998: 271-2). In other 
words, the reasons for attributing responsibility to an agent can also be the reasons 
for the agent’s self-reproach or negative evaluation of him/herself. So the analysis 
of whether responsibility can be attributed personally to an agent supports a 
parallel internal account of guilt on the part of the agent. This is responsibility in 
the sense of attributability.
Moral responsibility can also be understood in terms of accountability. To 
return to the above example of the sick child. A bystander who pays for his 
neighbour’s child to seek medical attention which the parent would not otherwise 
afford might attract our praise. Conversely, an individual who did not at least 
notify social services of the child’s plight might be regarded by us as worthy of 
blame. Here, responsibility in the sense of accountability pertains to moral 
questions about whether some action can be attributed to an agent as a 
precondition or basis for moral appraisal -  praise or blame are the most obvious
O'}
reactions. It appeals to the agent’s judgment-sensitive attitude, that is, the agent’s 
sensitivity to the external judgment of others. Accountability is what makes the 
action wrong rather than merely harmful, appropriate for a third party to react with 
indignation rather than merely dismay or pity. In turn, one may react with praise or 
blame to the agent’s action either because we think it deserves such a response (the 
‘merit-based view’), or because we think that our reaction will likely lead to a 
change in the agent’s behaviour (the ‘consequentialist view’) (Eshleman, 2004). 
Responsibility in the sense of accountability often presupposes attributability. In 
addition, to say that someone is responsible in the further sense of being 
accountable requires that the action attributed to him be judged against some 
objective criteria or interpersonal normative standard of conduct (Eshleman, 2004). 
These criteria create expectations between people of how the other should behave,
81 Although Scanlon states that moral responsibility in this sense can only be applied to rational 
creatures who are capable o f reflective self-governance, he does not explicitly state that this 
includes only human individuals or that it excludes non-person entities (like TNCs). The issue 
harks back to the critique o f the doctrine o f methodological individualism in the previous chapter, 
which posits that only human individuals possess the requisite intentional states for action. The 
issue is revisited later on in this chapter.
82 Confusingly, Scanlon calls this ‘responsibility as attributability’ (1998: 248).
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and we appeal to them to justify our judgments of others. For example, we attach 
normative expectations to certain social roles, and hold those who take on those 
roles accountable for fulfilling our expectations. So accountability arises when a 
person is judged for his actions from an external perspective. To hold someone 
responsible in the sense of accountability is to expect him to acknowledge the 
validity of my judgment of him based on our commonly held standards of conduct, 
or to demand an explanation for his behaviour.
Put in another way, the distinction between responsibility in the sense of 
attributability and of accountability is the distinction between being responsible 
and holding one responsible. Responsibility in the sense of attributability allows us 
to identify the agent who is responsible and the justifiable scope of a claim against 
him. Responsibility in the accountability sense, on the other hand, allows us to 
identify who we can hold responsible to deliver on the set of claims delineated by 
the first question. The two often conflate, but one does not necessarily lead to the 
other; the person whose action gives rise to a claim in justice is not always the one 
responsible for doing something about it. Regarding this distinction, Thomas 
Scanlon cites as an illustration the sailors in Aristotle’s example, where a group of 
sailors jettison the ship’s cargo in order to save the ship from being sunk in a storm 
(1998: 291-2). Scanlon suggests that, in this example, while the action may be 
attributed to the sailors,83 it may not be proper to hold them accountable for the 
loss of cargo or make them liable to compensate for the cargo they jettisoned.
Nonetheless, responsibility in both senses is required for what has been 
called “a complete attribution of responsibility” (Green, 2005: 118; Kuper, 2005b). 
However, the changing nature of our global world challenges the notion of a 
complete attribution of responsibility. Consider the case of child slavery in the 
cocoa industry.84 In an increasingly seamless world market, it is clear that as long 
as there is demand for chocolate in the developed world, poor families in the 
developing world will continue to sell their children to work on cocoa farms. Yet,
83 Although presumably one could make the argument that they were coerced and that there was 
involuntariness of choice in this case.
84 The following account of child labour and child trafficking and slavery in the cocoa industry is 
part of my own empirical research.
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no one individual is the cause of the 284,000 children labouring on cocoa farms in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, of which approximately 12,500 are suspected to be victims of
Of
trafficking and slavery. It is best described as a case of uncoordinated collective 
harm. The fact that you or I go to the store and buy a single Mars bar does not 
necessarily make us personally responsible for the abuse and exploitation of 
children on cocoa farms in developing countries like Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana. 
Firstly, my unilateral contribution to the worldwide demand for cocoa is so 
negligible as to make no difference to anyone. Secondly, my action is considerably 
far removed from the harm -  the cocoa harvested by a child slave is sold through at 
least two layers of middlemen, and then to exporters, distributors, chocolate 
manufacturers and retailers, before it reaches me. In the process, it is mixed with 
“slave-free cocoa”, such that it is impossible to trace the source of the cocoa that 
goes into the final product I purchased. So it would be hard to say that I, as the 
consumer, was responsible in the sense of attributability for the cocoa slave 
children’s plight because there are so many intervening factors standing between 
them and myself. To put it counterfactually, it would be unreasonable to claim that 
if I had not bought the single Mars bar, there would be no child slavery in the 
cocoa industry. But recent trends make it easier to say that I am responsible in the 
sense of accountability. The advent of movements like Fair Trade chocolate, for 
example, is increasing consumer awareness of our responsibility in the sense of 
accountability, because it changes our social notions of what is or is not morally 
acceptable and our expectations of each other. In this case, we have a situation 
where we may not be responsible in the sense of attributability, but are nonetheless 
responsible in the sense of accountability. Accountability without attributability 
fails the criterion of a complete attribution of responsibility.
Can theorizing the role of TNCs in global justice solve the problem of 
accountability without attributability? Different global justice thinkers have 
responded in different ways to meet the challenge. It has been suggested that TNCs
85 This is but a drop in the bucket compared to the 69 million child labourers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, according to UNICEF figures published in 2007 (UNICEF, 2007: 43).
86 The phrase is a common one, and used among others by Michael Green (2005) to describe the 
case o f global climate change.
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can “plug the responsibility gap”, so to speak, in three main ways: either (i) they 
stand as mediating institutions between potential individual duty-bearers and the 
victims of injustice (Shue, 1988), a proposition that I criticized previously in 
chapter 2, or (ii) they expand the scope of individual responsibility by being part of 
an unjust global institutional order that causes, perpetuates, and sustains poverty, 
which individuals are complicit in (for example, by being shareholders or 
consumers of the “tainted” products that these companies produce) (Pogge, 2002a 
etc.),87 or (iii) in addition, Iris Marion Young (2006) argues for individual 
responsibility in relation to global injustices with a model similar to Shue’s -  
namely, the ‘social connection model’ of responsibilities. In this model, 
institutions like TNCs mediate a social connection between individuals and the 
distant poor through a complex global structure and process -  for example, through 
the processes of production, investment and trade etc. Special attention is given to 
the case of our obligations as consumers towards sweatshop labourers in both 
developed and developing countries who produce goods that we buy. However, 
Young’s model differs from Shue’s in one respect: In the social connection model, 
the ethical relationship is “prior to” the institution (Young, 2006: 105). In other 
words, a social contract -  albeit one that transcends political boundaries -  exists
O Q
between all human individuals independently of any political institutions. 
Institutions like TNCs do not mediate or bring about these ethical relationships. 
They (merely) regulate the fairness of the social contract and provide the means 
through which the obligations under the social contract can be discharged: “A need 
for political institutions... follows from  the global scope of obligations of justice, 
rather than grounding these obligations.” (Young, 2006: 105-106)
In these three models of global justice in which TNCs feature, the 
individual himself does not directly cause the harm, but is seen to play a strategic 
role in a process of events that lead to the harm.89 The interposition of TNCs in the
87 Pogge’s theory is critically discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
88 Young does not explain this social contract or how it comes about, for example, whether it is an 
implicit social contract based on our common humanity.
89 In this sense, it is better to say that the individual “has a responsibility” towards the victim, rather 
than saying that he “owes a duty” towards the victim, which connotes a more direct causal link.
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picture is intended to expand the boundaries of an individual’s responsibility, 
either by extrapolating an ethical relationship between him and the victim (for 
example, if the individual buys from the company a product produced by a distant 
poor person under unjust circumstances), or by showing that he can be deemed to 
have caused more harm than he thinks (for example, by buying the product, the 
individual is personally endorsing the company’s participation in a global trading 
system that causes and perpetuates such injustice, and the system itself). The three 
conceptions of the role of TNCs in global justice are distinctive in another way. 
They all appeal to a structure of interpretive social science that is methodologically 
individualistic, meaning that they privilege individuals as the only ones capable of 
intentional moral action.90 Hence, the role of TNCs here is secondary, in the sense 
that the sole moral agent that this sort of political theory is concerned about is the 
individual. In an individualistic scheme, TNCs merely play an instrumental 
function, that is, in expanding the scope of the individual’s responsibility as 
described.
This solves the problem of accountability without attributability in the 
individual’s case. Increasingly, however, an individualistic understanding of 
responsibility is inadequate for understanding corporate responsibility and 
regulating large-scale global problems. As the international political order evolves 
into a “multi-level system” with “multiple players in functionally differentiated 
fields of activities”, the role of the individual has diminished just as the role of 
large institutional entities such as TNCs has risen (Kreide, 2007b). The key reason 
for this shift is that large companies are better positioned to make the changes that 
our global problems need compared to individual agents.
90 Technically speaking, to reiterate here, the reason why analytical theory is committed to 
methodological individualism is not because it privileges the individual, but because it privileges an 
action-theoretic level o f explanation. What makes methodological individualism ‘methodological’ 
is that we impose a structure o f interpretive social science that says that we cannot understand 
social phenomena without understanding actions. Since actions must be motivated by intentional 
states which (arguably) only individuals possess, we must analyse individuals (die “micro” 
foundations o f social phenomena) in order to deduce “macro” explanations o f the phenomena. The 
‘individualism’ in methodological individualism is, in a sense, no more than a by-product of  
analytical theory’s central theoretical commitment to action theory (Heath, 2005).
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Take the case of child slavery in the cocoa industry again. Most cocoa 
farms are run by independent small farmers. Low prices for their cocoa mean that 
income-poor farmers pull their children out of school to work on their family’s 
cocoa farm instead of using paid labour. In the worst forms of child labour, 
children are outrightly trafficked and sold as slaves for money. The most urgent 
solution is to establish a “child slavery-free cocoa” certification system to eradicate 
the worst forms of child labour.91 But the longer-term solution is to pay cocoa 
farmers a fairer price for their harvests, and to put in place a social program that 
takes care of those children whose families continue to need their income -  
including fair working conditions, education, health and welfare. The governments 
of the cocoa producing countries are too weak or failed to regulate this, being 
wrapped up in civil conflict (in Cote D’Ivoire, which produces 43% of the world’s 
cocoa) and corruption. Individual African middlemen are too scattered to 
coordinate a pricing scheme, let alone any social programs. In any case, they have 
no incentive to do so. Of course, individual consumers like you and I can boycott 
chocolate in order to place pressure on chocolate companies to take action. But 
individual action, unless organized and publicised through the media, is too small 
to make a difference on its own. It only underlines the point that it is the large 
chocolate companies, not individual agents, who have the capabilities to make the 
changes that are necessary to eradicate child slavery. As an industry, chocolate 
companies are highly consolidated (Hershey’s and Mars/M&M produce two-thirds 
of the world’s candy) and highly organized (viz., the World Cocoa Foundation, 
Chocolate Manufacturers’ Association of America). Unlike individual agents, they 
also have access to the resources and knowledge needed to implement the changes 
needed. Hence, it is wide acknowledged (even by NGOs, who have turned more 
and more from lobbying governments to lobbying TNCs) that large corporations 
are best positioned to solve the root cause of the problem of child labour: poverty.
91 In accordance with the Harkin-Engel Protocol signed in 2001, chocolate companies agreed to 
develop and implement certain initiatives to combat child slavery and child labour by the year 
2005. Among other things, the Protocol states that companies must verify and certify that their 
cocoa is produced without the “worst forms o f child labour” as defined by ILO Convention 182, 
and implement poverty remediation initiatives. The companies failed to meet the 2005 deadline and 
it was extended till July 2008. If they fail to meet the deadline again, a bill mandating a “child 
slavery-free” labelling system for chocolate is likely to be introduced in the United States in 2008.
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Moreover, the Fair Trade movement, whose chocolate products make up 1% of the 
market, demonstrates that it is quite viable for companies to pay farmers a 
guaranteed fair minimum price and still remain profitable.
Given the increasing and potential role of TNCs in global justice as agents 
in their own right, is there a normative argument for TNC responsibility, both in 
the sense of attributability and of accountability? That is to say, instead of talking 
about global justice in terms of the individual’s expanded responsibility through 
the conceptual intervention of TNCs, which does not correspond with the realities 
of tackling global justice, is there a way of talking about it in terms of corporate 
responsibility instead? In practice, corporate engagement in addressing the world’s 
social problems is not a new phenomenon (Oliveiro and Simmons, 2002). 
However, normative thinking about CSR and institutional just agency has 
remained doggedly individualistic. As we have said, TNCs play a role in global 
justice only insofar as they expand the boundaries of the individual agent’s moral 
responsibility (at least, according to Shue, Pogge and Young). It is the individual, 
rather than TNCs, that is the subject of political scrutiny. This stands in stark 
contrast with political reality where, as we have seen, it is large corporations that 
possess the capabilities to address large-scale global problems, not individual 
agents. In many global situations, it is also large corporations that are making a 
difference, not individual agents (O’Neill, 2001: 49). We therefore face the 
awkward situation where the social circumstances of TNCs’ role in global justice 
have changed, but the political conception of global agency has not.
Recent publications have seen a shift in philosophical focus from individual 
charity (Singer, 1972; 1999)93 to institutional agency (Kuper, 2005c; Green, 
2005)94 to corporate agency specifically (Lane, 2005; Kreide, 2007b). By
92 And which, moreover, are problematic (as discussed in chapters 2 and 4).
93 Peter Singer is probably the most famous advocate o f individual charity as a solution to poverty. 
See his seminal article “Famine, Affluence And Morality” (1972), reprinted together with a 
collection o f his articles in Writings On An Ethical Life (2000), including his New York Times 
Sunday Magazine article “The Singer Solution To World Poverty” (1999).
94 Kuper’s article - intended as a critique o f Singer’s individualistic approach to poverty alleviation 
-  provides sound empirical reasons (and some theoretical reasons) why the question o f  how to 
organise ourselves politically and economically to meet human rights claims is more compelling
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recognizing that large companies can do something to alleviate global poverty, we 
“cross a theoretical watershed” (Kreide, 2007b: 12). However, this does not 
automatically imply that large companies ought to do anything to alleviate global 
poverty. The first is an empirical claim, the second a normative claim. One does 
not invariably translate to the other. Moreover, as normative statements go, the 
more modest conclusion drawn in the literature is that, i f  they were responsible, 
and because they possess capabilities that individuals do not, “the responsibilities 
of institutional agents are always broader than those of individuals” (Green, 2005: 
129).
In normative terms, one could say that accountability without attributability 
becomes a problem again, because it seems “natural” to say that we hold a 
company accountable, for example, for injustices that have resulted from their 
business operations, but not to attribute responsibility to them “personally”. Let 
me explain. Unlike individuals, TNCs are not moral beings in the sense that you 
and I are. Human individuals have moral responsibilities qua human because they 
are thought to be qualitatively different from other known living species, capable 
of rationality and self-control (Eshleman, 2004). But TNCs are not human, so the 
idea that they can have moral responsibility is not an intuitive one. Moreover, the 
way we conceptualize power as agents and what constitutes intentional action also 
explains the appeal of the individualistic conception of responsibility in the sense 
of attributability, because it “correspond[s] to my understanding of myself as an 
agent” (Green, 2005: 122). In contrast, the idea that non-person entities like TNCs 
can be moral agents has attracted not consensus but controversy and debate, 
because TNCs do not possess the attributes commonly understood as necessary for 
personal responsibility.95 However, changing social norms and people’s attitudes 
towards TNCs may make it possible to ascribe to them responsibility in the sense 
of accountability: Because TNCs are in the position to do something to help the 
poor at relatively little cost to themselves, the prevailing view of third parties is
than the question of what we owe to the poor individually. Chiefly, it more reflective o f the 
complex causal story that is ‘poverty’ which Singer’s individualistic approach obscures.
95 It has also inspired at least two books that pose the question: Can Institutions Have 
Responsibilities? (Alston, 2005a). (This issue is also addressed in Erskine (2003).)
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that they should. So when we say that TNCs “should” be responsible, we do not 
usually intend to say that they are responsible in the sense of attributability. What 
we mean is that we have made a judgment concerning their actions and hold them 
responsible in the sense of accountability. To hold a corporate entity responsible in 
this way is to be one who demands an explanation and to whom an explanation is 
owed, based on some commonly-held criteria, as explained earlier. But to say that 
TNCs are responsible in the sense of attributability is a different thing. It suggests 
that, prior to being held responsible for taking remedial action or compensating for 
the harm caused, the TNC in question is somehow deemed morally blameworthy 
(or praiseworthy, whichever the case may be). But attributing responsibility to 
TNCs is not the same as attributing responsibility to individuals, because it jars 
with our notion of moral agents as people, as we have said.
Can the distinction between TNCs and individual agents throw any light on 
the normative question at hand? In other words, can a moral account of corporate 
responsibility -  that is, in the sense of attributability, not just accountability -  be 
elucidated by asking the following question: Are there any fundamental differences 
in the nature of responsibilities that can be attributed to TNCs and those that can be 
attributed to individuals?
I think there are. Firstly, capabilities become important when it comes to 
TNCs, because they are so much better positioned to solve large-scale global 
problems than individuals are. In the remainder of this chapter, the capabilities 
argument for CSR is critically analyzed and defended. Secondly, motivation also 
becomes important for TNCs, because they are primarily in the business of 
business, not human rights. A theory of CSR based on the notion of responsibility 
must, therefore, be supplemented by an account of why TNCs should adhere to the 
moral framework. I believe that in order for a theory of CSR to work, we need to 
theorize the business case for CSR, without which CSR as a theory of 
responsibility would not work. This is explored in chapter 5. The present chapter , 
however, focuses on the first point concerning the capabilities argument for CSR.
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3.2 The capabilities argument for CSR
No one disagrees with the broad claim that everyone, whether individuals or 
TNCs, is responsible in a general sense for the consequences resulting from their 
actions. Contribution to harm is a recognized principle and category of 
responsibility (Barry, 2005a; 2005b). Even those who oppose the idea of 
‘cosmopolitan global justice’ acknowledge that there is a place in political theory 
for remedial responsibility -  that is, to have an obligation to make a bad situation 
right -  when the bad situation is caused by one’s action or omission (Miller, 2001: 
455-458). Whether the causal connection can be traced to an identifiable 
perpetrator, or in cases where there are several candidates, how responsibility 
should be apportioned -  are separate matters. It has been commented, however, 
that in many cases, the complexity of tracking down the causes of global harms is 
exaggerated (Kreide, 2007: 10). Most global catastrophes that attract our moral 
reprobation are not unlimited; they are often localised or restricted geographically, 
and the risks and damages are calculable. Causal responsibility must, of course, be 
accompanied by moral responsibility. As pointed out earlier, the causal act or 
omission must be one that attracts moral praise or blame.
However, several theorists of global justice have suggested that, in 
addition to being responsible for harmful outcomes that they have directly 
contributed to, TNCs may be attributed with a responsibility to act on cases of 
global injustice where they are more capable than individuals to do so:
“What does matter is what TNCs can and cannot do, the capabilities that 
they can and cannot develop... it is plain that TNCs can have and can 
develop ranges of capabilities to contribute both to greater justice and to 
greater injustice... Fostering justice in specific ways is an entirely possible 
corporate aim...” (O’Neill, 2001: 50)
“Thus, in order to assign institutional responsibility for regulating global 
injustice, for example, it is less important to show that the putatively 
responsible institution has caused poverty or human rights abuse than it is 
to show that it is capable of taking effective steps against them... there is a
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distinctive set of institutional responsibilities that are structurally different 
from individual responsibilities.” (Green, 2005: 125, 126)
“By addressing the capacities of collective actors we cross a theoretical 
watershed. The collective actor’s obligation becomes less dependent on 
their role in causing harm and it becomes sufficient to show that the 
collective actor had the means to prevent harm and respect human rights.” 
(Kreide, 2007: 12)
TNCs are more capable than individuals in several ways. Firstly, they enjoy 
an asymmetry of information: They are better at collecting and processing 
information, and therefore predicting the future or indirect consequences of their 
actions. Superior knowledge also means that, in some cases, they can be said to 
foresee the consequences of not only their actions but also their omissions. Hence, 
it has been said that TNCs are not caught by the distinction made in the 
individual’s case between positive and negative duties: A negative duty (for 
example, the duty not to harm) is said to be violated by an action, whereas a 
positive duty (for example, the duty to do X) is said to be violated by an omission. 
Since TNCs are capable of foreseeing the outcomes in both cases, the distinction is 
therefore said not to apply to them (Green, 2005: 124; Kreide, 2007: 12). 
Secondly, they enjoy an asymmetry of power and influence. Unlike individual 
agents, TNCs can influence masses of people, change the course of public policy, 
set world prices of goods and many more things. Because of their relative power, it 
means that TNCs are able to implement change in cases of injustice and adapt to 
the resulting changed circumstances at relatively little cost to themselves (Young, 
2003: 42).96 It is not surprising, then, that it has been suggested that rather than 
wooing more companies to join the Global Compact, the UN should instead target 
the largest and most influential companies to change the culture and behaviour in
96 Unfortunately, in cases of abuse, TNCs have also been reported to exercise this power over 
corrupt governments to quell the voices o f justice -  the allegations o f Cargill’s involvement in the 
arrests o f cocoa farmers in Africa, Shell’s alleged involvement in the hanging o f environmental 
activist Ken Saro Wiwa in Nigeria, or the murder o f Brazilian rural activist Chico Mendes in 1988 
by a foreign investor, are often cited.
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their respective industries (Kuper, 2005d). Again, this appeals to the intuition here 
that ‘bigger is better’. Moreover, unlike individual agents, companies can spread 
the costs of regulating a problem, for example, by passing it on to consumers.
However, it has been pointed out that can does not imply ought (Green, 
2005: 129). The comparison between TNCs and individuals merely demonstrates
Q7that TNCs are more capable than individuals in addressing global problems. It is 
tempting to draw the stronger conclusion that they ought to address global 
problems. But the empirical claim that TNCs are more capable than individual 
agents in addressing and regulating our global problems does not naturally lead to 
the normative conclusion that they ought to be responsible. So the question here is 
this: Can a moral argument based on capabilities be made for why TNCs should be 
attributed responsibility for global justice (that is, not just to be held accountable 
for global injustice)?
I argue that it can. The capabilities argument is that the points which 
distinguish TNCs from individual agents also provide justification why they 
should be responsible for global justice (in the sense of attributability, that is). It 
also justifies a departure from the traditionally individualistic way of thinking, 
namely, that only individual agents can be invested with moral responsibility. This 
is achieved by treating the propensity for risk as a form of responsibility. Let me 
explain.
When we say that a person can be attributed responsibility for an outcome 
resulting from his action or omission, we commonly mean it in a retrospective 
sense. That is to say, the person is attributed responsibility for the outcome, 
whether good or bad, because it can be causally traced back to something he did or 
failed to do. His behaviour is therefore regarded as worthy of praise or blame, 
whichever the case may be. However, we also mean it in another sense. We mean 
also to say that the person is responsible for ensuring -  that he ought to ensure -  
that the outcome happens (if it is a good outcome) or does not happen (if it is a bad
97 Although Michael Green (2005) goes one step further to suggest that the comparison would also 
lead to the conclusion that the responsibilities o f institutions are always broader than those of  
individuals -  i f  it could be proven that institutional agents like TNCs ought to be attributed 
responsibility for these global problems. It seems to me that the latter proposition, then, should be 
argued first; the first proposition is irrelevant unless the second is proven first.
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outcome). This is to attribute responsibility to him in a prospective sense. The 
justification for praise or blame in this instance lies in the more fundamental idea 
that, if he had taken this responsibility more seriously, the outcome in question 
would have been different. So for example, if I break a vase in a shop, I am 
responsible for the breakage that I caused. However, I am also responsible in the 
sense that I ought to have been more careful. If I had been more careful, the vase 
might not be broken now. Responsibility in the prospective sense, then, is a 
precondition for any blame that might follow. If I was not responsible in this 
prospective sense, my failure to be careful would not have been blameworthy; 
indeed, there would be no “failure” to speak of. It is in this prospective sense that 
corporate responsibility based on capabilities is conceived.
Corporate responsibility in the prospective sense can be measured in terms 
of the propensity for risk, that is, how much risk a corporation can and is willing to 
take. The fact is, all decisions and actions create risks -  and when those risks 
materialize, retrospective responsibility and blameworthiness kicks in. TNCs 
assume certain risks when they choose to operate globally across political borders 
in distant lands with distant strangers. By choosing to take these risks, they also 
undertake certain responsibilities in the prospective sense to manage the risk. The 
further argument for saying that TNCs ought to factor in these risks as part of the 
cost of doing business overseas, that they ought to be responsible for global justice 
(in the prospective sense), is that they are more capable than individual agents in 
assessing and absorbing these risks. That is to say, they have a bigger propensity 
for risk than the individual agent. With their superior knowledge and power and 
other capabilities enumerated above, they are in a better position than individual 
and most other agents to foresee and to prevent any potential problems that might 
arise from their operations. They are also in a better position to remedy any 
fallouts that might occur subsequently. Prospective responsibility, in a sense, is the 
cost of doing business. It is the responsibility to manage the risks created by one’s 
decisions and actions. In a global just order, prospective responsibility attaches to 
TNCs because of their greater propensity for risk as compared to individual agents. 
The capabilities that distinguish TNCs from individual agents also provide 
normative justification for the attribution of global responsibility to them. In the
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bigger picture, the capabilities argument provides argumentation for an expanded 
conception of the basic political units that legitimately make up a just global order 
and form the basis of modem political theory and political science; it leads to the 
recognition of global just agents other than individuals, like TNCs. Therefore, 
understood prospectively, I argue that ‘capabilities’ is a valid category of 
(corporate) responsibility.
However, it is not for every business transaction that a company may be 
held responsible, nor even every business transaction that causes harm. The 
attribution of prospective responsibility depends, in this case, on whether the 
harmful outcome was reasonably foreseeable. The understanding of the concept of 
‘reasonable foreseeability’ here owes much to the law of tort for negligence. 
Negligence as a tort is the breach of a legal duty to take care by one which results 
in unintentional damage to another. A man is only held legally liable in negligence 
if he is first and foremost under a duty to take care. Duty is the chief ingredient of 
the tort of negligence, and must be established before liability can be considered. 
Duty, therefore, acts as a “control device which allows the courts to keep liability 
for negligence within acceptable limits”, otherwise the courts would be 
overwhelmed with claims for every careless act that causes harm to others (Rogers, 
1994: 79). There are several established categories of duty in law, but the 
underlying principle is that “[y]ou must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your
QO (
neighbour.” The question in law is, ‘Who is my neighbour?’. The answer is, 
“persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably 
to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind 
to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”99 Reasonable foreseeability, 
then, is the test for the standard of care that we owe each other. It governs the 
proximity of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant necessary to 
establish duty. This proximate relationship is different from the ethical relationship 
necessary to establish correlativity between rights and duties that we saw in
98 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 (Lord Atkin).
99 Ibid.
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chapter 2. Here, we are solely concerned with whether or not a duty exists; rights 
and the issue of correlativity do not feature. Similarly, reasonable foreseeability is 
the test for whether or not prospective responsibility should be attributed in any 
given case. A company is only liable for harm caused if responsibility in the 
prospective sense is first attributable to it.
According to the law of negligence, whether or not the defendant could 
have reasonably foreseen the harm suffered by the plaintiff or his property by his 
act differs according to the type of case. So, for example, the standard of care 
demanded of a reasonable man in a domestic situation is different from the 
standards of business, and a passer-by who renders first aid in an accident is not 
required to show the skill of a professional doctor. Similarly, because they possess 
superior capabilities, the standard of care demanded of a corporation is different 
from that required by an individual agent -  this is the thrust of the capabilities 
argument.100 Nonetheless, the standard in law is objective, in the sense that it is 
independent of the facts in the individual case itself or the personal idiosyncrasies 
of the particular person whose conduct is in question.101 Rather, the standard 
applied here is ascertained by first deciding what is to be attributed to a 
hypothetical reasonable man: the question is not ‘Did the defendant do his best?’ 
(subjective test) but ‘Did the defendant come up to the standard of the reasonable 
man?’ (objective test) (Rogers, 1994: 125). In the case of TNCs, the question is 
‘Did the company in question come up to the standard of a “reasonable company”,
100 Other types of cases that have passed through the courts include cases of defects in the quality 
of goods supplied by the defendant to a third party and thereon sold to the plaintiff, economic loss 
on the part of the plaintiff resulting from damage caused by the defendant to property belonging to 
a third party (for example, if  the plaintiff is a tenant of the property), harm or economic loss 
resulting from a failure to act, cases o f psychiatric injury etc. The cases suggest that, where direct 
physical harm is inflicted on the plaintiff or his property by the defendant’s act, duty is more readily 
established. In contrast, where there is a failure to act or the loss is economic in nature, the court 
may insist on a substantially closer proximity between the parties.
Although the categories o f duty are not closed, the courts have generally been cautious in 
expanding the tort o f negligence, and have in certain cases taken into account public policy 
considerations in making a decision whether or not a duty of care existed.
101 It is not a matter of probability either, which is independent o f the knowledge and experience o f  
anybody.
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1 • as if the reasonable company were a single person?’. This means that not all risk
carries with it responsibility. The test to be applied in all cases is whether or not
the conduct demanded of a particular company in a particular case matches that
which can be reasonably required of any company in the given situation.
How is reasonable foreseeability ascertained? There are many factors that 
enter into the consideration, but the general principle in law is that the degree of 
care demanded of the defendant must be commensurate with the risk of the harm 
being caused. The magnitude of risk, or how reasonably foreseeable the harm is, 
depends on a confluence of factors. In the cases that have come before the courts, 
these factors have included considerations like the remoteness or likelihood of 
injury being caused, the defendant’s knowledge of any extenuating circumstances, 
the practicability of the precautions that would have to be taken, the consequences 
if an action was not taken etc. Similarly, when we consider the issue of corporate 
responsibility, a balance between risk and responsibility must be struck. 
Attributability is proportional to the magnitude of risk that a company knowingly 
undertakes in a given operation.
To give an example of applying ‘prospective responsibility’ and 
‘reasonable foreseeability’ to TNCs, I revisit the case of child slavery in the cocoa 
industry here. Large chocolate companies may be said to be responsible in the 
sense of attributability because any company in their position should reasonably 
have known about the risk, given the prevalence of child labour on cocoa farms, 
and should reasonably have acted upon that knowledge. At least, when the first 
report of child slavery came out in 1998 from the Ivory Coast office of UNICEF, 
they should have taken immediate action and deployed some of their vast resources 
to investigating the allegations further. Upon being made aware of the situation, 
they should have put pressure down the supply chain for the worst abuses of child 
labour to stop, and to address the root causes of child slavery -  that is, poverty and 
unfair prices. Instead, they chose -  and some still choose today -  to deny that child 
slavery exists in the cocoa industry and that it is a global problem. The persistence 
of child slavery in the cocoa industry is, given the evidence, a reasonably
102 For example, as in the case where companies are considered corporate citizens o f the world 
alongside you and me.
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foreseeable consequence of their failure to act, which constitutes the violation of a 
positive duty in this case. The chocolate companies can also be said to cause 
and/or perpetuate the problem of child slavery on cocoa farms, because they 
continue to purchase cocoa from the farms despite knowing about the problem. 
And they continue to do so while depressing the price of cocoa paid to these 
farmers at unfair levels, farmers who are in turn forced to employ cheap labour that 
more often than not takes the form of child labour. These constitute the violation of 
a negative duty -  again highlighting how reasonable foreseeability blurs the 
distinction between positive and negative duties (Green, 2005: 124; Kreide, 2007: 
12). The capabilities argument, then, is that they should have taken due care and 
managed this risk better, and their failure to do so constitutes a breach of the 
responsibility attributed to them.
At the end of what might be considered a protracted argument for 
capabilities as a valid category of corporate responsibility, one might reasonably 
ask: Why is attributability important? Would it not suffice to hold the chocolate 
companies in this case responsible in the sense of accountability? Recall the 
distinction made earlier between attributability and accountability. It is less 
intuitive, it was argued, to attribute responsibility to corporate entities than it is to 
individual agents. When we say that an individual agent “should” be responsible, 
we usually mean to say that we attribute to them some sort of moral 
blameworthiness or liability. When we say that a company “should” be 
responsible, on the other hand, we usually mean to say that we hold them 
accountable to an impersonal and external standard of conduct. However, a closer 
scrutiny of what exactly distinguishes corporate entities from individual agents 
seemed to provide the means to close this conceptual gap. Specifically, it was 
argued that the capabilities that distinguish companies from individuals (that is, 
that they are better able to foresee and absorb risks) also provide the ethical 
reasoning for saying that they are responsible for global justice in the same way 
that individuals are. The capabilities argument, then, is both a means of attributing 
responsibility to non-person entities like TNCs, and of mediating the gap between 
accountability and attributability. But why is attributability so important for CSR? 
We turn next to this question.
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3.3 The importance of attributability
There are some who seem to think that whatever sense of responsibility we ascribe 
to TNCs should be distinguished from the notion of responsibility as 
blameworthiness (Williams, 2006).103 Others have argued that the kind of 
responsibilities which arise indirectly between distant persons and which are 
highly mediated through market connections and other social structures can never 
be moral responsibilities. Rather, they are ‘political responsibilities’ which belong 
to a category of responsibility separate and distinct from the notion of 
blameworthiness or liability (Young, 2003; 2004; 2006). Iris Marion Young 
argues, for example, that it is “implausible” to hold each and every individual 
consumer in developed countries personally liable for sweatshop conditions in 
third world countries when they (the individual consumers) stand so remote from 
the harm. Nonetheless, they are responsible in some sense for this injustice because 
both parties are embedded in global processes and structures that connect them 
tightly. Hence, she concludes that the anti-sweatshop movement must “implicitly” 
be relying on another conception of responsibility (Young, 2006: 368). The notion 
of political responsibility is offered, in this context, as an alternative conception of 
responsibility to the liability model.104
The distinction between personal liability and political responsibility here 
parallels the distinction between attributability and accountability. What Young’s 
theory does effectively is to abandon the idea that action for global justice requires 
a sense that one is personally and morally at blame for the injustice in question; in 
other words, responsible in the sense of attributability. Rather, her claim seems to 
be that one’s sense of global responsibility is guided by and acted on by one’s 
participation in the public discourse about justice. The way one discharges one’s 
political responsibilities is to be rallied or by rallying others around one’s moral 
view of the problem, and persuading one another on how to alleviate the problem 
collectively (Young, 2004: 380). This is similar to the kind of interaction that
103 ‘Attributability’, ‘blameworthiness’ and ‘liability’ are used interchangeably here. They all 
connote the sense of personalized responsibility, as opposed to being held ‘accountable’ to an 
external standard, as explained further below.
104 Ibid. How Young’s theory o f individual political responsibility relates to TNCs will be made 
clearer later on in this section.
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happens in a social contract, and it involves an ultimate shared understanding of 
what the problem is and what needs to be done.105 So even though Young casts 
political responsibility as a personal responsibility to engage in such kinds of 
global activism, the sense of responsibility that it appeals to is ultimately propelled 
by what others say, think and expect, as well as what one thinks others should say, 
think and expect. To be held and to hold others to a common shared standard of 
behaviour is exactly what responsibility in the sense of accountability is about. 
According to Young, this is the type of responsibility that global justice should 
subscribe to, rather than the liability model or responsibility in the sense of 
attributability.
Young lists several features of political responsibility that distinguish it 
from the liability model of responsibility, in what I suggest amounts to an 
argument for accountability without attributability. Here, I have re-grouped her list 
to highlight what I think are the three main points that she makes, and offer a 
critical response to each of them in turn:
(1) Political responsibility solves the problem of imperfect duties.
The notion of political responsibility arises because of the phenomenon of 
uncoordinated collective harm: “People have difficulty reasoning about individual 
responsibility with relation to outcomes produced by large-scale social structures 
in which millions participate, but of which none are the sole or primary cause” 
(Young, 2004: 374) What this means is that no one perpetrator can be isolated and 
identified as the one responsible for the harm, such that any duties that are owed 
towards the distant poor will always be imperfect. (Recall that in chapter 2, perfect 
duties were said to be owed by specifiable individuals against whom the right to 
performance can be claimed or enforced, and imperfect duties arose when there 
was no specifiable duty-bearer.) Hence, the liability model of responsibility does 
not work for global justice because imperfection means that it is “implausible” to 
hold any individual consumer in developed countries personally liable for 
sweatshop conditions in third world countries.
105 See fh 88.
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The solution, Young says without much further explanation, is not to 
continue working within the framework of the liability model of responsibility and 
try to “perfect” imperfect duties: “I am not convinced that what we need to respond 
to this predicament is a set of principles to which individuals might look for 
guidance about what to do in relation to global social processes” (Young, 2004: 
374). Rather, she argues, what is needed is responsibility “in a different sense”, by 
which she means political responsibility. Political responsibility is different from 
the liability model of responsibility because it is not reducible to “the self- 
conscious collaborative acts of individuals”, since there is in fact no isolatable 
perpetrator (Young, 2004: 375). Rather than assigning responsibility to individual 
agents according to what they have or have not done in respect of the harmful 
outcome, political responsibility derives instead from one’s “embeddedness” in the 
collective processes and structures that have resulted in the harmful outcome. It 
does not require us to tie the particular harm to an identifiable duty-bearer (perfect 
duty); instead, everybody bears political responsibility for global harms -  including 
the victims -  because everybody is a participant in the global basic structure that 
links distant persons and everybody shares the responsibility for engaging in 
actions directed at transforming the wider structural injustices that are the root 
causes of these harms. For this reason, finding that some people bear responsibility 
for global injustice does not necessarily absolve others. So instead of solving the 
problem of imperfect duties by perfecting them (that is, tying specific agents to 
specific harms), Young’s argument makes everyone responsible. Political 
responsibility thus solves the problem of imperfect duties not by addressing the 
issue of perfection, but by abandoning it entirely.
Of course, by positing the capabilities argument in section 3.2 above, I 
would have already shown my cards, that is, that I do not agree that the liability 
model of responsibility is at all implausible. Analysing Young’s argument with 
respect to TNCs, we note that the capabilities argument is precisely an argument to 
attach responsibility in the sense of attributability to TNCs who stand remote from 
the harm. The question here is not why political responsibility is relevant, but why 
the liability model is so irrelevant. The claim that the capabilities argument makes 
here is that TNCs have a personal responsibility to manage the reasonably
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foreseeable risks that their business decisions and operations create, lest liability or 
blame for any reasonably foreseeable harm that arises be attributed to them. When 
it comes to responsibility for global harms, the argument is more intuitive for 
attributing responsibility to TNCs than it is for individuals, because they have a 
bigger propensity for taking such risks. TNCs are more capable than individual 
agents in foreseeing the outcomes of their actions and addressing them, whereas 
Young’s concern seems to be largely driven by the concern that individuals find it 
harder to pinpoint their place in the collective process that connects their personal 
action to the harm.106 Of course, an individual agent who is in a position of power 
and influence might still be caught by the capabilities argument. But generally- 
speaking, TNCs (and other institutional agents) are more likely to be attributed 
responsibility under the capabilities argument. The capabilities argument, 
therefore, provides one category of corporate responsibility. More pertinently here, 
the capabilities argument actually provides a solution to the problem of imperfect 
duties (that is, by tying specific companies to specific harms), while working 
within the liability model of responsibility.
(2) Political responsibility is outcome-oriented, not rule-guided 
Some philosophers like Young like to make a distinction between ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘duty’ (Pogge, 1992b; Young, 2004: 379-380).107 Young’s argument, for 
example, is that, like duties, responsibilities carry obligations; one should carry out 
one’s responsibilities. However, unlike duties, responsibilities do not specify how 
those obligations should be carried out; this is a matter of judgment, and depends 
on what the desired outcome is, the capabilities of the agents, the practicality of the 
action etc. Carrying out a responsibility consists solely in seeking to bring about a 
specified outcome. Carrying out a duty, on the other hand, involves the duty-bearer 
discharging specific actions required by the duty in question. According to Young, 
then, duty is rule-guided, whereas responsibility is outcome-guided. Political
106 With regard to the anti-sweatshop movement, Young does identify non-person actors like 
universities and other bulk consumers, as well as large retailers, as bearing political responsibility 
for the labour injustices committed in sweatshop factories. However, the thrust o f her thesis on 
political responsibility is directed at individual agents.
107 See also fn 50.
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responsibility is, in this sense, a responsibility. It is therefore open about what 
actions count as or are sufficient for discharging it, so long as it is aimed towards 
achieving a certain just outcome (Young, 2004: 387-388). It is not a duty as such, 
unlike in the liability model of responsibility.
I wish to suggest that, on the contrary, political responsibility is less likely 
to achieve its desired outcomes than a liability model of responsibility that posits a 
specific agenda for action. Young claims: “It is very possible to act in accordance 
with rules of morality and yet not have discharged one’s responsibilities, because 
one has not achieved the required outcomes even though it is feasible to do so” 
(Young, 2004: 380). I would claim that the critique applies a fortiori to Young’s 
conception of political responsibility. The intuition that Young is appealing to here 
is that political responsibility, unlike the liability model of responsibility, is not 
concerned about pointing fingers at who is to blame. Rather, it is concerned solely 
with what the goals of global justice are. It is not prescriptive of the means to that 
end (presumably these means still have to fall within some sort of moral 
framework), simply that we must aim for it. But aiming towards an outcome is 
different from achieving the outcome. Both political responsibility and the liability 
model of responsibility aim towards certain global just outcomes. But the liability 
model of responsibility not only identifies who needs to do what, but also specifies 
what needs to be done in order to achieve those goals. Political responsibility, on 
the other hand, is silent on who needs to do what, merely that everybody who 
participates in the world’s global and market processes has a “responsibility” to do 
something. This open-endedness seems to be borne out of Young’s resistance to 
having “a set of principles to which individuals might look for guidance about 
what to do in relation to global social processes” (Young, 2004: 374). She also 
worries that “there are significant disagreements both within and outside the 
movement about whether some tactics do more harm than good and thus about 
what are the best ways in the long run to encourage and enforce decent working 
conditions” (Young, 2004: 388). But action-guidance is precisely what moral 
agents need, and indeed, it is what political theory is about. And political 
responsibility fails in this respect to define the scope of just agency. This, I think,
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is particularly important for CSR: that TNCs know what exactly the scope and 
limits of their global responsibilities are.
In contrast, there are several advantages to subscribing to the liability 
model of responsibility under the capabilities argument. Firstly, the discussion of 
capabilities shows that TNCs are not affected by the distinction between positive 
and negative duties in the same way that individual agents are (Kreide, 2007: 12). 
Under the capabilities argument, it is only relevant that the TNC in question has 
the capabilities to reasonably foresee and to address the risk of harm -  whether this 
involves ensuring that others are not unduly harmed by its corporate action 
(negative duty), or the duty to benefit others or protect them from harm (positive 
duty). It might be argued that the conception of political responsibility is blind to 
the distinction between positive and negative duties too. However, note that while 
this is true of the liability model because it specifies a category of corporate 
responsibility based on capabilities, it is only true of political responsibility 
because it does not specify anything at all.
Secondly, it has been claimed that the conception of political responsibility 
is forward-looking because it “doesn’t reckon debts, but aims at results” (Young, 
2003: 3). The question that political responsibility asks is what social changes can 
we make that will eliminate future harm, rather than compensating victims for past 
wrongs (Young, 2003: 3). But as we note, the capabilities argument is also 
forward-looking, when it is based on the notion of prospective responsibility. 
Moreover, the liability model is more comprehensive than Young’s conception of 
political responsibility, because it is both forward- and backward-looking: The 
capabilities argument, which is forward-looking, supplements the category of 
responsibility based on contribution to harm, which is backward-looking. Both 
categories of responsibility based on capabilities and on contribution are part of the 
liability model of responsibility, insofar as they both seek to attribute personal 
responsibility to a specifiable agent. In other words, unlike political responsibility, 
the liability model encompasses both forward-looking and backward-looking bases 
of moral responsibility.
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(3) Political responsibility addresses the issue of limits and the problem of
motivation
Lastly, Young turns to respond to concerns about the limits of political 
responsibility and the problem of motivation, which she terms “existentialist” 
questions (Young, 2004: 383).
On the limits of political responsibility, the worry is that the conception of 
political responsibility, with its wide and relatively undefined ambit, seems to 
make nearly everyone responsible for nearly everything. Under the conception of 
political responsibility, most of us would find ourselves participant in one or more 
structural processes that affect someone somewhere in harmful or unjust ways. 
Therefore, to say that almost everybody is politically responsible for all injustices 
might be regarded as over-demanding. Young rejects this criticism on the basis 
that political responsibility is not about every individual taking on the personal 
burden of righting all wrongs, or assigning such responsibilities to this person or 
that. Rather, the conception of political responsibility is intended to compel each of 
us to question how we “should reason about [our] own action in the face of 
structural injustice”, and decide how we can work together as a collective to make 
better institutions (Young, 2004: 384). The limits of responsibility come in the 
form of loose guidelines as to what our responsibilities are, instead of a principled 
assignment of responsibility. Rather than appealing to pre-assigned duties or tasks 
that people have, Young argues that each person can reason about their action in 
relation to structural injustice along the parameters of (1) their specifiable 
connection to the distant persons potentially affected by their action, if any (2) the 
power and influence that they wield according to their position in the relevant 
structural processes, and (3) their relative privilege, derived from structural 
inequalities, as compared to the distant poor who are affected by their actions 
(Young, 2004: 385-387).
On the problem of motivation, conceptualizing political responsibility as 
distinct from blame is, according to Young, important not only philosophically but 
also practically. That is, political responsibility is useful for the practical reason of 
motivating collective action for the sake of social change and global justice. The 
argument is that, while pointing the finger of blame has its place in moral and
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political theory, in many global justice contexts, liability is not the issue. In fact, 
the traditional emphasis on blame and liability only succeeds, Young argues, in 
making these potential agents who are blamed defensive and hostile. In contrast, 
rather than adopting such a positional strategy of ‘me versus you’, political 
responsibility emphasizes a shared agenda that everyone can engage in. The issue, 
then, is not about discerning who is responsible for what, but about how to 
mobilize everyone concerned to acknowledge their shared responsibility in solving 
a particular global problem, and to organize forms of collective action to address it 
(Young, 2004: 381-383). This sort of global civil activism, Young seems to think, 
is more effective in inspiring action for change than any principled division of 
labour.
One gets the sense that, what Young’s arguments (for why political 
responsibility addresses the issue of limits and the problem of motivation more 
effectively than the liability model of responsibility) have in common with each 
other is that they are aimed at stirring the moral conscience of the individual. The 
thrust of these arguments seems to be that, while the liability model of 
responsibility banks on a set of principles that pre-assign our global responsibilities 
to identifiable just agents, the conception of political responsibility is in a sense 
more inspiring precisely because it is less defined and less perfect in these respects. 
It reminds us of our implicit participation in the market and other world processes, 
and our relative position of power and privilege. In projecting the idea of a shared 
agenda to act for global social change, it appeals to our nobler selves, and the sense 
that we are not helpless in the face of global injustice, but that we can act for 
global social change. If I am correct, then the conception of political responsibility 
is redolent of political rhetoric more than political theory.
There is a place and time for political rhetoric. The language of rhetoric is 
important for bringing people together and for inspiring them. The problem for 
CSR is that, while this “call to unite for a better world” may be attractive to many 
individual agents and may be motivating for you and me, it is hard to imagine 
corporations, who have as their primary objective maximising profits and 
shareholder value, being inspired in the same way. Others argue that political 
rhetoric is valid precisely because it serves a business purpose, for example, in
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enhancing the reputation of a particular company among consumers. But this 
argument negates any moral weight political responsibility might have right from 
the start, since then it is the business motivation that is driving moral action, not 
the sense of political responsibility. Moreover, responsibility tends to be 
constrained by companies’ profit-maximising agenda. Hence, as in the case of the 
chocolate industry, continued profitability means that the problem of child slavery 
remains virtually ignored by large chocolate manufacturers and retailers, despite it 
being a widespread and well-known problem.
It is interesting to note that, in the final analysis, rather than relying on the 
aforesaid sense of working for a common good, Young actually appeals to the 
notion of ‘capabilities’ in order to make the case for a separate model of 
responsibility. Her attribution of political responsibility, in fact, rests on our 
capability to invoke social change based on our power, privilege and connection to 
the problem. But it is not a ‘capabilities argument’ as such, because it does not 
theorize about what exactly the scope of the CSR agenda is, or what exactly 
motivates TNCs to become agents of global justice -  that is, unlike the capabilities 
argument laid out in section 3.2. There is no room in the conception of political 
responsibility for acknowledging the distinction between TNCs and individuals, or 
that TNCs face constraints to moral action that individuals do not. Moreover, it 
cannot offer principled arguments for why TNCs per se should engage in CSR. I 
myself am not convinced that all these questions are necessarily solvable within 
the framework of ideal theory. However, I do think that a proper theory of CSR 
must offer principles that are practicable and action-guiding in all these respects, 
rather than mere rhetoric.
If political responsibility cannot offer principles that guide us in the moral 
content of a theory of CSR, the question then is: Can the liability model of 
responsibility? The argument so far has been critical of the alternative model of 
political responsibility that Young posits in favour of the liability model of 
responsibility, which I have suggested amounts to an argument for accountability 
without attributability. But what of the arguments for attributability? Why is 
attributability important? In my opinion, attributability is ultimately important 
because it invests TNCs with a personalized sense of moral agency. It means that
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TNCs are personally responsible for global harms, rather than just saying that they 
should be held to account for these harms. In other words, instead of being an 
external judgment on the corporation as in the case of accountability, attributability 
reflects some inner perspective or internal value commitment on the part of the 
company. To attribute responsibility to a company is to make a moral statement 
about its ethos and corporate culture from the point of view of the company. To 
hold it accountable, on the other hand, is to make a judgment about its behaviour 
from the point of view of a juror standing at arms length to the company being 
judged.
In practice, responsibility in the sense of accountability is usually tied with 
the external imposition of rules and laws (or the expectations of others) to regulate 
one’s behaviour. This quickly becomes rhetorical if  the regulatory initiatives fail to 
change the behaviour of the subject in question. Responsibility in the sense of 
attributability, on the other hand, is meant to provoke a voluntary response from 
the one responsible. In the case of the individual, praise or blame is intended to 
prick one’s conscience and/or to provoke a change of behaviour. In the case of the 
TNC, it provides the moral reason to do better. The reason why investing TNCs 
with a sense of personal responsibility (responsibility in the sense of attibutability) 
is more effective than regulating their behaviour through the external imposition of 
rules and laws (responsibility in the sense of accountability) is based on research 
that shows that voluntary self-regulation is more effective, less costly, and 
politically more feasible.108 Of course, the real-life business constraints on global 
agency that TNCs face and how to think philosophically about them must still be 
addressed. But the argument here is that, first and foremost, a theory of CSR must 
be founded on the firm ground of attributability with accountability.
~  ~
In conclusion, by considering the structural differences between institutional 
(corporate) responsibility and individual responsibility, we were able to extrapolate 
the normative framework of responsibility outside its individualistic schema to
108 See chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.
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consider its application to non-person actors like TNCs. In doing so, a new 
category of responsibility was developed -  one that was based on capabilities. The 
capabilities argument was that, in addition to the remedial responsibility for global 
harms that they had directly caused or contributed to, TNCs ought to be 
responsible for global justice because, among other things, they had a greater 
propensity for risk than individual agents. They had more capabilities than 
individuals to reasonably foresee the harms that may result from their actions. 
Therefore, they ought to manage these risks and address any harms that result from 
their failure to do so. This global responsibility was attributable to TNCs if we 
conceived of responsibility in the prospective sense -  that is, the responsibility to 
ensure that a harmful outcome does not happen. The responsibility was understood 
in the sense of attributability, which was distinguished from responsibility in the 
sense of accountability. Although corporate responsibility is more commonly 
understood as accountability, it was argued that accountability without 
attributability was not sufficient for a complete attribution of responsibility. The 
category of responsibility based on capabilities should, therefore, be understood as 
responsibility in the sense of attributability.
The discussion also throws up potential gaps in our normative thinking 
about corporate responsibility. Specifically, what is the scope of CSR, and how can 
we theorize about real-life business constraints that TNCs face with respect to the 
scope of CSR? What about the problem of motivation? These issues go to the 
moral content of a theory of CSR, and it is to the first of these -  the scope of CSR, 
or what I call the ‘CSR agenda’ -  that we turn to next.
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4The scope of corporate responsibility: Testing out Pogge’s 
theory on the CSR agenda
In March 2004, members of the Commission on the Private Sector and 
Development of the UN Development Programme (“UNDP”), in consultation with 
top management consultants from McKinsey & Company, submitted a report to 
the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (UNDP, 2004). The report was 
commissioned by Mr Annan to analyse how the potential of the private sector and 
entrepreneurship could be “unleashed” in developing countries, so as to advance 
the development process towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
and alleviating poverty. Based on these observations, it made several 
recommendations on how the private sector could harness their capabilities 
innovatively to aid developing countries. These included (i) foreign development 
investment (“FDI”), (ii) creating new markets at the bottom of the pyramid, (iii) 
growing domestic enterprises and business networks, (iv) setting standards, and (v) 
broader cooperation with government and civil society initiatives (hereafter “the 
CSR agenda”).
What the various arms of the CSR agenda as presented here do is to outline 
for us the practical scope of CSR. In addition to saying that TNCs ought to have 
global responsibilities (in chapter 3), we are told what the content of these 
responsibilities consists of. The challenge that follows, then, is to provide the 
normative argument for the scope of CSR as presented here. Given their moral 
obligations towards the poor, then, I ask: What is the moral justification for the 
CSR agenda, if any? What responsibilities exactly do TNCs have towards the very 
poor?
One of the arguments for extending the scope of responsibility to cases 
where there is no direct causal culpability is put forward by Thomas Pogge. 
Pogge’s argument is that individuals in rich states have, as a matter of human 
rights, a moral responsibility to ensure that they do not unduly harm the distant 
poor by supporting a global economic order that promotes poverty. According to
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this theory, our moral responsibilities towards the poor occupies an intermediate 
position -  we are less implicated than if it were ourselves withholding food from a 
starving person, but more implicated than if it were simply a third party and not 
ourselves causing the harm. The aim of this chapter is to test out Pogge’s theory on 
the CSR agenda.
Distinguishing between institutional and interactional understandings of 
duty, I critically analyse the usefulness of Pogge’s argument in grounding the CSR 
agenda morally. The advantage of focusing on the causes of poverty, as Pogge’s 
theory does, is that it reveals poverty not as a regrettable phenomenon but as the 
outcome of structural conditions -  a conception of poverty endorsed by both 
development theorists and global justice philosophers. A better understanding of 
the underlying causes of poverty helps avoid simplistic explanatory theories and 
opens up creative options for addressing it, rather than consigning poverty 
alleviation merely as a matter of foreign aid or, in the case of CSR, FDI.
However, I argue that the philosophical trade-offs are too costly. 
Conceptually, I think that Pogge’s argument trades heavily on the distinction 
between institutionalism and interactionalism. Institutionalism is concerned with 
the way our social world ought to be structured -  that is, the principles by which 
the laws and practices that regulate our human interactions are assessed. 
Interactionalism, on the other hand, is concerned with the way we ought to treat 
each other -  that is, the principles that govern our moral conduct. This distinction 
has also been marked by Pogge as the distinction between institutional moral 
analysis and interactional moral analysis (2002), or the distinction between legal 
cosmopolitanism and moral cosmopolitanism (1992).109 My critique is that the 
distinctions that Pogge makes are an ideal fallacy: While they meet certain ideal 
needs and challenges, the distinctions do not hold up as well outside an ideal 
context.
Following up on my criticism, I argue that a perspective that avoids the 
need for the kind of distinctions Pogge has attempted is far more practical all 
round. In drawing the boundaries of corporate responsibility, the line should not be
109 Beitz (1994), in contrast, uses the terms institutional cosmopolitanism and moral 
cosmopolitanism analogously.
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dictated by a false distinction between institutionalism and interactionalism. 
Rather, I argue, the active distinction in this instance is the distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal theory. I propose and outline one form such a non-ideal 
approach might take, that is, the business case for the CSR agenda. I explain why I 
think that theorizing the business case for the CSR agenda is appropriate in this 
case, and indeed, why it offers an alternative approach that is normatively 
advantageous in the light of the problems with Pogge’s approach.
This chapter is divided as follows: In section 4.1, the CSR agenda is 
presented in greater detail. The CSR agenda provides a starting point for outlining 
the practical scope of CSR. The normative argument for what responsibilities 
exactly TNCs have towards the very poor is then addressed in section 4.2. An 
account of Pogge’s theory is presented, then critically tested out on the issue. The
thrust of my argument is that, in drawing the boundaries of corporate
responsibility, a perspective that avoids the kind of distinctions that Pogge has 
attempted is far more practical all round. Picking this up, section 4.3. concludes by 
introducing a non-ideal approach to the CSR agenda.
4.1 The CSR agenda
The fight against poverty has evolved over the years from a simple course of
overseas development aid (“ODA”). The poverty agenda of today encompasses a 
broad range of mechanisms to combat poverty, including cancellation of third 
world debt, trade liberalization, child labour, employment standards, worker 
mobility, environmental sustainability, conflict resolution, human rights etc., as 
well as the possibilities of global taxation and the implementation of other forms of 
international standards and regulations.110 The expansion of the set of tools to fight 
poverty parallels the evolving objectives of development, as exemplified by the
110 For a taxonomy o f measures to address global poverty that meet a minimal conception of 
global justice, see Simon Caney’s list o f twelve measures (2006).
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Millennium Development Goals.111 The significance of the poverty agenda’s 
growing diversity is that it illustrates the true extent of the injustice of poverty -  
not only that the poor are poor,112 but that poverty leads to various forms of social 
exclusion which need to be addressed individually. The increased diversity of the 
poverty agenda also reflects changing conceptions of poverty in developmental 
theory, that is, the growing awareness that causality in poverty is more complex 
than we thought. In philosophical terms, the change can be traced as a move away 
from what Pogge (2004, 2002) calls ‘explanatory nationalism’ -  this is the uni­
linear view that poverty in third world countries is caused by corruption and the 
failure of the governments in these countries and, for this reason, somebody else’s 
problem. This narrow view of poverty is unhelpful because it leads to apathy and 
myopic solutions. Seeing poverty as somebody else’s problem creates the tendency 
to “pass the buck” to somebody else, or to discuss our moral obligations (solely) in 
terms of donations and transfers, assistance and redistribution (Pogge, 2004), 
rather than addressing the many ways in which poverty is the outcome of the way 
our social world and its institutions are structured.113
A critical agenda for CSR is needed if we are to avoid such apathy and 
myopia. Even today, many developmental organisations still view poverty as 
“difference” from ourselves, “divorced from any structural causality” (Blowfield, 
2004: 67). As a result, an environment has been allowed to flourish and influence 
the international development agenda whereby “CSR is based on the premise that 
if the right people with the right means sit together, they can reach a consensus that 
is for the benefit of all” (Blowfield, 2004: 67). But just as the poverty agenda has 
evolved and moved beyond ODA, contemporary views of CSR and what TNCs
111 The Millennium Development Goals include:
(i) Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger
(ii) Achieving universal primary education
(iii) Promoting gender equality and empowering women
(iv) Reducing child mortality
(v) Improving maternal health
(vi) Combating HIV/Aids
(vii) Ensuring environmental sustainability
(viii) Developing a global partnership for development.
112 According to the UNDP report, a fifth o f the world’s population live on less than US$1 a day.
113 Institutional responsibility, as we shall see, is a cornerstone of Pogge’s theory.
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owe to the very poor must also progress and move beyond FDI. The poor need not 
so much our altruism, but a paradigm shift in our thinking about the problem of 
world poverty.
In their report “Unleashing Entrepreneurship” (2004), the UNDP lists five 
components that make up their conception of an extended CSR agenda, which our 
normative analysis is focused on :114
(i) Foreign development investment ( “FD I”). The OECD (1996) defines FDI 
as “the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy 
(“direct investor”) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the 
investor (direct investment enterprise”)”.115 In other words, it is the investment by 
a foreign entity into the domestic economy.116 Between 2003 and 2004, inflows of 
FDI into developing countries surged by 40% to US$233 billion, surpassing other 
private capital flows as well as flows of ODA; in 2004, it accounted for more than 
half of all resource flows to developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005).117 The 
importance of FDI in developing countries goes beyond financial injection into the 
domestic economy. As the UNDP report points out, the value of FDI lies also in 
other things that foreign investment brings with it -  the infusion of a developed 
corporate culture, managerial know-how and best practices, access to international 
markets, technology and innovation, and competition (especially in previously 
closed markets). In certain instances, FDI can also extend to the physical presence 
of TNCs, which is an important driver for the growth of local businesses that 
support the TNC’s local operations. Unequivocally, statistics show a direct causal
114 Other CSR agendas have also focus on the role o f corporations in combating problems such as 
HIV/Aids, the economic exclusion o f home-workers in the clothing industry and small-holder 
farmers etc.
115 The “lasting interest” usually implies the existence o f a long-term relationship between the 
direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and a significant degree o f influence on the 
management o f the enterprise, usually associated with some degree of equity ownership (some 
sources suggest a threshold of 10%).
116 Although does not typically include foreign investment in the stock market.
117 Much o f this phenomenon was driven by the internationalisation o f research and development 
(R&D) by TNCs, particularly into developing countries.
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link between annual per capita GDP growth and a decline in the rate of poverty. 
Sustained economic growth, if translated into higher rates of employment and 
incomes of the poor, reduces poverty. Investing in developing countries also 
benefits firms trying to capture the competitive advantage of dividing their 
production process into multiple steps in different locations to take advantage of 
location-specific advantages in each step (for example, low labour costs, skill 
specialization).
(ii) Creating markets at the bottom o f the pyramid (“BOP”). C.K. Prahalad and 
Stuart L. Hart (2002) were the first to suggest that the world’s poorest people at the 
bottom tier of the world economic pyramid, numbering 4 billion (and predicted to 
increase to 6 billion over the next 40 years) or two-thirds of the world’s 
population119 -  represent significant new growth opportunities for TNCs yet to be 
fully realised. New analysis has estimated that this tier represents $5 trillion in 
purchasing power, with the Asian BOP market leading the pack ($3.47 trillion), 
followed by Eastern Europe ($458 billion), Latin America ($509 billion), and
Africa ($429 billion) (World Resources Institute, 2007). The BOP market ranges
from small sector markets like water, information and communication
technologies, to medium-scale markets like health, transportation, housing and 
energy, to large markets like food.120 In addition to consumption goods, it also 
covers microcredit services that make it possible to extend credit to lowest-income 
customers who would not otherwise have access to capital. Creating BOP markets 
benefits the disenfranchised poor, because it provides critical links to the
marketplace for the world’s poorest, increases their consumer choices by bringing 
a greater variety of goods at lower prices to the market, and gives them a chance
118 The UNDP report gives figures for East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia 
(UNDP, 2004: 7).
119 The bottom tier is defined as persons having less than an annual per capita income o f $1,500 
(based on purchasing power parity in US dollars), the minimum considered necessary to sustain a 
decent life.
120 According to the report, as incomes rise, household expenditure on food as a percentage of 
income decreases, while spending on transportation, phone and internet access increases sharply.
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for a better life. It also benefits TNCs, who are better positioned to leverage this 
potential market than local entrepreneurs, because the BOP market is not only an 
ideal early market testing ground for new products, but sustainable product 
innovations specially created to cater to the BOP market can also be adapted for 
sale and use in developed markets. However, the final verdict on the potential of 
BOP markets remains open for the moment. The current success of BOP markets 
remains largely anecdotal; because the idea of BOP markets is relatively new, 
there is a lack of data to measure how much it benefits the poor or companies. 
Moreover, entering the BOP market requires TNCs to adopt radically new business
191models, and it is not obvious that they will eventually be able to beat the cost or 
responsiveness of local entrepreneurs. The most one can say for now is that 
engaging the BOP market gives companies an early advantage in gaining a share 
of what could potentially be a very big market.
(iii) Growing domestic enterprises and business networks. Domestic business 
ecosystems are created by building up networks of supply-chain relationships, 
clusterings of businesses in the same or complementary industries, informal 
entrepreneurial networks like ethnic- or religion-based chambers of commerce, 
alumni associations and incubators. As an example of how the different arms of the 
CSR agenda can be linked, domestic enterprises and business ecosystems often 
grow as an offshoot of the creation of a BOP market. A good example of this 
symbiosis at work is Hindustan Lever Ltd (HLL), a subsidiary of British TNC, 
Unilever PLC. A pioneer among TNCs exploring BOP markets, HLL entered the 
Indian BOP market in 1995 by offering a new environmentally friendly and cheap 
detergent called Wheel, formulated specifically for poor people who often washed 
their clothes in rivers. Today, it has 38% of the detergent market in India and is 
widely considered the best-managed company in India (Prahalad and Hart, 2002). 
The significance of the growth of domestic enterprises is the domestic business 
ecosystem that grows with it. The ecosystem of HLL includes some 80
121 For example, models in which profits are driven by volume and capital efficiency rather than 
high margins, distribution systems that need to be redesigned for rural areas, and for banks, risk 
assessment is based on a manual field-based operation rather than on paperwork.
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manufacturing facilities, 150 small and medium enterprise (SME) suppliers 
employing up to 40,000 people, 7,250 exclusive stockists, 12,000 wholesalers and 
small retailers, 300,000 shop owners and 150,000 individual entrepreneurs in 
remote Indian villages who sell its products (UNDP, 2004). Networks have many 
spillover benefits for the poor in the form of, among other things, enabling the 
transfer of skills, technology, information and quality, opening markets and 
bringing smaller domestic firms into the formal sector, improving the ability of 
SMEs to get financing on commercial terms rather than relying on local 
loansharks, increasing wages, employment standards and the productivity of local 
companies. It is a relationship for mutual benefit, since TNCs also rely on 
domestic enterprises for local sourcing -  although this trend is concentrated in only 
a few developing countries such a Brazil, China, India and Malaysia, with sub- 
Saharan African countries trailing behind in the number of commercial 
transactions between TNCs and small local companies.
(iv) Setting standards. Sustainable development requires a genuine commitment 
by TNCs to corporate governance and transparency, in order to safeguard against 
corruption and mismanagement, insider trading and cronyism etc., while 
promoting the values of a market economy in a democratic society like 
accountability, transparency, trust, the rule of law, fairness, ownership and 
protection for minority shareholders. Rules may be formal or informal. Business 
associations, such as chambers of commerce and industry groups, are good starting 
points for developing codes of corporate governance and behaviour for their 
members (UNDP, 2004). Rules may also be regulatory or voluntary. It has been 
argued that forward-looking corporations should welcome the regulation of 
industry standards, as it sets an objective standard for what constitutes acceptable 
practice, without which corporations will always be at the mercy of their critics 
and bear the burden of how to respond (Hertz, 2003; 2004).122 At the same time, 
what is now commonly referred to as the “triple bottom line” -  that is, the 
voluntary reporting by companies of their environmental performance, social
122 On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that the profusion o f standards can create 
confusion as well as the opportunity for deliberate obfuscation (Oliveiro & Simmons, 2002).
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equity, as well as financial profitability -  has also entered the mainstream, 
accompanied by a huge range of environmental/social auditing and reporting 
standards available nowadays.123 Whether formal or informal, regulatory or 
voluntary, a healthy private sector depends on the development of these market 
institutions. In turn, and for reasons given, a healthy private sector benefits both 
the poor and TNCs.
(v) Broader cooperation with government and civil society initiatives. The 
general consensus is that a major causal factor for the rise of CSR is the rise of 
campaigning bodies, both national and international, actively representing the 
interests of individuals, consumer associations, charities, single-interest groups and 
NGOs (O’Mahony, 2004; Owen, 2002). NGOs are defined here as third sector or 
civil society organisations “that have as their primary purpose the promotion of 
social and/or environmental goals rather than the achievement of economic power 
in the marketplace or political power through the electoral process” (Murphy and 
Bendell, 1999: 6). Historically, the relationship between TNCs and NGOs has been 
founded upon conflict. The tools NGOs used to change corporate policy ran from 
direct action protests to corporate boycotts, and resulted in some horrific human 
rights abuses, even death. Since the early 1990s, however, there has been a gradual 
transition from anarchy to partnership with “the emergence of formal sustainable 
development partnerships between these long-standing adversaries” (Murphy and 
Bendell, 1999:1). Increasingly, NGOs are using the tools of dialogue and 
collaboration to engage corporations instead. Partnership between TNCs and 
NGOs benefits the poor in indirect ways. Firstly, partnership often leads to codes 
of corporate behaviour that are arrived at by mutual agreement and can be 
independently verified. Secondly, it increases consumers’ sense of agency when 
they work with businesses via NGOs to promote positive change, resulting in “a 
more sustainable form of consumerism” (Murphy and Bendell, 1999: 51). Thirdly,
123 The most influential and successful being AccountAbility 1000 (Institute o f Social and Ethical 
Accountability), the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines, and SW8000 (Social Accountability 
International). The growth o f socially responsible investing (SRI) has also seen the creation of CSR 
indices such as the FTSE4Good, Dow Jones Sustainability Index and BITC’s Corporate 
Responsibility Index.
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dialogue and partnership with business is more effective in terms of educating the 
public on ethical products, since many corporations have wider reach and 
influence. Fourthly, demonstrating that partnership solutions work may encourage 
governments to pursue innovative policy alternatives based on partnership as well. 
The advantages go both ways. Partnership also benefits TNCs, including avoiding 
the costs of confrontation, which can be very high, and cultivating and maintaining 
a good public image among their consumers. According to research commissioned 
by McKinsey & Company, companies also benefit from the free exchange of 
information that comes from partnership, because they are able to receive advice 
and learn from their critics.
What the various arms of the CSR agenda as presented here do is to outline 
for us the practical scope of CSR. In addition to saying that TNCs ought to have 
global responsibilities (in chapter 3), we are told what the content of these 
responsibilities consists of. The challenge that follows, then, is to provide the 
normative argument for the scope of CSR as presented here. Given their moral 
obligations towards the poor, then, I ask: What is the moral justification for the 
CSR agenda, if any? What responsibilities exactly do TNCs have towards the very 
poor?
The reason for going into relative detail about the various arms of the CSR 
agenda here is also to highlight something else that they have in common besides 
causal distance between the potential contributor and the potential benefactor, 
namely, that engaging in these socially responsible initiatives leads to mutual 
benefit -  that is to say, CSR not only benefits the poor, it also benefits or is at least 
potentially advantageous for the contributing corporations themselves. Hence, the 
CSR agenda also hides a business agenda, and this, as we shall see, becomes 
important in the course of the discussion.
4.2 The scope of corporate responsibility
One of the arguments for extending the scope of responsibility to cases where there 
is no direct culpability put forward by Thomas Pogge is that individuals in rich 
states have, as a matter of human rights, a moral responsibility to ensure that they
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do not unduly harm the distant poor by supporting a global economic order that 
promotes poverty.
The reason for focusing on Pogge’s theory here is that it bears testing out 
on the CSR agenda in particular. This is because, in order to give an account of 
moral responsibility while avoiding all the potential pitfalls that have befallen 
alternative accounts, Pogge is forced to be very precise about the nature of the 
responsibility that he is talking about. Specifically, he makes very careful 
distinctions between institutional and interactional understandings of duty. 
Institutionalism, as we have said, is concerned with the way our social world ought 
to be structured -  that is, the principles by which the laws and practices that 
regulate our human interactions are assessed. Interactionalism, on the other hand, 
is concerned with the way we ought to treat each other -  that is, the principles that 
govern our moral conduct. Knowing what type of duties moral responsibility 
entails is necessary in order to flesh out a moral agenda. In this case, it is necessary 
in order to provide the normative argument for what responsibilities exactly TNCs 
have towards the very poor in general, and the CSR agenda in particular. Pogge’s 
theory therefore provides a starting point to think about the CSR agenda and what 
corporations ought to do for the distant poor, in addition to why.
4.2.1 Pogge’s theory
In his theory, Pogge makes the distinction between institutionalism and 
interactionalism, which has already been stated. In this regard, while many 
commentators have emphasized Pogge’s distinction between institutionalism and 
interactionalism, what few realise is that he actually seeks to combine them. On the 
one hand, he departs from tradition by “making the institutional view primary” 
(Pogge, 1992: 50). Global justice is described as “institutional moral analysis 
extended to the realm of international relations” (Pogge, 2003: 4). On the other 
hand, global justice for him is still concerned, at its most “basic” level (Beitz, 
1994: 125), with interactional morality. It is ultimately concerned with the way we 
stand in certain moral relations to one another, particularly vis-a-vis the world’s 
poor. While it may be primarily concerned about the way our global institutional 
order is or should be structured and the causal impact of its institutional design on
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the welfare of human beings worldwide, nonetheless the central idea in global 
justice is that “every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral 
concern” (Pogge, 1992: 49).
The question is, how can a theory privilege both the institutional and the 
interactional at the same time? The answer -  and one that, as we shall see, 
characterizes Pogge’s methodology for almost everything -  is to mark out an 
intermediate position. According to him, global justice is defined as the moral duty 
of every individual not to cooperate in imposing an unjust institutional scheme 
upon others. It privileges the institutional approach, but with two interesting 
qualifications. Firstly, what is being presented here is a “variant” of 
institutionalism (Pogge, 1992: 50), in the sense that it goes beyond a purely 
institutional moral analysis: “[w]e are asked to be concerned about human rights 
violations not simply insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are 
produced by social institutions in which we are significant participants” (Pogge, 
1992: 52, emphasis is my own). In other words, the worry is not so much about the 
justice of our existing social institutions, as it is about our individual moral 
responsibilities for the design and perpetuation of these unjust institutions. This is 
where the interactional element comes in. On the other hand, the interactional 
morality Pogge has in mind is really a variant itself. Although global justice is, at 
its very fundamental level, concerned with the moral duty of every individual (not 
to cooperate in imposing an unjust institutional scheme upon others), it goes 
beyond a purely interactional moral analysis. This is because the idea of global 
justice that is being envisioned here captures individual moral responsibilities that 
a purely interactional approach would not. A third party who may not be directly 
responsible for causing a moral wrong, may nonetheless be implicated far more 
directly than he/she thinks by virtue of supporting (or similarly, failing to make 
reasonable efforts to prevent) the institutional scheme under which that moral 
wrong is permitted.124 According to this view then, our moral responsibilities 
towards the poor occupy an intermediate position, as previously stated -  we are
124 The converse is also true though. Under Pogge’s scheme, a third party who directly causes a 
moral wrong, may nonetheless not be responsible for any human rights violation on the institutional 
view.
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less implicated than if it were ourselves withholding food from a starving person, 
but more implicated than if it were simply a third party and not ourselves causing 
the harm.
Pogge’s account departs from recent accounts of global justice and world
poverty, for example, Peter Singer’s One World: The Ethics o f  Globalisation
(2002), which tend to focus more on our positive and interactional moral duties to
assist the poor. However, Pogge has explicitly stated that he does not intend by this
to offer a counter-thesis to the existing literature. Rather, his desire is to add to it -
to show not only that we owe the poor more than what we think we do, but that
there are more of us implicated in the mission for global justice than we think there 
1are. The exact nature of the intermediate duties that he has in mind involves 
several intertwining layers of distinction that narrow down our precise moral duties 
towards the poor, the essence of which can be discerned from a reading of Pogge’s 
prolific works on global justice over the years, as well as his seminal book on 
World Poverty and Human Rights (2002). Gathering all these together, I have 
broken down Pogge’s unique conception of our moral duty towards the world’s 
poor into three components:
1. Poverty as a violation of human rights
Poverty can be seen as a lack of reasonable secure access to basic necessities. If 
reasonable secure access to basic necessities is seen as a human right, then the lack 
thereof is a violation of human rights. Conversely, ensuring freedom from poverty
is a fulfilment of human rights. There is great controversy whether reasonable
1 0 ^secure access to basic necessities is a human right or not. However, this is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. The focus here is on Pogge’s 
distinction between institutional and interactional (as well as negative and positive) 
understandings of duties. For the present purposes, we shall accept that the lack of 
reasonable secure access to basic necessities constitutes a violation of human 
rights.
125 Comment made by Thomas Pogge on 21st November 2006, at: Conference on ‘Pogge And His 
Critics’, Newcastle University, 20th-21st November 2006.
126 For further discussions about freedom from poverty as a human right, see Pogge (2007).
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2. Poverty as a violation of a negative duty
Pogge defines a negative duty as the duty to ensure that others are not unduly 
harmed through one’s own conduct, and a positive duty as a duty to benefit others 
or to protect them from harm. This can be confusing, because a negative duty is 
violated by an active tort, and a positive duty by a passive tort or omission. So the 
positive act of killing a person for the sake of some gain is a violation of a negative 
duty (not to harm others), whereas an omission like failing to rescue that person for 
the sake of a like gain is a violation of a positive duty (to protect others).
With regard to world poverty, Pogge’s contention is that we could do more 
to ensure that the world’s poor are not harmed by our actions, and for our own 
gain. In other words, our moral duty towards the world’s poor engages “not merely 
our vague positive duty to help those badly off and worse off than ourselves, but 
also our sharper and much weightier negative duty not to harm others unduly, 
either single-handedly or in collaboration with others” (Pogge, 2002: 133). This 
is Pogge’s unique take on our moral duty towards the poor: that global justice 
consists solely of negative duties. The argument is not that Pogge thinks violations 
of positive duties do not count as human rights violations, but rather that they do 
not count in his particular conception of global justice. For Pogge then, the duty 
not to harm the poor constitutes a minimal standard of justice.
Why should global justice be limited to negative duties? Pogge invokes a 
minimal standard for two reasons. Firstly, he points out that there is a lot of 
disagreement about what else justice requires. A narrow conception of justice, 
then, allows Pogge to “bypass these issues” altogether, while making his argument 
“widely acceptable” (Pogge, 2005: 55-56). Again, Pogge is not saying that we do 
not have a positive duty to assist the poor. Rather, he is saying that, for the purpose 
of a theory of global justice, it is sufficient if  we agree that “any institutional order 
imposed on human beings must be designed so that human rights are fulfilled 
under it insofar as this is reasonably possible”, and that “an institutional order
127 Pogge notes that this negative/positive distinction is “doubly moralized, because its application 
requires us to decide whether A ’s conduct harms P (relative to some morality-stipulated baseline) 
and, if so, harms P unduly”, presumably meaning for our own gain. (Pogge, 2002: 130)
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cannot be just if it fails to meet the minimal human rights standard” (Pogge, 2005: 
56). In other words, talking about global justice in terms of negative duties already 
covers a lot of ground, and it does so “without invoking any more demanding and 
less widely acceptable standard” (Pogge, 2005: 56). There is, thus, no reason to go 
beyond the conception of global justice as negative duties, and much reason to 
avoid the messiness of a discussion about positive global duties and what these are 
exactly.
Secondly, Pogge is attempting to reach out to libertarian sympathizers by 
agreeing with them in the first instance that human rights entail only minimal 
responsibilities. Libertarians agree that we should not violate human rights, but 
they do not accept that society has a positive duty to protect its most vulnerable 
members. With regard to CSR, for example, most people would agree that TNCs 
have a negative duty always to ensure that their foreign operations do not damage 
the environment, or force poor people to work in deplorable working conditions, or 
exploit child labour etc. But they would similarly agree that corporations do not 
have a positive duty in every case to clean up the environment (especially where 
they have not contributed to its degradation), build houses for the poor, set up 
schools and hospitals, or distribute free drugs in developing countries. To impose 
all of these responsibilities on corporations or, indeed, any of us, would rightly be 
too burdensome. CSR engages moral responsibility; it is not about altruism.
Nonetheless, Pogge wants to capture some of these issues in his theory of 
global justice. But he wants to do so without going the whole hog and capitulating 
to the extreme opposite of the libertarian position, that is, the maximalist position. 
The maximalist account sees human rights as entailing both negative (avoiding 
harm) and positive duties (protecting and helping). For the maximalist, morality 
requires us to help the all human beings who are in need, however we can, 
wherever we can. With regard to CSR, this is (and in my opinion, rightly) asking 
too much of corporations. Pogge wants to avoid this, but he also wants to address 
some of the social issues which a wholly negative account of moral duty would 
exclude.
128 Although corporate philanthropy can be a strategic means o f achieving the desired outcomes o f  
CSR.
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The way he chooses to have his cake and eat it, so to speak, is by 
interposing yet another layer of distinction to the conception of our moral duties 
towards the poor. This is the distinction between institutionalism and 
interactionalism, which we examine next.
3. Poverty as an institutional issue
As outlined earlier, interactional moral analysis is concerned with the ethical duties 
that individuals owe each other, whereas institutional moral analysis is concerned 
with the structure of our social world that produces just and unjust outcomes. An 
institutional understanding of human rights is concerned with the effect our formal 
and informal institutions, laws and conventions, and existing system of global 
governance, have on social justice.
One of Pogge’s missions is to “challenge the claim that the existing global 
order is not causing poverty, not harming the poor” (Pogge, 2002: 13). Towards 
this, he marshals together an impressive army of data and factual information to 
show that the reason why almost half of humankind (46%) continues to live in 
severe poverty despite enormous economic and technological progress, why 
34,000 children die everyday of malnutrition and preventable diseases despite the 
enlightened moral values and affluence of Western civilization, is that our global 
economic order ensures the continuation of this status quo.
Pogge (2002) cites the example of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Rich countries open their markets to imports from developing countries, only to 
close them effectively with protectionist measures like anti-dumping tariffs to 
prevent their markets from being flooded with imports they deem “unfairly cheap”. 
This deprives developing countries of export markets, often in sectors they are 
most able to compete, namely, agriculture, textiles and clothing. A 1999 study 
showed that rich countries’ average tariffs on manufacturing imports from 
developing countries were four times higher than that on imports from other rich 
countries. The causal claim depends on making a counterfactual comparison as 
well: If the WTO treaty system had not allowed the aforesaid protectionist 
measures, there would be less poverty in the world today (Pogge, 2003). UNCTAD
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estimates, for example, that developing countries could have exported US$700 
billion more between 1999 and 2005 if rich countries had done more to open their 
markets.
The global institutional order can also impact the poor indirectly, by 
shaping the national institutional order under which they live. For example, 
international resource and borrowing privileges are accorded to some corrupt 
governments and military juntas of poor nations, who are then able to sell their 
countries’ natural resources for their own gain. The oppressed poor of these 
nations have no say over how their countries’ natural resources are used. It also 
gives their rulers more incentive to entrench themselves in power and for others to 
take power by force. Conferring resource and borrowing privileges to corrupt 
governments and military juntas of poor nations therefore amounts to a tacit 
endorsement of these rulers by the international community, and fosters the 
continued oppression of the poor under their rule.
These examples illustrate the impact, direct and indirect, that the global 
institutional order can have on the poor. The facts are compelling, and for the 
purposes of my discussion, I shall accept this factual premise as true: that our 
global institutional order is set up in a way that causes and perpetuates global 
poverty, and that this constitutes, as we have said, a violation of human rights.
The second challenge for Pogge is to establish the normative argument, 
namely, that this ought not to happen, and that we have a moral duty to ensure that 
it does not happen. This brings us back to the question of responsibility. So far, we 
have covered how Pogge responds to the libertarian critique by narrowing his 
conception of moral responsibility in global justice to negative duties. However, 
even libertarians (most of them anyway) agree that justice requires society to do 
more than just refraining from causing harm to others. They agree that justice 
requires us, for example, to take positive action to suppress domestic violence in
1 9Qour society, not just refrain from hitting our spouses ourselves. But they do not 
go so far as to advocate that justice entails positive duties. So the question for 
global justice is this: How can Pogge capture the sense that we have some positive
129 This example is taken from Alan Patten’s (2005) critique o f Pogge (2005) in the same volume.
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responsibilities towards the global poor, without actually saying that we have 
positive global responsibilities? In other words, how can a middle ground be 
struck?
Pogge’s answer is to narrow the conception of moral responsibility even 
further, to include in his conception of global justice only negative duties that 
relate to our institutional rather than our interactional participation. On an 
interactional understanding of human rights, states and individuals have a moral 
duty not to violate the human rights of another. However, as we have said, there is 
a sense that this does not capture the full extent of our global responsibilities -  that 
these must consist of more than the negative duty not to cause harm to others 
directly. On an institutional understanding, however, the argument is that states 
and individuals have a moral duty not to work for an institutional order that 
violates human rights -  in this case, by excluding some members of society from 
secure access to basic necessities. By interposing institutionalism in the picture, 
Pogge is saying that, as individuals, we cause harm to others indirectly by 
participating in and therefore endorsing a global institutional order under which 
human rights are massively under-fulfilled. The normative argument, therefore, is 
that we have a duty to ensure that we are not complicit in such an unjust system, 
often to our own benefit but at the disproportionate expense of others.
This idea of “complicity”130 has the advantage of capturing the positive 
duties Pogge is concerned about (that is, to alleviate global poverty and help the 
global poor), albeit in an negative way (that is, to refrain from supporting unjust 
institutions). According to Pogge, therefore, global justice does not involve a duty 
on the part of you and me to refrain from the act of taking food away from a 
hungry man (interactional negative duty), for example, or the duty to feed anyone 
and everyone who is hungry (interactional positive duty). Neither does it involve 
an obligation on the part of individuals to create political institutions that uphold 
the rights of the poor (institutional positive duty). That is not to say that these are 
not duties that should attract our moral attention, merely that they are not part of 
what Pogge considers the scope of global justice. According to Pogge, global
130 The word is Besson’s (2003).
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justice consists, in the final analysis, of the negative duty on our parts to refrain 
from supporting or participating in a global institutional order that causes and 
perpetuates poverty (institutional negative duty).
In other words, treating poverty as an institutional issue allows us to go 
beyond minimalist libertarianism without offending the libertarian. It promotes the 
idea that we are required by justice to take some sort of positive action to help the 
global poor, but enables us to phrase this in terms of a negative duty by engaging 
the distinction between institutionalism and interactionalism. By interposing an 
institutional understanding, we are able to widen the scope of our negative duties 
to include the indirect harms that we cause to distant others by endorsing and 
participating in a global institutional order that causes and perpetuates their 
poverty, which we treat here as a human rights violation. But it allows us to do so 
while retaining the central tenet of libertarianism: that human rights entail only 
negative duties. An institutional understanding of human rights
“thus occupies an appealing middle ground: it goes beyond (minimalist 
interactional) libertarianism, which disconnects us from any deprivations 
we do not directly bring about, without falling into a (maximalist 
interactional) utilitarianism of rights, which holds each of us responsible 
for all deprivations whatever, regardless of the nature of our causal relation 
to them” (Pogge, 2002: 66).
4.2.2 Testing out Pogge’s theory on the CSR agenda131
My contention is that this middle ground is neither middle nor appealing when 
tested out on the CSR agenda. The question here is not whether or not Pogge’s
131 A note on agency here. In Pogge’s theory, the agent who is said to have a negative duty not to 
support a global institutional order in which human rights are massively under-fulfilled is the 
individual. In our analysis here, the agent with this negative institutional duty is the corporation.
The argument for shifting our philosophical conception o f agency from the individual to the 
institution to, specifically, corporations is covered in chapter 3. There, it was argued that the 
functions which distinguish TNCs from individual agents also (1) provide justification why they 
should be responsible for global justice, and (2) justifies a departure from the traditionally 
individualistic way o f thinking, namely, that only individual agents can be invested with moral 
responsibility. I shall not repeat the argument here, and only mention it in order to avoid any 
confusion that might arise from the shift in philosophical focus from the previous section (that is, 
from individual to corporation).
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theory is useful in grounding the CSR agenda morally, but how useful it is. Taking 
this up, I weigh the advantages and disadvantages of Pogge’s theory, and argue 
that the philosophical trade-offs in this case are too costly in the balance.
Firstly, the advantages. The biggest advantage of Pogge’s theory is that it 
focuses our attention on the causes of poverty, and reveals poverty not as a 
regrettable phenomenon but as the outcome of structural conditions -  a conception 
of poverty endorsed by both development theorists (Blowfield, 2004; Blowfield 
and Frynas, 2005) and philosophers working on global justice (Kreide, 2007). 
World poverty is not a fact that simply exists, nor is it attributable simply to weak 
or failed states. This is not to deny that poverty in developing countries is, in many 
cases, caused partly by corruption and the failure of the governments in these 
countries. However, as with our earlier rejection of what Pogge calls ‘explanatory 
nationalism’ -  that is, the uni-linear view that poverty in third world countries is 
caused by corruption and the failure of the governments in these countries -  this is 
not the sole explanation for world poverty. Poverty is not a systemic problem but a 
“complexity of multilayered, structurally rooted problems” -  and it should be 
presented to business as such, rather than as “something undesirable and soluble on 
par with, for instance, a malfunctioning valve or a quality control problem” 
(Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 511).
The reason why it is important to invest in understanding and addressing 
the structural complexity of causality in poverty is because the failure to do so 
tends to lead companies into misguidedly applying simplistic solutions and 
incurring unnecessary opportunity costs. One of the concerns about contemporary 
CSR is that, “rather than encouraging more detailed understanding, it may be 
reinforcing the misguided belief that for every complex problem there is a simple 
solution.” (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 511). An institutional approach to global 
justice is, for this reason, advantageous because it broadens our conception of 
poverty. It focuses attention on the fact that poverty is also the result of the way 
our social institutions are structured rather than merely the hand of a few 
individual entities (as the interactional approach implies), and that its causes are 
multi-faceted. A better understanding of the underlying causes of poverty helps 
avoid simplistic explanatory theories and opens up creative options for addressing
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it rather than, as we have said, consigning poverty alleviation merely as a matter of 
foreign aid or, in the case of CSR, FDI. It follows from this that Pogge’s approach 
has great practical relevance. It is supported by contemporary conceptions of 
poverty in development theory, as well as the multi-linear agenda recommended by 
the UNDP to fight poverty.
Conceptually, however, I think that Pogge’s argument trades too heavily on 
the distinction between institutionalism and interactionalism. Let me explain:
1. Conceptual distinction between institutional responsibility and interactional
responsibility as an ideal fallacy 
The first difficulty for Pogge is that it is crucial for his institutional account of 
human rights that the distinction between institutional and interactional 
understandings be maintained. This, I argue, is not plausible outside an ideal 
context.
To begin, it seems rather artificial to “evade” the libertarian critique 
“simply by splitting negative and positive duties among two different levels of 
human rights recipients”, that is, between the responsibilities of institutional agents 
of justice and of interactional agents of justice (Besson, 2003: 518). As Samantha 
Besson (2003) argues, theoretical delineations of who is responsible for what often 
do not reflect commonsense understandings of what is really going on. On the one 
hand, it is right to hold corporations that support institutions that do not respect 
human rights in violation of their institutional negative duties. On the other hand, it 
is important to recognise that what the corporations are ultimately being called to 
answer for are the violations of those interactional positive duties held by the 
institutions that represent them. So, for example, when the Ogoni campaign 
brought worldwide condemnation against Shell for, among other things, implicitly 
supporting human rights abuses through their close association with the Nigerian 
military regime, what Shell was ultimately being condemned for was not its 
support for the regime per se, but for the murders and unlawful arrests and other 
human rights violations that it had abetted.132 It was these human rights violations
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that were the objects of moral reprobation. The distinctions between 
interactionalism and institutionalism, positive and negative duties, therefore, seem 
abstract and academic in the light of the responsibilities that TNCs are really being 
attributed with.
Moreover, as Besson points out, corporations can only compensate for the 
breach of their (the corporations’) institutional negative duties through the 
institutions’ own compensation for the breach of their (the institutions’) 
interactional positive duties. Hence, when legal or other action is taken against the 
violators, it is often taken jointly against both the unjust institution and the 
colluding corporation where this is possible. To pick up the above example again: 
when the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) sought 
compensation for the human rights violations perpetrated against them, they sought 
compensation not just from Shell but also from the Nigerian government jointly 
(their campaign continues till this day). Claimability, it seems, makes no 
distinction between whether an agent is institutionally or interactionally 
responsible; at the very most, it is reducible to a matter of apportioning blame 
between agents, but not the blameworthiness of the agents itself.
Last but not least, on the point of distinction between negative and positive 
duties in particular, it might be asked: Do corporations sometimes not have a 
positive duty to actively support institutions that are just, or to actively interfere 
with unjust institutions? Without inferring any motivation for their actions, it 
seems that corporations themselves do not make the distinction between positive 
and negative duties when deciding how to engage in CSR. We have seen that, in 
the case of the Ogoni people, Shell was allegedly in violation of its negative duty
132 A little background: The Ogoni is an ethnic group o f 500,000 people living in 82 communities 
covering 1,000 square kilometres in the Nigerian Delta region. In 1987, the Iko community staged 
their first demonstration against Shell. In response, Shell engaged the protection o f the Nigerian 
Mobile Police Force -  two people were killed, some 40 homes destroyed, and more than 350 were 
made homeless. Protests against Shell escalated -  in 1990, Shell officials counted 63 protests 
against the company in that year alone. In one demonstration in Ogoniland, 80 villagers were killed 
by the Nigerian Mobile Police Force. When novelist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, rose to become President o f  
the Movement for the Survival o f the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1994, he was arrested, tried by a 
military tribunal, and hanged. It was this incident that brought the Ogoni campaign into the 
international media spotlight. For further information, see Murphy and Bendell (1999). Such human 
rights violations are significant because they perpetuate poverty, and it has been argued that one o f  
the measures to eradicate poverty should, among other things, include conflict resolution and the 
establishment of democratic institutions (Caney, 2006).
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not to support the oppressive Nigerian government. Yet, in response, Shell did not 
merely pull out of the Niger Delta. It seemed to assume, also, that it had a 
responsibility to spearhead a human rights agenda in the oil industry. So in March 
1997, it took the initiative to release a major international review of its Statement 
of General Business Principles that included, for the first time, explicit support for 
human rights. What the examples show is that, at least from the point of view of 
the corporation, it would seem that institutional negative duties not to support 
unjust institutions that violate human rights sometimes also hide interactional 
positive duties.
At this point, Pogge might object by saying that all the foregoing argument 
has merely shown is that corporations do not make the same distinctions as 
philosophers do, but that in the Humean spirit, an ‘ought’ cannot be inferred from 
an ‘is’. But this is to misunderstand my concern. My concern is not with the 
empirical disanalogies in Pogge’s theory per se. Rather, my concern is with what 
these empirical disanalogies point to -  that is, the failure of the theory to offer 
principles that are practicable and action-guiding. The critique of Pogge’s theory is 
that it fails to provide an abstracted picture of society that is representative of its 
crucial aspects and how it actually works. Put in another way, the problem with 
Pogge’s theory is that the sharp distinctions that are so central to his theory are not 
captured in the real world.
Pogge might follow this up by insisting that the distinctions that he makes 
are ideal distinctions. That is to say, it is not the case that violations of 
interactional and/or positive duties do not count as human rights violations in real 
life, only that they do not count in ideal theory -  that is, a theory of global justice
conceived independent of the non-ideal structures that obstruct the realisation of
1the ideal. In this case, what Pogge might wish to say is that it is true that there 
are some empirical discrepancies between his theory of global justice (the ideal) 
and commonsense perceptions of what the scope of corporate responsibility is (the 
non-ideal), and that the distinctions that he makes between institutionalism and 
interactionalism are not as clear-cut in real life. Thus, they might not guide
133 See chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation of ‘ideal theory’ and ‘non-ideal theory’.
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corporate action as well as is desired. However, he might go on to argue that ideal 
theory is important nonetheless, because it serves an ideal purpose. What the 
institutional/interactional distinction achieves for a theory of global justice is a 
conceptual middle ground that avoids the over-archingness of a maximalist 
interactional conception of responsibility while capturing the concerns that a 
minimalist institutional position would omit, as explained previously. Hence, it is 
important to make these distinctions, even if they do not always pan out in reality.
However, this argument only serves to make my point, which is that, 
outside the ideal realm, it is questionable whether the institutional actions of 
corporations can be separated from their interactional actions. Even within a 
framework of purely negative duties (assuming that a strict line between negative 
and positive duties can be drawn in the first place), it is not always clear that the 
actions by which agents are supporting or not supporting an unjust institutional 
order can be distinguished from the interactional actions they pursue to distance 
themselves from that unjust institutional order. If a corporation does not want to be 
implicated in the harsh working conditions in a foreign plant, and avoids the issue 
by selling the plant and then buying its products from its new local owner who 
fails to improve the working conditions, for example, then prima facie it is in 
violation of its negative duty not to support an institutional order that perpetuates 
bad working conditions. This is the institutional view. But one could also argue 
that the corporation is in violation of another type of negative duty -  that by selling 
the plant, it is itself perpetuating the exploitation of the workers for its own gain.134 
This is the interactional view. However, under Pogge’s theory, the corporation 
would not be responsible on the interactional view, but only on the institutional 
view.
Relatedly, there is the concern that Pogge’s institutional account fails to 
provide justice in the paradigmatic cases where, for example, the corporation is the 
one making its employees labour in poor working conditions. As one critic 
questions, “is it plausible to think that a human rights dimension enters into such a 
case only if [the corporation’s exploitative behaviour] can be interpreted as the
134 Not to mention that, by selling the plant, it failed to provide better working conditions where it 
could have -  a violation o f a positive duty.
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object of official disregard within a coercively imposed institutional scheme?” 
(Tasioulas, 2007: 97). Underlying this, of course, is the intuition that corporations 
ought to be held responsible on the interactional view. The concern, then, is that 
Pogge’s theory distances corporations too much from certain moral 
responsibilities, and relegates their role in global justice to cases where their 
actions can be related to the institutional structures that give rise to or create 
barriers to stop the so-called human rights violations. According to Pogge, this is 
sufficient scope for a theory of global justice. The question, of course, is whether it 
really is.
No one denies the advantages offered by Pogge’s theory, the most 
important of which is that it draws our attention to the complexity of causality in 
poverty. The idea that moral responsibility attaches itself to the institutional case as 
well as the interactional case incorporates an understanding of poverty as the 
outcome of the institutional and structural conditions of society, rather than just a 
regrettable phenomenon brought about by the interactional actions of certain 
individuals or entities. A better understanding of poverty, in turn, leads to a better 
understanding of how to fight poverty. In this case, it provides normative grounds 
for broadening the scope of the CSR agenda to include not merely interactional 
means of alleviating poverty like FDI, but also institutional solutions that aim to 
change the way society is structured. This means a broader role for corporations in 
global justice, which is captured by the CSR agenda. The problem is that, in 
Pogge’s theory, the institutional understanding of poverty driving this broader 
vision for CSR is arrived at through a series of abstract ideal distinctions between 
institutional and interactional understandings of moral responsibility, which turn 
out to be problematic outside an ideal context. Although, ideally-speaking, the 
abstract distinctions offer the promise of a conceptual middle ground, these ideal 
advantages are obtained at a cost -  the distinctions are empirically unstable, and 
there is the worry that institutional responsibility does not cover the paradigmatic 
cases. An accurate conception of moral responsibility outside an ideal context is 
ultimately important for the CSR agenda, because what corporations are held to be 
responsible for (or not) ultimately determines what they should or should not do 
for the world’s poor. Non-ideally-speaking, then, it seems that the distinctions that
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started out so promising turn out less so outside an ideal context. We will say more 
about ideal and non-ideal theory later on.
2. Moral equality between institutional responsibility and interactional
responsibility as an ideal fallacy
Is one more morally compelling than the other? Pogge is of the view that both
instances of moral wrongdoing are on par, and that it is not the case that one
1 ^carries more moral weight than the other. The difficulty for Pogge this time is 
maintaining this moral parity between institutional and interactional 
responsibilities, while at the same time maintaining the conceptual distinction 
between the two that is so crucial to his theory.
As far as I can tell, violations of interactional responsibilities always carry 
with it the greater threat of sanctions than institutional responsibilities. Oil spills 
are almost always accompanied by vast sums of compensation to the victims of the 
spill, whereas it has proven more difficult in comparison to hold corporations 
accountable for their complicity with corrupt governments over human rights 
violations. So when a major spillage of crude petroleum in the town of Ogbodo 
near Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta happened, for example, Shell was ordered by 
the Nigerian courts to pay the local community US$40 million in compensation.136 
In comparison, the suits brought under the Alien Torts Claims Act (“ATCA”) by 
Ogoni victims and survivors against Shell for alleged complicity in violations of
1 ^7international human rights law and other federal and state laws have proved to 
be less straightforward, or have otherwise been mired in procedural disputes for 
nine years after the filing of the initial complaint against Shell and have yet to
135 Discussion with Thomas Pogge on 21st November 2006, at: Conference on ‘Pogge And His 
Critics’, Newcastle University, 20th-21st November 2006.
136 BBC news (26th June 2000) Shell fights compensation order. Shell has appealed.
137 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Wiwa v. Anderson, Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development 
Company. These suits were brought with assistance from the Centre for Constitutional Rights.
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) o f 1789 grants jurisdiction to US Federal Courts over “any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law o f nations or a treaty o f the 
United States”.
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reach a hearing date.138 The most that Shell has received in the meanwhile is but 
condemnation by civil society organisations that it “failed to use its considerable 
influence in Nigeria to bring about change in the Niger Delta” (Christian Aid, 
2004). Assuming that moral weight in this case is represented by the consequences 
suffered by the perpetrators of violations of moral duty, or the threat of such 
consequences, then it would seem from the evidence that institutional 
responsibilities are not equal to interactional responsibilities at all. If anything, 
they are less morally compelling on the evidence.
Pogge might reply that this is precisely the point, that the purpose of 
focusing on the institutional case is precisely to build it up to a point where it is as 
morally compelling as interactional cases. In the context of the CSR agenda, he 
might argue that the idea behind institutionalism is not about imposing sanctions 
on corporations when they are in violation of their institutional responsibilities, but 
giving corporations a moral basis to push for change where they find themselves as 
“co-designers” of an unjust institutional order.139 In this case, the normative 
argument would not be dispelled merely by its empirical disanalogies.
In itself, there is nothing wrong with this conclusion. However, when run 
together with the first argument (namely, that global justice is concerned 
exclusively with institutional responsibilities), a paradox arises. Pogge, I think, 
systematically exaggerates the institutional/interactional distinction when it comes 
to establishing responsibility in global justice, but downplays the distinction when 
it comes to assigning moral weight to the different responsibilities. This is the first 
paradox. A second paradox arises because the reverse is true on the evidence. 
Empirically-speaking, the distinction between institutional and interactional 
responsibilities is not always as clear as Pogge wants it to be when it comes to their 
moral significance, but the distinction becomes clearer when it comes to their 
moral weight, just as Pogge seems to downplay it.
138 Centre for Constitutional Rights docket on the suits: 
http://www.ccr-
nv.org/v2/legal/corporate accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObiID=sReYTC75ti&Content=46
139 Discussion with Thomas Pogge on 21st November 2006, at: Conference on ‘Pogge And His 
Critics’, Newcastle University, 20th-21sl November 2006.
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Pogge might object again that there is no paradox. He might accept that, 
while the degree of the institutional/interactional distinction varies from context to 
context, the nature of the distinction itself holds nonetheless within the realm of 
ideal theory. Firstly, as suggested earlier, staying within the ideal realm might 
allow Pogge to uphold the separation of the ‘is’/’ought’ worlds, so that the 
empirical disanalogies pointed out here did not affect the normative soundness of 
the institutional/interactional distinction. Secondly, as Pogge himself argues, it 
would allow him to say that, within this ideal realm, insisting on the institutional 
case does not exclude the moral importance of interactional responsibilities, 
merely its importance with regard to constructing a theory of cosmopolitan global 
justice.
But why insist on the distinction then? Why take an exclusively 
institutional approach to cosmopolitan global justice? If the distinction (itself 
disputed) can only be maintained by making it conditional on other distinctions 
(that is, between ideal/non-ideal worlds), perhaps it is the case that there is no 
distinction to be made in the first place. Perhaps by intricately carving out his 
middle ground the way that he has done, Pogge has played into the hands of the 
libertarians.140 The suspicion here is that Pogge’s argument arises primarily to 
meet an ideal need. It is driven by the need to find, for reasons given, a conceptual 
middle ground between minimalist interactional libertarianism and maximalist 
interactional utilitarianism. In order to plant his flag on this middle ground, Pogge 
necessarily privileges the institutional approach over the interactional approach as 
the way to view global justice. In other words, institutional theory is but a 
“dialectical ploy”141 to find conceptual harmony between different philosophical 
outlooks. However, Pogge’s problem is this: the world is a messy place. As we 
have seen, it does not always fall into the clear-cut distinctions that we want it to. 
Institutional responsibilities sometimes involve interactional obligations, and vice 
versa. Outside an ideal context, the line between the two is sometimes blurred, and 
at other times, it is clearer. The fact is, in a non-ideal context, different arms of the
140 This claim was first made by John Tasioulas, at: Conference on ‘Pogge And His Critics’, 
Newcastle University, 20th-21st November 2006.
141 Again, the description is John Tasioulas’s (2007).
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CSR agenda matter differently in different situations. In some situations, for 
example, FDI may be more urgent; in other cases, the situation may call for more 
emphasis on one or more of the other arms of the CSR agenda. In this case, the 
fine distinctions between institutional responsibility and interactional responsibility 
seem artificial and unnecessary.
4.3 A non-ideal approach:
Theorizing the business case for CSR
In the light of these problems, I wish to suggest that a perspective that avoids the 
need for the kind of distinctions Pogge has attempted is far more practical all 
round. From our discussion so far, it seems that the active distinction is not 
between institutionalism and interactionalism, but between ideal and non-ideal 
approaches to CSR. Ideally, the way Pogge has chosen to design a theory of global 
justice leads him to make certain conceptual distinctions. But in doing so, his 
procedural commitments present him with no choice but to perpetuate the distance 
between an imagined cosmopolitan world and the realities of an un-simple world, 
so much so that “it is doubtful that any dialectical advantage here offsets the costs 
incurred.” (Tasioulas, 2007: 97) Despite Pogge’s claims that his version of 
institutional global justice is “mediated by empirical regularities and correlations” 
(Pogge, 1992: 56-57), we have seen that this is not always true.142
What about non-ideal theory then? Can non-ideal theory address the 
empirical disanalogies that are problematic for ideal theory? Perhaps it is 
appropriate to start by saying that the importance of non-ideal theory is not that it 
bridges over the empirical disanalogies of ideal theory. The importance of non­
ideal theory is that captures certain empirical facts that lead to injustice, but which 
are excluded from consideration in ideal theory, hence preventing the ideal theory 
from achieving ideality. In this case, I have argued that the overwhelming focus
142 Although Pogge does admit that his theory “does not, as such, entail crisp practical 
conclusions”, because cosmopolitan institutionalism deals not with the “established consequences” 
of an unjust institutional scheme, which can be straightforwardly read off from the terms o f the 
scheme (for example, a constitutional provision that allows slavery), but with its “engendered 
consequences”, which are more complex to trace empirically (for example, how an existing 
institutional scheme tends to affect the incidence o f poverty, social exclusion, child labour) (Pogge, 
1992: 56-57).
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paid to the abstract distinction between institutional and interactional 
understandings of moral responsibility in Pogge’s theory obscures the fluidity of 
the distinction in real life. This leads to injustice because, firstly, an exclusively 
institutional approach excludes certain things that we want the CSR agenda to 
capture, and secondly, insisting on an absolute institutional/interactional distinction 
excludes flexibility in tailoring a CSR agenda that meets the particular needs of the 
developing society in question. On the other hand, as we have said, the concept of 
institutional moral responsibility broadens our conception of causality in poverty, 
and a broader conception of causality in poverty is crucial because it leads to a 
broader poverty agenda that covers the root causes of poverty and is not merely 
symptomatic. A non-ideal approach to CSR would want to capture this broader 
conception of causality in poverty, but without the need to appeal to an over­
demanding institutional/interactional distinction.
Clearly, a more detailed explanation of what a non-ideal approach is 
exactly and why I think that it can do the normative work that (I argue) Pogge’s 
theory fails to do here is required. For this, I ask the reader to bear with me until 
chapter 5. In this concluding section, however, I would like to briefly propose and 
outline one form such a non-ideal approach might take first, that is, to theorize the 
business case for CSR. There are several reasons for this.
Firstly, as much as Pogge’s theory provides a normative argument for the 
CSR agenda, it obfuscates the extent to which the realisation of these best practices 
is constrained by business considerations. The critique of Pogge is that, by 
doggedly pursuing the institutional/interactional distinction, he has sacrificed 
practical theory for ideal theory. My argument here is that the scope of the CSR 
agenda is not in fact normatively determined by such fine distinctions between 
institutional and interactional understandings of moral responsibility (which are in 
themselves problematic), but by the limitations and constraints imposed by the 
corporations’ fiduciary duties to their shareholders to maximise profits and 
shareholder value -  in other words, the business case for CSR. Indeed, the very 
idea that TNCs have responsibilities in global justice is circumscribed by the need 
to consider the business case for CSR.
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Why the fiduciary duties of corporations pose as non-ideal constraints is 
explained in more detail in chapter 5. The point I wish to highlight here, however, 
is why we need to theorize these constraints. To adopt the language of non-ideal 
theory temporarily here, we need to theorize “the existence and functioning of the 
actual non-ideal structures that obstruct the realization of the ideal” (Mills, 2005 
: 170), in order that our normative argument produces principles that are capable of 
guiding corporate action and informing public policy. To ignore the non-ideal 
circumstances in which corporations operate and treat them like any other 
individual agent, would be to systematically gloss over a very real and very 
compelling problem corporations face uniquely when they consider their role in 
global justice. Just as normative theory abstracts away social and historical 
contingencies like class struggles, racism, sexism and other conceptual biases, in 
this case, it abstracts away the business reality that corporations face. It assumes 
unhindered perfect compliance to the demands of their global responsibilities on 
the part of corporations. The theoretical poverty that results in turn leads to 
injustice, because it leads to the misguided conclusion that corporate engagement 
in global justice is practically unfeasible and/or undesirable.143 It obfuscates the 
powerful role that corporations can (and already do) play in global justice -  not as 
a part of the institutional order of which change is demanded, or as regulated 
minions of states and international institutions, but as primary agents of justice in 
their own right. This oversight, I think, represents a great loss for the poor.
Secondly, mapping the business case for the CSR agenda onto a normative 
argument broadens it without the need to appeal to the kind of problematic 
distinctions that Pogge’s theory proposes. The idea here is that profit maximisation 
can be a motivation for CSR as well as a constraint. If we turn back to the CSR 
agenda proposed by the UNDP in section 4.1, we see that there are compelling 
profit-motives for TNCs to engage in the range of initiatives proposed. The agenda 
of creating bottom of the pyramid markets that cater to the poor is, for example, in 
itself a hugely potential and profitable social enterprise. Growing domestic
143 Or, it leads us to misguidedly conclude that profits are bad, as some anti-capitalist activists 
would have it, and to lament that corporations have no role to play in global justice altogether. The 
point, as I will argue later on, is not that profits are good or bad, but what type o f profit-outcomes 
we can accept and what we cannot.
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enterprises and a vibrant domestic business network also benefits TNCs, because 
these support their operations in the particular developing country in question. In 
some cases, the regulation of industry standards can take away the burden of self­
regulation.144 As for broader cooperation with government and civil society 
initiatives, it has been argued that corporations often have an incentive to 
cooperate and form partnerships with NGOs lobbying against their behaviour, 
particularly where the cost of conflict is high.
At the same time, however, there are many anti-competitive incentives 
pulling TNCs in the opposite direction. In many developing countries, self- 
interested TNCs take advantage of the lack of market regulations and weak 
institutional environments to raise protectionist barriers to trade, in some cases 
lobbying corrupt governments to slow progress in improving the institutional 
infrastructure for markets. These anti-competitive measures in turn make it 
difficult for local entrepreneurs to get finance on competitive terms, leading to 
underdeveloped domestic economies, higher prices and lower quality products that 
hurt poor people (UNDP, 2004). Moreover, a stakeholder’s recognition is more 
often than not “contingent upon the business case for that recognition” (Blowfield 
and Frynas, 2005: 508). Groups who are not considered “primary stakeholders” -  
that is, those who are not a priority, who do not present a threat to TNCs, or whom 
TNCs are not highly dependent on -  often have their issues sidelined by TNCs and 
NGOs alike. The fact is, it is the business case that shapes the choice of issues and 
delineates the boundaries of CSR in practice. Hence, this dynamic needs to be 
incorporated into normative theory. The argument here is that non-ideal theory 
offers a way of doing this.
Thirdly, accepting that the business case for the CSR agenda acts as a 
constraint on the extent of TNC engagement in CSR avoids the problems involved 
in defining the “cut-off point” for the scope of moral responsibility. The main 
concern of those who oppose the implementation of any principle of distributive 
justice on an international scale is that there lacks such a “cut-off point” and 
therefore makes any responsibilities of global justice potentially burdensome
144 Although I argue later on in chapter 6 that the advantages o f regulation are exaggerated.
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(Tasioulas, 2005). There are some who argue for the conception of the moral 
responsibility of TNCs as a duty to assist burdened societies to achieve well- 
orderedness, beyond which cut-off point no further assistance is owed. Others see 
it as a duty of international distributive justice that it does not incorporate a target 
of cut-off point, but instead sets the continuous task of adjusting for any 
inequalities based on Rawls’s maximin principle. Theorizing the business case for 
the CSR agenda takes away the need to make a choice between the two by offering 
a variant approach that does not only focus on the poverty of the potential 
benefactor that is (on Pogge’s account) generated and sustained by a 
discriminatory economic order but, additionally, considers the factors that 
constrain the behaviour of the potential contributor. In other words, theorizing the 
business case for the CSR agenda means that, whether or not the duty of assistance 
or the duty of international distributive justice is at work, the targets of maximising 
profits and shareholder value are always present as an integral part of the 
normative argument to regulate the scope of the CSR agenda.145 Moreover, in the 
case of a duty to assist, the same reasoning allows the business agenda to serve as a 
cut-off point where the duty to assist exceeds this parameter, whether or not that 
duty to assist consists of helping a society to achieve subsistence or the more 
exacting requirement of an adequate standard of living.146
In this chapter, I presented the CSR agenda and critically tested out Pogge’s theory 
on it in order to discover its usefulness in grounding the scope of CSR 
normatively. In doing so, I argued that Pogge’s argument traded too heavily on the 
distinction between institutionalism and interactionalism. The problem was that, on 
the one hand, Pogge maintains that institutional responsibility and interactional
145 In a similar vein, Tasioulas (2005) suggests a scheme o f social cooperation for mutual 
advantage, although he seems to view it as an alternative to, rather than as a variant of, the duties o f  
assistance and o f international distributive justice.
146 Tasioulas (2005) characterizes the duty o f assistance in terms o f the more demanding standard 
of an adequately good life, but while he provides argumentation as to why we should have no 
reason to disagree with this expanded conception o f moral responsibility, one is left wondering 
what the reasons to agree with it are? The business case, on the other hand, provides at least a 
positive argument for why the boundaries o f the CSR agenda are drawn as they are.
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responsibility are mutually exclusive arguments; on the other hand, he wishes to 
assign them equal weight. Individually taken, these were not necessarily 
conflicting lines of argument. However, when run together in practice, they 
revealed probable cause to rethink Pogge’s middle ground. In the first case, the 
distinction between institutionalism and interactionalism was drawn too tightly; 
there were too many cases where the line was simply not clear. In the second case, 
the distinction between institutionalism and interactionalism was drawn too 
loosely; the apparently unequal sanctions that corporations incurred for violations 
in each instance revealed the empirical disanalogies. The juxtaposition of the two 
cases seemed paradoxical at first, but careful consideration of the relationship 
between ideal and non-ideal theory suggested that the fundamental problem lay 
with Pogge’s distinction between institutionalism and interactionalism, which if 
true, revealed it to be an ideal fallacy. It was an ideal fallacy because, as I 
suggested, the active distinction was not between institutionalism and 
interactionalism -  a distinction wholly struck within the realm of ideal theory -  but 
between ideal and non-ideal approaches to CSR.
I then looked briefly at theorizing the business case for CSR as a potential 
form such a non-ideal approach might take. I argued that not only did this 
approach resist the appeal to a false Poggean “bifurcation”147 of corporate 
responsibility, it went on to offer us a real method of conceptualizing the scope of 
corporate responsibility. On the one hand, it served as an acknowledgement of the 
very real constraints corporations face in realising the normative ideals of the CSR 
agenda -  namely, the fiduciary duties to their shareholders to maximise profits and 
shareholder value. On the other hand, it also broadened the normative boundaries 
of CSR by identifying how these business considerations could be a motivation for 
engaging in the various arms of the CSR agenda as well. Indeed, in the first place, 
there was a need to take into account these business considerations when we say 
that TNCs have responsibilities in global justice. The question, of course, is: how 
can we theorize the business case for CSR? In this chapter, it was suggested briefly 
that this could be done by taking a non-ideal approach. But what is non-ideal
147 Again, the phrase is Tasioulas’s (2007).
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theory and why is it the best way of theorizing the business case for CSR? It is to 
these questions that we turn to next.
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5The problem of the CSR dilemma and non-ideal theory 
explained
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the scope of corporate responsibility is 
not determined by ideal distinctions between institutionalism and interactionalism, 
but by the business considerations that constrain what companies can and cannot 
do outside their business mandate. These business considerations consist of 
companies’ fiduciary duties to their shareholders to maximise profits and 
shareholder value. They are non-ideal, it was claimed, because they pose an 
obstruction to the full realisation of the ideal that we have constructed so far: the 
argument that TNCs have responsibilities in global justice as a matter of duty.
The notion that the demands of business and the demands of global justice 
pull companies in opposite directions is not an unfamiliar one. Many of us 
approach the subject of CSR as if the two were irreconcilable, taking up dogmatic 
positions on either side. Either we adopt the “moral” view that TNCs ought to be 
responsible for some of the global injustices in the world, and make an 
impassioned argument for them to do more to deliver on human rights. Or we 
staunchly maintain the “strictly business” view that the sole responsibility of a 
company is “to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits” (Friedman, 1970: 42); therefore CSR is a “misguided virtue” (Henderson, 
2001).
TNCs, then, appear to face a dilemma. On the one hand, as we have argued 
in the previous chapters, TNCs bear some global responsibilities towards the very 
poor as a matter of duty. On the other hand, there is the seemingly conflicting 
argument that the sole responsibility of a corporation is to maximise profits and 
shareholder value. The two opposite views of where corporate priority should lie 
give rise to a perennial dilemma in any theory of CSR: that of balancing the 
demands of global justice on a corporation and the primacy of its fiduciary duties 
towards its shareholders. What we might thereby call the ‘CSR dilemma’ therefore
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prompts us to ask the important question: If the business of business is business, 
why should it care about global justice?
Those who fall into the “strictly business” camp may concede that 
corporations should sometimes commit to certain human rights causes, but only if 
they serve a business purpose. Such instrumentally-led decisions form part of what 
has been called “strategic philanthropy” (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Those who 
take the “moral view”, on the other hand, tend to regard such self-interested moral 
action merely as a public relations exercise or “greenwash” (Murphy and Bendell, 
1999). Whatever labels we put on the different viewpoints, the instrumental case is 
indicative of a third reality that we are increasingly being confronted by nowadays: 
that, in many global situations, TNCs who are thought to have “constitutive aims 
that prevent them from being agents of justice at all” and who, indeed, sometimes 
act as “rogue companies” who “throw their considerable weight in the direction... 
of greater injustice” for the sake of maximising profits -  these are the same 
companies that sometimes also “insist on decent environmental standards although 
no law requires them to do so, or on decent standards of employment practice or of 
safety at work even where they could get away with less...” (O’Neill, 2001: 48, 
49). In other words, there are cases where we find that the “moral” view and the 
“strictly business” view of TNCs both apply, as in the instrumental case.
In this chapter, I explain why I believe that there is a widespread failure in 
global justice to recognise the extent to which what I describe as the ‘business case 
for CSR’ shapes corporations’ choice of CSR issues and delineates the boundaries 
of CSR. I believe that this failure causes and/or perpetuates a historical and 
ideational exclusion of corporations in global justice which, in turn, represents a 
great loss for the poor. This is the problem in theorizing about the role of 
corporations in global justice. The normative challenge for political theory, 
therefore, is to find a way of theorizing about both the “moral” and “strictly 
business” views together, to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable in a way that 
reflects the social reality of what TNCs are doing. I suggest that this lies in 
theorizing the business case for CSR, where both the “moral” and “strictly 
business” views overlap. To do so would be to seek and provide a solution to the 
CSR dilemma as well.
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Solving the problem of the CSR dilemma involves not only identifying the 
problem but also locating the site of the problem. I think that the best 
methodological strategy for solving the CSR dilemma (that is, by theorizing the 
business case for CSR) is not to abandon political theory for political sociology, as 
has been suggested (Nielsen, 1983). Instead, I believe that the problem of the CSR 
dilemma should be located within the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory. 
The argument is predicated on the idea that theorizing about the role of 
corporations in global justice should produce principles or policies that are capable 
of being action-guiding for companies. The critique is that the structure of the 
current theoretical status quo is unable to rise up to the task because, in developing 
the conceptual tools for analysing the role of non-person, non-state actors like 
corporations in global justice, theorists of global justice have largely chosen to 
ignore the non-ideal circumstances (exemplified by the CSR dilemma) under 
which these actors operate. This structural bias in turn explains a historical and 
ideational exclusion of corporations in theories of global justice. The CSR 
dilemma, in this sense, falls into a “guidance gap” between ideal and non-ideal 
theory. Drawing from the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, I go on to offer some 
methodological principles for developing a theory of CSR, and suggest that there 
are lessons to be learned from some non-idealists, particularly those who 
emphasize the business case for CSR. Theorizing about the role of corporations in 
global justice, I conclude, involves theorizing the non-ideal.
The chapter is structured as follows: I begin by laying out the “moral” and 
the “strictly business” views that make up the CSR dilemma in section 5.1. I then 
go on in section 5.2 to suggest that the staunch positions taken in each view, and 
the failure in global justice to recognise the extent to which the business case for 
CSR shapes corporations’ moral engagement in CSR, has led to a historical and 
ideational exclusion of corporations in global justice. Therefore, I argue that the 
two traditionally opposing views need to be married within a single theory of CSR. 
How should a theory of global justice approach this? In section 5 .3 ,1 suggest that a 
political theory that sees CSR in terms of the role of TNCs in global justice should 
also theorize about the business case for CSR, by treating it as a case of theorizing 
the non-ideal. I explain what non-ideal theory is and why I think that it is the best
- 158-
methodology for this purpose. I conclude by suggesting that there are lessons to be 
learned from some non-idealists.
5.1. The CSR dilemma
The CSR dilemma arises because there are two apparently competing views of 
what TNCs ought to do running parallel to each other. In this thesis so far, we have 
been concentrating on the “moral” view, that is, developing a normative argument 
for why TNCs ought to have some responsibilities for the global injustices in the 
world. However, there are those who staunchly maintain a “strictly business” view, 
that is, that the sole responsibility of a company is to maximise profits and 
shareholder value. Those who take this view are naturally sceptical about any 
theory that advocates that the company act, even prima facie , outside their core 
business ambit, such as engaging in CSR. Generally speaking, most people, 
including those who take no views either way, would be forgiven for having 
nagging doubts about CSR in the light of the predominant conception of TNCs as 
self-interested profit-maximisers. A theory of CSR would, therefore, be incomplete 
if it did not acknowledge and address the “business view” as well.
One of the main schools of scepticism about CSR is that ‘CSR is bad 
capitalism’. The dilemma between the “moral” view and the “strictly business” 
view is suggested by this quote from The Economist:
“... there is a dilemma. Profit-maximising CSR does not silence the critics, 
which was the initial aim; CSR that is not profit-maximising might silence 
the critics but is, in fact, unethical.” (22nd January 2004).
At first glance, it might seem that this is an untenable dilemma -  one way 
or the other, CSR involves the failure by corporations to fulfil some obligation(s) 
towards either society or their shareholders. If corporations fulfil their obligations 
towards society, then it is good CSR but bad capitalism. If they fulfil their 
obligations towards their shareholders, then it is good capitalism but bad CSR. So 
either way, CSR is bad capitalism, or else it is simply socially irresponsible.
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The most famous advocate of the “strictly business” view is Milton 
Friedman. In his seminal article ‘The Social Responsibility Of Business’ (1970), 
Friedman famously argued that, in a free society, “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business -  to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or defraud.” (42). He 
presents a few arguments for the “strictly business” view. Firstly, there is the 
classic ‘methodological individualism’ argument, that is, that a “business” entity 
cannot be said to have “responsibilities”. Secondly, there is the ‘principal-agent 
relationship’ argument, that is, that individual managers breach their fiduciary 
relationship with the company’s shareholders when they exercise social 
responsibility through the corporate mechanism.148 However (and thirdly), the 
thrust of Friedman’s condemnation of CSR149 is that it is “undemocratic” (40) and 
“harm[s] the foundations of a free society” (41). This, he argues, is because CSR 
amounts to corporate individuals using shareholders’ money to pursue social goals 
via the corporate mechanism that should rightly be pursued via democratic 
procedures. CSR, he says, “involves the acceptance of the socialist view that 
political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to 
determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses” (39). For these 
reasons, according to Friedman, the social responsibility of business a 
“fundamentally subversive doctrine” (42).
It has been suggested that the level of political rhetoric that is used in 
Friedman’s argument appears to reflect a deep fear of some perceived anti­
capitalist ideology. For example, in the course of his argument, Friedman 
expresses the fear that CSR “helps to strengthen the already too prevalent view that 
the pursuit of profits is wicked and immoral and must be curbed and controlled by 
external forces” (41). We must remember that Friedman wrote the article in the 
climate of big business in the late 1960s, when large companies were dominated by
148 Hence, there are those who see CSR as creating a corporate governance problem, because CSR 
is akin to the corporate executive serving the interests o f the public instead o f the shareholders, 
while remaining an agent o f the shareholders in name.
149 He spends half the article on this point.
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managerial elites, and there was a worry that “the real agenda [behind CSR] was to 
get the chief executive into the country club in the US or a knighthood in the UK”, 
and that shareholders’ interests were not being protected (Sparkes, 2003). 
Moreover, the Cold War was still going on at the time. Hence, one also sees the 
likes of prominent American economists like Theodore Levitt, who was the editor 
of the Harvard Business Review, comparing CSR to Soviet “ideological clack” 
(1958: 45), calling it “a new feudalism” (44) and saying that it marked the “end of 
capitalism” (46). Levitt sums up the prevalent view of CSR sceptics at the time as 
follows:
“There is a name for this kind of encircling business ministry, and it pains 
me to use it. The name is fascism. It may not be the insidious, amoral, 
surrealistic fascism over which we fought World War II, or the corrupt and 
aggrandizing Latin American version, but the consequence will be a 
monolithic society in which the essentially narrow ethos of the business 
corporation is malignantly extended over everyone and everything.” (46)
In other words, what these critics of CSR were really defending was a 
capitalist ideology: that capitalism is good, profits are good. This defence was in 
turn a counter-response to the prevailing anti-business climate then.
In the twenty-first century, I believe that the debate about CSR is no longer 
a question about whether capitalism is valid or not. I think that we need to accept 
that corporations exist and, at the same time, accept the norms, values and 
priorities of global capitalism -  not fighting it, but working with it. As 
development experts argue, the starting point for identifying the problem of 
corporations in global justice is not to debate whether or not we accept the validity 
of global capitalism, but to accept global capitalism as the predominant ideology 
and to acknowledge instead its embedded social, moral and economic dimensions 
(Blowfield, 2004). Of course, this means accepting that the norms, values and 
priorities of global capitalism will to an extent define the boundaries of the 
negotiation over global justice. But it also means an advance in the research on 
poverty and development: rather than saying that big business is bad, we are able
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to analyse the ways in which the dedicated pursuit of corporate interests causes 
poverty, and to see it rightly as a product of society’s structural conditions rather 
than a phenomenon (Blowfield, 2004). The question, therefore, is no longer 
whether profit maximisation is valid or not, but what type of profit outcomes we 
are willing to accept. Only when we accept capitalism as the status quo can there 
be any meaningful discussion of whether CSR is good or bad capitalism, and how 
to think about that philosophically. Anti-capitalism is, in this case, a separate 
debate altogether.
Moreover, when critics of CSR accuse it of being an aw/z-capitalist 
ideology, what they really mean most of the time is that it is bad capitalism. In 
‘Misguided Virtue’ (2001), for example, David Henderson argues like Friedman 
and Levitt that CSR is the equivalent of “global salvationism” (82) or “generalised 
alarmism” (83). But it has been noted that these are “overwrought” political labels 
quite out of place in academic works (Sparkes, 2003: 3). Henderson’s real and 
extensive argument is that, from the point of view of the corporation, the adoption 
of CSR carries with it a high probability of cost increases and impaired enterprise 
performance which subvert the corporation's profit motive. Hence, CSR is 
“misguided virtue”, because it
“involves the voluntary adoption by businesses of broader objectives, more 
complex procedures, and more exacting standards. To this extent it would 
tend to impair enterprise performance, with effects on both costs and 
revenues, short-run and long-run... Its adoption would reduce competition 
and economic freedom and undermine the market economy. The 
commitment to it marks an aberration on the part of the business 
concerned, and its growing hold on opinion generally is a matter for 
concern.” (Henderson, 2001: 11, 15)
Henderson’s argument characterises the real concern of the ‘CSR is bad 
capitalism’ camp. The argument is that CSR is bad capitalism because it is 
uneconomic. It is uneconomic because, according to Henderson, the adoption of
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CSR by corporations interferes with the efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
Hence, CSR is “misguided virtue”.
A theory of CSR, then, faces two seemingly conflicting arguments. On 
the one hand, global theorists argue that TNCs should have some global 
responsibilities as a matter of duty (the “moral” view). On the other hand, some 
economists argue against it, claiming that CSR is bad capitalism, as if CSR and 
good capitalism were mutually exclusive (the “strictly business” view). The claim 
that the function of corporations is to maximise profits and shareholder value is in 
itself unremarkable. But, juxtaposed against the “moral” view, it gives rise to a 
perennial dilemma: that of balancing the demands of global justice on a 
corporation and the primacy of its fiduciary duties towards its shareholders. This is 
the ‘CSR dilemma’. In most cases, the debate begins and ends here. Philosophers 
and economists have differing perspectives about what the purpose of business is, 
and each perspective is legitimate within its own frame of reference. At this level, 
we are stuck with “a rather sterile debate” (Sparkes, 2003: 3).
I think that the claim that all forms of CSR are misguided virtue is over­
generalised. Indeed, not all advocates of the “strictly business” view agree that 
CSR should be necessarily identified with bad capitalism. Business advocates of 
CSR like Russell Sparkes (2003) argue that CSR can be good capitalism as well. 
For example, CSR can improve product branding and enhance the reputation and 
goodwill that a company has with its customers. CSR as a form of voluntary self­
regulation can also be a means of pre-empting government regulation, which 
places constraints on business. The growth of institutional investors like large 
insurance companies and pension funds, where the vast majority of clients are 
private investors who are increasingly keen on investing in environmentally or 
socially responsible companies, also means that there is a profitable market for 
CSR.150 So whether CSR is good or bad capitalism really depends on our 
understanding of what ‘CSR’ means. According to Sparkes, CSR can be good 
capitalism as well, when seen and understood as a response to consumer and 
investor needs. In other words, it can be “justified in classical profit maximisation
150 The business case for CSR is explored in greater detail in the next chapter (chapter 6).
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terms” (Sparkes, 2003: 4). Business is no longer just about making profits, but how 
these profits are being made. In order to move on in the debate about CSR, then, 
Sparkes argues that we should focus on the business case for CSR, that is, CSR as 
good capitalism.151
I agree with Sparkes’ pragmatic approach. However, while he thinks that 
the discussion about the business case for CSR is a purely economic one and 
should be kept separate from the discussion about corporations’ “moral” role: 
“economists should leave questions of ‘ought’ to philosophers, and concentrate on 
questions of ‘is’” (2003: 3) - 1 think that it is important for philosophers to address 
it as well. Rather than taking an ‘either/or’ approach as the supporters of the 
“moral” and the “strictly business” views are wont to do, I think that a theory of 
CSR must respond to the dilemma that arises from putting both views up. The way 
a theory of CSR can do this, I think, is by providing a philosophical analysis of 
where the two views overlap, that is, where a business case for CSR can be made. 
The failure to recognise the extent to which the business case for CSR shapes the 
choice of issues and delineates the boundaries of CSR, I suggest, perpetuates a 
historical and ideational exclusion of corporations in global justice. Given their 
capabilities and increasing role in alleviating poverty in the world, this in turn 
represents a great loss for the poor, and is therefore unjust.
5.2. The historical and ideational exclusion of corporations in global justice
In mainstream political philosophy, the role of corporations in global justice has 
surprisingly remained largely in the margins until quite recently. I say 
“surprisingly” because corporations have been active in issues of human rights 
since the eighteenth century (at least), and are contemporaneous with and deeply 
implicated in Western practice of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ (Oliveiro and Simmons, 
2002).152 Indeed, it has been commented that the idea of ‘CSR’ -  the notion that
151 I note that, even though Friedman was a vociferous critic o f CSR, he too conceded that “doing 
business by doing good” was for him a grey area: “If our institutions, and the attitudes o f the public 
make it in [corporations’] self-interest to cloak their actions in this way, I cannot summon much 
indignation to denounce them.” (1970: 41)
152 The movement in Britain to end slavery throughout the British Empire by British companies 
and ship-owners, which started in 1787 and resulted in the ban on slave trade in the 1830s, is one o f  
the oldest examples of CSR.
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there is some rigid division between “social” and “economic” affairs and that, by 
doing good, one is somehow doing something “extraneous” or conflicting with 
good business practice -  is a fundamentally Anglo-Saxon idea. In more corporatist 
(for example, Germany) or communitarian (for example, Japan) societies, CSR has 
always been simply an expression of a longstanding social contract, whereby 
business has social obligations to its employees and the wider society.153 For 
example, Japan has often been seen as the greatest example of successful 
capitalism, but much of its success emerges from the special characteristics of the 
‘Japanese ethos’ arising form its particular history of rule-based behaviour patterns 
exhibited by corporations, rather than treating them as automatons who mindlessly 
pursue their own self-interests without regard to others’ well-being (Sen, 1993).
In the USA, the general principle that has emerged from the courts since 
the 1950s and 1960s is that companies have the authority to make “contributions of 
reasonable amounts to selected charitable, scientific, religious or educational 
institutions, if  they appear reasonably designed to assure a present or foreseeable 
future benefit to the corporation”, whereas deciding what is “reasonable” is left to 
the discretion of managers.154 The regulation of CSR has also been an issue of 
public policy since the 1970s. In 1977, for example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, which prohibited US corporations from paying bribes when conducting their 
business overseas, was passed. A number of multilateral agreements also emerged 
in the 1970s, including the OECD’s Guidelines fo r  Multinational Enterprises 
(1976, revised in 2000), which laid out standards regarding, among other things, 
the disclosure of information, workers’ rights, environmental protection, 
combating bribery, consumer interests, respect for human rights and the 
elimination of child and forced labour; the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration o f  
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), 
covering employment issues like non-discrimination, wages, benefits, working
153 For a comprehensive overview of CSR in various societies and corporate cultures, see Avi- 
Yonah (2005) and Bratton (1989). Both works give a especially detailed survey o f the 
transformations undergone by the corporate form throughout history. Avi-Yonah covers the period 
from Roman law to the present, whereas Bratton covers the period from the mid-nineteenth century 
to mid-twentieth century.
154 American Law Institute, 1993, Principles o f  Corporate Governance, Section 2.01: 71.
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conditions, health and safety, the freedom of association, and respect for specific 
international human rights agreements. Of course, there is also the UN Global 
Compact (2000) and the Norms on the Responsibilities o f Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (2004) 
covered in chapter 2.155 These examples show that, rather than being a recent 
phenomenon, CSR has been around for longer than we think.
However, despite this reality, political theory has been comparatively 
cautious about treating non-human, non-state actors like TNCs as basic political 
units capable of just agency in their own right. There has been both a historical and 
an ideational exclusion of corporations in the study of global justice. As was 
previously noted (in chapter 3), theories of global justice that feature TNCs have 
tended to take a methodologically individualistic approach. That is to say, 
conceptions of the role that TNCs play in global justice have extended merely to 
their functionally instrumental role of expanding the scope of the individuals 
responsibility, rather than viewing them as agents of justice capable of acting in 
their own right. Although recent publications have seen a shift in philosophical 
focus from individual charity (Singer, 1972; 1999) to institutional agency (Kuper, 
2005c; Green, 2005) to corporate agency specifically (Lane, 2005; Kreide, 2007b), 
it was argued in chapter 3 that the literature stops at drawing the conclusion that 
large corporations ought to play a role in global justice, merely that they can. 
(Chapter 3 then sought to develop such a normative account of CSR.) This, 
however, is not how we view corporations in practice, nor is it how corporations 
perceive themselves in many cases. Hence, there is a gap between theory and 
practice.
It was also suggested previously (in chapter 1) that one of the reasons for 
this theoretical gap was because the idea of taking notions of morality that have 
been traditionally applied to human individuals and applying them to corporate 
'entities leads to all sorts of conceptual problems about the corporate form -  
specifically, whether the corporate entity is made up of an aggregation or 
collective of individuals, or whether it is a separate legal entity with its own
155 For a useful account of the contemporary history o f CSR, see Bendell (2004).
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personality, and whether or not it can be a moral agent. Thus, political theory has 
been relatively reticent about discussing them as primary agents of justice, as if 
they were capable of moral agency. For this reason (among others), an alternative 
framework for CSR was advocated in chapter 1, namely, to talk about CSR in 
terms of justice rather than ethics. By doing so, it was argued that the discussion 
might bypass the ontological questions about the nature of the corporate form that 
remain indeterminate, and move on to the normative consideration of their 
responsibilities in global justice -  particularly since, as it has been observed, “a 
corporation does not turn into a moral person simply because one recognises its 
obligations of justice” (Kreide, 2007b: 14).
In addition here, I think that another reason why the theoretical gap exists 
is because we have not developed the conceptual tools for dealing with the 
problem posed by the CSR dilemma. Global justice theorists have focused almost 
exclusively on the “moral” side of the question (of the role of corporations in 
global justice) and have given almost no attention to the “strictly business” side of 
the story. There are some political philosophers who offer rational choice theories 
in an attempt to solve the CSR dilemma, that is, by casting moral choices in 
neoclassical economic terms. This is done in two ways: either by arguing that 
individuals are not merely maximising automatons (homo economicus) but actors 
with valued ends that sometimes make them pursue altruistic choices (homo 
sociologicus) (Elster, 1983, especially chapter 1; Zamagni, 1995), or by arguing 
for ‘enlightened self-interest’, that is, the self-interested individual’s commitment 
to an institutional system of moral rules because it sustains and promotes economic 
activities (Brittan, 1993; Sen, 1993). These arguments -  particularly the second 
one -  actually approximate the solution to the CSR dilemma that is being proposed 
here, that is, to focus on how companies can “do well by doing good”. However, 
the problem with these rational choice theories is that they concern individuals and 
individual choices. Thus, applied to corporations, they encounter the same 
objection about the moral agency of corporate entities and taking theories that have 
been traditionally applied to individuals and applying them to corporate entities. 
We end up, again, questioning what sort of entity the corporation is (for example, 
whether it is an aggregation of individuals or a real separate legal entity with its
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own personality), and whether or not it is capable of moral agency. These 
questions are important in their own right and need to be asked. But the concern 
here is that, where questions of global justice are concerned, they hinder rather 
than help the normative narrative. Therefore, I argue that a different way of 
theorizing about the business case for CSR has to be sought within the global 
justice framework itself.
5.3. Theorizing the business case for CSR: Ideal and non-ideal theory
Solving a problem involves not only identifying the problem, but also locating the 
site of the problem. The question here is, how does the CSR dilemma translate into 
normative theory? How does it affect the way we theorize about the role of 
corporations in global justice? In other words, how can we think about it 
philosophically? In this section, the argument is made for locating the CSR 
dilemma within the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory. Drawing from the 
ideal/non-ideal theory debate, I offer some methodological principles for 
developing a coherent theory of CSR, and suggest that there are lessons to be 
learned from some non-idealists, particularly those who emphasize the business 
case for CSR.
5.3.1 What is non-ideal theory, and is it the best way of theorizing the
business case for CSR?
The starting claim in respect of developing a coherent theory of CSR is that the 
best way to do normative theory is to produce principles of justice that guide 
action, that political theory ought to inform political practice. Most theorists 
presume that guiding action is, as Mills puts it, “the proper goal of theoretical 
ethics as an enterprise” (2005:170). They dismiss the type of “political 
intellectualism” touted by ‘divorce theorists’, that is, those who argue that 
philosophy is philosophy and politics is politics, as if they were divorced from 
each other, embracing instead some form of “political pragmatism”. Instead, they 
believe that the study of political philosophy empowers citizens and has great 
application to politics and life. Indeed, it continues to exist and evolve because it is 
constantly reacting to materials and issues given to it by happenings in the world
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(de-Shalit, 2004; Graham, 1999). Non-ideal theory, then, is concerned about 
issuing recommendations that are both desirable (in the light of relevant 
principles) and achievable for us here and now.156 The presumption, of course, is 
that ideal theory fails to do this, because it “forgets” that moral decision-making is 
done on the background of real-life political or business conditions -  for example, 
the reality of capitalism and the need to balance the “moral” aspect of corporate 
life with the “strictly business” aspect. The problem with ideal theory, then, is that 
it underdetermines our moral decisions, and thus cannot offer us principles of 
justice that are action-guiding. There is a need, therefore, to theorize “the existence 
and functioning of the actual non-ideal structures that obstruct the realization of the 
ideal” (Mills, 170). This is what non-ideal theorizing is about. And, in the sense 
that non-ideal theory takes these non-ideal structures into account and ideal theory 
does not, non-ideal theory is a better way of doing normative theory. It consists, as 
it were, normative theory that can be applied to guide action.
Is it the best way of doing normative theory though, better than all other 
contenders? In order to argue this, non-ideal theory must consist of more than 
philosophy that can be applied, since even (some) divorce theorists offer 
algorithms of action (although whether these algorithms are actually actionable is
i  cn
controversial). There are two challenges here: to argue firstly, that good 
normative theory consists of more than just applying algorithms of action, and 
secondly, that good normative theory consists of more than just applying principles
156 This definition is Stemplowska’s (2007), although in her paper, she defends ideal theory 
against non-ideal theory as defined. In her opinion, ideal theory is still important even if  it does not 
offer the sorts o f practical recommendations described. It is important not because it shows the way 
to utopia, but because it provides a “feasibility set” within which “the ideal o f justice can be 
rendered compatible with constraints that limit the extent to which it can be realised, before it is 
changed beyond recognition”. In other words, ideal theory is important because it captures the 
values we set out to achieve and gives us an idea of whether and how far the ideal can be realised in 
practice. However, I think that this does not help us in cases where the values held out by ideal 
theory are unachievable to begin with, not because we are constrained in our ability to realise them, 
but because the ideal theory itself is deficient and cannot be realised (for example, in the case o f the 
historical and ideational exclusion of corporations in global justice) unless the non-ideal is 
addressed first.
157 Those who take a formal/analytical approach to political theory (for example, game theorists, 
rational choice theorists), who pursue consistency rather than applicability in philosophical 
concepts, would fall under this category. A useful taxonomy o f divorce theories, from which the 
present examples are derived, can be found in de-Shalit (2004).
- 169-
of morality. Both are addressed by Onora O’Neill in her 1987 paper Abstraction, 
Idealization and Ideology in Ethics, and later on in her 1996 book Towards Justice 
and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f Practical Reasoning (especially chapter 2). 
In response to the first challenge, one needs to look no further than classical 
utilitarianism for a counter-example. Classical utilitarianism purports to offer a 
“life algorithm”158, one that can be applied universally in all cases, not just for 
some situations but for life, as it were. But, as O’Neill argues, even this most 
extremely algorithmic theory depends on strong idealising assumptions about 
utilitarian agents -  for example, that they have complete information of all 
available options, that they are able to evaluate all expected consequences of all the 
options available, that they are able to make cardinal and interpersonal 
comparisons in order to arrive at the most optimal option that maximises their 
utility. In the absence of these “implausible” idealizations, the utilitarian agent 
needs to fall back on his/her deliberation and judgment about these things (O’Neill, 
1987: 59).
The same goes for the second challenge. Inevitably, as O’Neill puts it, 
“principles underdetermine decisions” (1987: 58). No principle of morality can 
purport to be complete, universally applicable or utterly exceptionless for all 
situations. Principled moral decision-making must always be supplemented by 
procedures of deliberation and judgment, particularly in our descriptions of 
particular situations and when we apply abstract principles in particular situations, 
and is most sustainable when moral principles are internalised:
“Applied ethics is not a matter of deducing decisions from principles. It 
requires judgment and additional premises... The need for deliberation 
and casuistry -  for procedures by which principles are applied to cases 
-  is taken for granted by non-algorithmic utilitarians as well.” (O’Neill, 
1987: 62)
158 The description is O’N eill’s (1987: 59).
- 170-
The point here is that the best sort of non-ideal theory is not only non-ideal 
theory that is action-guiding, but action-guiding in the right way. On O’Neill’s 
account, it must abstract without idealizing.159 Idealization, as illustrated above, 
consists of adding on characteristics to hypothetical agents that are false of actual 
human beings; abstraction, on the other hand, consists of taking away or bracketing 
certain “social and historical contingencies” that are true of human agents (O’Neill, 
1987: 56). Both abstraction and idealization describe human agency inaccurately, 
but the former is acceptable while the latter is not -  presumably because 
idealization invokes the charge of falsehood (possibly good for theoretical 
purposes like frictionless surfaces and perfect vacuums, but bad for guiding action) 
and is in any case unachievable, whereas abstraction merely involves the selective 
omission (but not denial) of certain predicates that are true and is, not to mention, 
“theoretically and practically unavoidable” (1996: 40). O’Neill argues that, too 
often, the distinction between abstraction and idealization is obfuscated, leading 
critics wrongly to reject abstraction. In short, abstraction is necessary for all 
theorizing -  including non-ideal theorizing -  whereas idealization is bad for 
action-guiding, period.
It is not clear, however, that O’Neill’s “strategy of mere abstraction”160 
plus a more robust account of deliberation and judgment is always enough to guide 
action. Exercising our cognitive judgment in particular cases is one thing, but what 
if the theory itself is too abstract to capture the salient facts of the case necessary to 
produce a just outcome? For example, as will be argued further below, a theory of 
CSR that brackets away the “strictly business” aspect of corporate life and does not 
address the CSR dilemma fails to provide principles of justice that can guide 
corporate action. It also leads, as has been argued, to a historical and ideational 
exclusion of corporations in global justice. So the question about abstraction is, 
what if the thing that is bracketed away is the very source of oppression and 
injustice? Note that the criticism here is not of abstraction per se, but the degree of 
abstraction -  that is, the amount and type of information that is bracketed away
159 Note that O’Neill is referring to normative theorizing in general here, not just non-ideal 
theorizing.
160 The description is Schwartzman’s (2006).
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(Schwartzman, 2006). The problem that critics like communitarians, conservative 
critics of liberalism, feminists and critical race theorists have is not that abstraction 
in theorizing happens, but that certain types of institutionalised, non-ideal patterns 
of domination or discrimination based on class, gender, and race are abstracted 
away from our knowledge of the social structure when we theorize. As Mills puts 
it, “[t]he problem is that they are deficient abstractions... not that they are 
abstractions tout court.” (2005: 173) These institutional structures are often 
powerful and deeply embedded, and the oppression that they lead to for the 
categories of people in question hidden and invisible. Yet, they are often 
marginalised and left largely un-theorized. There is a failure, as in the case of the 
CSR dilemma, to develop the conceptual tools needed to analyse them in the 
oppressive context of genderised or racialised or class-driven or other exclusionary 
dimensions of contemporary politics (McCarthy, 2001).
Again, this is where non-ideal theory comes in. Given the presence of 
institutional oppression, the solution is not to do away with abstraction altogether 
(since I agree with O’Neill that good theorizing requires us to make some 
simplifying assumptions; to argue otherwise would lead to more problematic 
particularist positions), but to turn the spotlight on specific oppressive structures 
that we regard as important, to systematically analyse and understand the nature 
and sources of oppression, and to incorporate them into our conception of the basic 
structure of society. In a way, this seems as if we are backtracking to our starting 
point: “non-ideal theorizing of this sort turns normative political theory back in the 
direction of the empirical social reality it began by abstracting and idealizing away 
from.” (McCarthy, 2001: 14) 161 But this is to see it wrongly as an ‘either/or’ 
situation. At the end of the day, the question is not whether ideal or non-ideal 
theory is the best way of doing normative theory, but what is the best way of 
achieving justice. An approach that systematically mediates between ideal and 
non-ideal theory ensures that abstract principles, when applied, are always kept
161 Although McCarthy means this as a criticism o f non-ideal theorizing, that it does not go far 
enough. His arguments is based on the claim that, so long as issues like race are marginalised in 
political theory, what mediation there is between the ideal and the real will be “only tacit and 
always drastically restricted” (2001: 14-15). Rather than consigning the treatment o f race to non­
ideal theory, he recommends a critical overhaul of ideal theory itself.
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accountable for the factual contingencies of particular situations that are morally
1 fi*}compelling, and therefore always kept in line with their action-guiding tenets. 
The value of non-ideal theory, then, is that it addresses the specificity of the special 
situation that the moral subject in question finds him/her/itself in -  whether it is 
females, homosexuals, blacks, minorities or, in this case, corporations in their 
business contexts.163
To sum it up, good normative theory that has as its object justice must not 
only be action-guiding in the right way, it must also abstract in the right way. In 
this case, the specific argument is that, in order for justice to be achieved, a theory 
of CSR must necessarily contain some level of abstraction, but it must not abstract 
away the real business constraints that corporations face in practice. To do so 
would, as it has been said, to fail to address the problem of the CSR dilemma. We 
turn now, then to focus specifically on the CSR dilemma.
5.3.2 Why exactly is the CSR dilemma a problem?
If the CSR dilemma merely presented a conflict of preferences or values or some 
such, then it would be no different from the kind of conflicts private individuals 
face in their decision-making. Corporations would be tom between their global 
responsibilities and their fiduciary duties towards their shareholders. Just as private 
individuals, too, sometimes have to make choices between their moral obligations 
to others and their special obligations to, say, family members or fellow citizens.
However, in the case of the private individual, the moral calculus can take 
into account these sorts of morally significant factors and provide a moral 
argument for their priority. Utilitarianism, for example, makes exception to special 
obligations like keeping a promise where doing so does not maximise average 
general welfare because, among other things, it is argued that encouraging 
promise-keeping is of greater utility. In that sense, we are able to compare the 
conflicting sets of obligations already incorporated into the moral calculus in some
162 Of course, it still begs the question which features o f our messy political reality are morally 
significant and which of these we want to engage in non-ideal theorizing. In the absence of any 
procedural guidance why we should focus on certain empirical problems rather than others, this 
remains a background issue.
163 How exactly non-ideal theorizing in the context of oppression translates to non-ideal theorizing 
in the context o f the CSR dilemma is addressed in section 5.3.3.
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way, and therefore guide individuals in making their moral choices. This is not to 
say that conclusive answers to our moral dilemmas can always be derived (Bernard 
Williams’ example of Jim and the Indians, cited in his critique of utilitarianism, 
comes to mind here). But the point is that the possibility of a normative argument 
presents itself within the framework of the moral calculus.
In the case of the corporation, though, there is no parallel calculus for 
corporations to make a moral choice between the potentially conflicting sets of 
obligations that they face. Indeed, there is no reason to presume that the choice is a 
moral one. If it were, then the solution would be straightforward: it would simply 
be a matter of moral argument, that is, giving moral reasons why one obligation 
should have moral priority over the other, as in the case of the private individual. 
But the CSR dilemma is not a matter of moral ranking. There is no reason to think 
that the fiduciary duties that companies owe their shareholders to maximise profits 
and shareholder value are moral duties, the sort that can be incorporated into a 
corporation’s moral calculus and weighed against the moral demands of global 
justice. Indeed, there is good reason to think why they are not moral duties. Firstly, 
the principal-agent relationship companies have with their shareholders is 
primarily a legal, contractual relationship. Even if there were some ethical 
undertones to the contractual relationship (as some business ethicists have tried to 
argue), any usable principal-agent relationship depends on the law to identify 
where a duty exists, to regulate the scope of that duty, and most importantly, to 
enforce it in the case of a breach. So the duties are primarily legal, not moral, 
duties. Secondly, equating corporate fiduciary duties to moral duties entails the 
argument that the corporation is in some way a moral agent, which argument we 
have set aside here for the purposes of developing a theory of CSR. Therefore, 
there is good reason to think that the fiduciary duties corporations owe their 
shareholders are not moral duties, and little reason to think that they are anything 
other than simply factual realities that are part of what doing business is about. If 
they are not moral duties, then they do not create a moral dilemma.164
164 Although the firm is not affected in the “moral” sense by their fiduciary duties, this does not 
mean that they do not play a “moral” role in society -  in this case, in global justice. I have been 
careful in this regard to avoid saying that TNCs owe any duties to the very poor, in order to reflect 
better the framework envisioned for the discussion here -  that is, not one based in ethics (that is,
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Rather, the fiduciary duties that corporations owe their shareholders to 
maximise profits and shareholder value are problematic for global justice because, 
in the context of the foregoing discussion, they pose as real-life non-ideal 
structures that fall outside the global justice calculus. The critique here is that 
global justice as an ideal theory lacks the analytical tools to deal with these non­
ideal factors that are necessarily part of any corporation’s action-guiding calculus 
in practice. This is because, in developing the conceptual tools for analysing the 
role of corporations in global justice, global justice theorists have largely chosen to 
ignore the non-ideal circumstances (exemplified by the CSR dilemma) under 
which these actors operate. The CSR dilemma, in this sense, falls into a “guidance 
gap” between ideal and non-ideal theory. In order to fill in the gap then, we need to 
theorize about it. Hence, theorizing about the role of corporations in global justice 
must (I argue) involve theorizing the non-ideal.
5.3.3 Theorizing the business case for CSR
What does all this tell us about theorizing the role of corporations in global justice? 
First and foremost, that a theory of CSR should offer principles that are practicable 
and action-guiding. Secondly, that it should provide an abstracted picture of 
society that is representative of the “crucial aspects (its essential nature) and how it 
actually works (its basic dynamic)” (Mills, 2005: 166). But it should do so in a 
way that is also sensitive to dominant ideologies or structural biases in 
conventional theorizing that, in the cases considered so far, hide forms of 
institutionalised oppression in real-life and therefore prevent the ideal of justice 
which it set out to achieve from being realised. Thirdly, that the non-ideal 
principles so derived should be applied in conjunction with the exercise of our 
cognitive facilities of deliberation and judgment. These principles are non-ideal 
because (1) they “make theoretically central the existence and functioning of the 
actual non-ideal structures that obstruct the realization of the ideal” (Mills, 2005: 
170), and (2) they are capable of guiding action. Non-ideal theory, then, amounts 
to the best way of theorizing the role of corporations in global justice, because it is
how we should treat one another) but in justice (that is, how our social world should be structured 
ideally and why TNCs ought to play a role in it).
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able to incorporate into political theorizing these different levels of practical 
reality, and in so doing realise justice both inside and outside academic thinking.
However, the astute reader would have already observed that non-ideal 
theorizing in the case of CSR is distinct from the foregoing cases on one crucial 
point: the non-ideality in this case arises not in the context of oppression, but 
specifically because of the CSR dilemma. To reiterate, the CSR dilemma is this: 
Firstly, while a morally responsible company may exercise judgment in choosing 
which causes to take up or deciding what it would take to institutionalise certain 
rights in various situations, in the case of a conflict between its global 
responsibilities and its fiduciary duties towards its shareholders, judgment can only 
go so far. Secondly, the CSR dilemma is a non-ideal problem because, entrenched 
in our normative thinking are “systems of domination [that] negatively affect the 
ideational”, and these prevent the realisation of justice (Mills, 2005: 174). But the 
unjust system of domination in question here is not about the dominant ideologies 
or structural biases in our theories of justice that sustain an institutional exclusion 
of race or gender or class theory. Rather, it concerns the dominant ideologies or 
structural biases in our theories of global justice that sustain a historical and 
ideational exclusion of corporations. More accurately, in the context of CSR, these 
dominant ideologies or structural biases exclude from our theories of justice 
consideration of the CSR dilemma, which includes the problem that corporations 
act under a system of non-ideal fiduciary constraints. It excludes the philosophical 
treatment of a practical reality -  that is, the fact that corporations need to balance 
the normative demands of global justice and their mandate to maximise profits and 
shareholder value, and that the business case for CSR shapes the choice of issues 
and delineates the boundaries of CSR.
To summarize the comparison:
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Ideal theory Theories of justice: 
Distributive fairness
Theory of CSR:
The role of corporations in 
global justice
The problem Ideological domination 
and/or structural biases 
->
Institutional exclusion of 
females, blacks etc.
Oppression
The CSR dilemma
Historical and ideational 
exclusion of corporations
Injustice
Non-Ideal theory Feminist theory, critical 
race theory etc.
Theorizing the business 
case for CSR
Of course, the feminist or race theorist might balk at the way in which non­
ideal theory is being deployed here. While their raison d’etre is to urge us to 
reconsider the oppressive institutional backdrop that shapes our views about 
justice, what the non-ideal theorization of CSR does here is to urge us to accept the 
capitalist status quo of our institutions (that have in many cases produced the 
injustices that we wish to address). However, I think that this objection is short­
sighted. Consider the alternatives: If we adopt an anti-capitalist stance, that would 
put TNCs on the defensive and would likely discourage them from engaging in 
CSR, thus depriving the poor of a potential agent with the capabilities of helping 
them most. In contrast, case studies show that cooperation rather than 
confrontation is a better strategy. The transformation of the relationship between 
TNCs and NGOs from anarchy to partnership since the early 1990s is an example 
of how “the emergence of formal sustainable development partnerships between 
these long-standing adversaries” has encouraged more CSR activity on the part of 
corporations and benefited the poor. (Murphy & Bendell, 1999: 1) If, alternatively, 
we accept the existence of capitalism, but otherwise ignore the dilemma that 
corporations face in CSR, that would lead to a historical and ideational exclusion 
of corporations in global justice, as suggested in this chapter. This outcome is
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equally unhelpful. For these reasons, I think that non-ideal theorizing of CSR is 
more theoretically advantageous, in the balance, for realising the ideals of just 
business. We can change ourselves to see race and gender differently, but we 
cannot change what corporations are: just agents, but also business entities.
Theorizing the role of corporations in global justice, then, involves 
theorizing the non-ideal -  that is, the business case for CSR. It involves accepting 
that the CSR dilemma poses a problem. Just as normative theory abstracts away 
social and historical contingencies like class struggles, racism, sexism and other 
conceptual biases, in this case, it abstracts away the business reality that the CSR 
dilemma represents. It assumes unhindered perfect compliance on the part of 
corporations. The theoretical poverty that results in turn leads to injustice, not 
because institutionalised structures of oppression are perpetuated, but because it 
leads to the misguided conclusion that corporate engagement in global justice is 
practically unfeasible and/or undesirable.165 It obfuscates the powerful role that 
corporations can (and already do) play in global justice -  not as a part of the 
institutional order of which change is demanded, or as regulated minions of states 
and international institutions, but as primary agents of justice in their own right. It 
constitutes bad practical reasoning insofar as it is conceptually inadequate for 
guiding corporate action in real and tangible ways. These oversights, I think, 
represent a great loss for the poor.
5.3.4 Two ways of theorizing the non-ideal
Non-ideal theory, then, offers a “broader mapping of [our] [intellectual] space” 
(Mills, 2005: 174) that incorporates thinking about the CSR dilemma, which is in 
many crucial respects part of business reality and any corporation’s moral 
decision-making space. But how exactly is it done? How should it be done? 
Although the critics of abstraction agree that some non-ideal features of our social 
world ought to be made theoretically central, they seem to be divided on how to do 
this. The question is one of theoretical strategy. In this concluding sub-section, I
165 Or, it leads us to misguidedly conclude that profits are bad, as some anti-capitalist activists 
would have it, and to lament that corporations have no role to play in global justice altogether. The 
point, as I have argued, is not that profits are good or bad, but what type o f profit-outcomes we can 
accept and what we cannot.
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highlight what seem to be two approaches of doing non-ideal in the literature, what 
I call:
• The ‘scepticism and transformation’ (ST) approach -  which advocates a 
radical reconstruction of the concepts, norms, values, assumptions and 
other predicates of ideal theory that perpetuate oppression from the 
standpoint of those who are subordinated, and
• The ‘application and mediation’ (AM) approach -  which takes the more 
conservative approach of “mapping how systems of domination negatively 
affect the ideational” (Mills, 2005: 174), and then rethinking what, say, 
social justice will require in the context of female subordination.166
The ST approach is supported mainly by critical social theorists and some 
feminists who argue that, in its abstracted construction of the social world, 
conventional rational discourse about justice misses out certain persistent and 
morally compelling features of the real world that have “tectonic” implications 
on the theory and practice of justice. The issue here is about where the boundaries 
of abstraction should fall, and how we can map crucial realities onto a bigger 
intellectual space. It can be summed up by the question: How fact-sensitive should 
a theory of justice be? The way we rethink our universally basic norms, therefore, 
is based on empirical analysis and critique of our current concepts of social power 
structures (deconstruction), and we seek political transformation of the current 
social order on this basis, in order to achieve a “genuinely inclusive theory of
166 I focus on these two approaches because they emerge from the literature as the dominant 
strategies for theorizing the non-ideal. Although they are not explicitly identified as distinct 
approaches, I think the two disparate strains are evident in the literature. Other strategies include 
interpretive approaches, which place more weight on historical modes o f inquiry, and strategies o f  
avoidance, which privilege theoretical stability in the face o f social/historical/cultural pluralism -  
these alternative strategies are discussed in more detail by McCarthy (2001). The Rawlsian idea o f  
a professional ‘division of labour’ between ideal and non-ideal theory, which privileges the “purity” 
of its social justice construct over its guidance function, is also bracketed here, since it hints of the 
divorce theories previously rejected, and has in any case been extensively discussed elsewhere.
167 McCarthy (2001) uses this word to talk about a “tectonic shift in methodology” in his argument 
for a critical approach to race in moral and political philosophy.
- 179-
justice” (reconstruction) (McCarthy, 2001: 13). Thus, their recommendation is a 
radical one, because it suggests that our social ideals can only be achieved through 
social change. These ideals are ever-evolving, as society itself goes through 
transformations, as new circumstances arise to question and challenge old ones: 
“the ongoing contestation of essentially contestable articulations of the universal 
demands of justice” (McCarthy, 2001: 13).
Those who advocate the AM approach, on the other hand, support more 
piece-meal changes. They advocate, firstly, mapping accurately crucial realities 
that differentiate the ideal from the ideal-as-applied (that is, applied in a non-ideal 
world), hence preventing the realisation of the ideal, then secondly, asking what 
special measures can be taken to mediate the two. The AM approach is distinct 
from the ST approach because it is not concerned with determining the size and 
extent of our intellectual space from the outset. Rather, it is more interested in 
systematically identifying and analysing the empirical realities that stand in 
between our abstracted descriptions of the world and our conceptions of the ideal 
world, and finding ways to compensate for them, thus bridging the two and 
bringing them closer. In other words, it takes our cognitive sphere as given by 
conventional theorizing, and asks the question: What are “the peculiar features that 
explain [the social phenomenon]’s dynamic and prevent it from attaining ideality” 
(Mills, 2005:167)? Nonetheless, it is more than just applied ethics, precisely 
because the empirical input is incorporated into theory and guides theory -  
although, in comparison to the ST approach, it is more a reconfiguration than a 
reconstruction of the ideal. It advocates remedial social reform post hoc, rather 
than demanding ex ante radical social change. It approaches the non-ideal 
conditions of the real world in the spirit of reform, asking how political ideals 
might be achieved or worked towards. Again, our awareness to what particular 
non-ideal structures need to be theorized stems from real-life knowledge of how 
power relationships actually work, and can only be awakened when we put theory 
into action: “It is only when we see situations o f that sort as requiring action o f this 
type that knowledge of some description becomes action guiding.” (O’Neill, 1987: 
64).
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To understand how the two approaches could produce different outcomes,
consider what happens when the ST approach and the AM approach are applied to
1the case of the ‘Deferential Wife’. The ‘Deferential Wife’ is a woman who is so 
subordinated in her role as a wife that her values, preferences, interests, ideals etc. 
are aligned with her husband’s and, even when she forms independent views about 
these things, she ranks them as less important than her husband’s. She represents a 
non-ideal anomaly for theories of justice, since these do not traditionally take into 
account a non-autonomous rational agent who consents to her own victimization, 
as it were. On the one hand, those who advocate the AM approach would argue 
that the ‘Deferential Wife’ is being coerced into colluding with her husband’s 
wishes, and propose discounting for the fact that she was not a truly willing 
agent.169 They might also argue that a commitment to fairness, equal rights and 
justice in the family requires special measures to compensate for her coercion -  for 
example, educational facilities to enhance her own capabilities and functionings, 
better exit options from the marriage. On the other hand, those who advocate the 
ST approach would argue that the problem is more complex and requires solutions 
that go deeper. For them, there is something troubling about the ‘Deferential 
Wife” s very identity and sense of self. But because she has internalised her 
oppression and made it part of her rational agency, arguing that she has not 
“consented” to her subordination is unlikely to lead to solutions that address the 
root causes of the case. Rather, they argue that what is needed is a closer 
examination and deconstruction of the particular social institutions and practices 
that reinforce, perpetuate, or contribute to the ‘Deferential Wife” s existence and 
its effects on the larger society, and to rethink these specific forms of institutional 
oppression rather than recommending ultimately symptomatic or superficial 
remedies: “Rather than simply concluding that she is being coerced or that she is
168 This example is Thomas Hill’s, and is cited by Schwartzman (2006) in the context of 
illustrating what seems to be the ST approach.
169 Note that those who advocate a strategy o f mere abstraction might also accept that cases o f the 
‘Deferential Wife’ happen, but they might find it acceptable on the grounds that it did not violate 
the wife’s agency, since she might be seen to have willingly consented to her subordination and 
was therefore not a victim. Even if they acknowledged that it was a problem, they might not 
theorize it at the same level and in the same detail as other major ordinates o f justice.
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somehow mistaken about what she wants, one might instead argue... that it may be 
necessary for the Deferential Wife to undergo some sort of transformation before 
she will be able to form her own interests in a way that expresses a fuller sense of 
self’ (Schwartzman, 2006: 576). The ST approach, therefore, provides an 
argument for more extensive reform in this case.
Non-ideal theorizing about the role of corporations in global justice, 
however, is not the same as non-ideal theorizing about the ‘Deferential Wife’. I 
have argued the ways in which the injustice that ultimately arises from the problem 
of the CSR dilemma differs from cases of institutional oppression. These 
differences, I argue here, also mean that there is no need to appeal to the ST 
approach; the AM approach is sufficient for the purposes of theorizing the non­
ideal in the context of CSR.
A few observations. Firstly, the CSR dilemma, unlike forms of institutional 
oppression, is not an ideological problem. It is not, for example, “a distortional 
complex of ideals, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative 
interests and experiences of a small minority of the national population -  middle- 
to-upper-class white males -  who are hugely over-represented in the professional 
philosophical population” (Mills, 2005: 172). It is in many ways detachable from 
idealized notions, because we can see the two distinct claims that are pulling 
corporations in opposite directions (that is, the “moral” view versus the “strictly 
business” view).
Secondly, the CSR dilemma, unlike forms of institutional oppression, does 
not require radical solutions. It is not a problem of “deeply contested” norms 
requiring us to “alter our self- understandings” (McCarthy, 2001: 14), but is I think 
more a matter of exploring hitherto unexplored categories of agency. In this case, it 
requires an analysis of the nature and unique features of corporate just agency, as 
we work towards a non-ideal theory of just business. On the other hand, the kind of 
critical theory advocated by the ST approach would entail, for example, adopting 
an anti-capitalist stance, or changing the nature of corporate fiduciary duties -  in 
essence doing away with everything we know about the very corporate agent 
whose agency we want to theorize about. This is not where I think the debate 
should or needs to be located.
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Lastly, our ideal theories of global justice already offer a rich resource for 
theorizing about global corporate responsibility. In the case of CSR, there is also 
the added advantage of being able to identify and articulate clearly what the non­
ideal obstruction that is preventing our theories of global justice from realising 
ideality is, namely, the CSR dilemma. We are also able to propose a counterpart 
solution, namely, the business case for CSR, and problematise it in the context of 
global justice. Given these strong starting points, there seems to be little reason for 
taking the ST approach, and good reason for taking the AM approach. Theorizing 
about the role of corporations in global justice, then, is about non-ideal theorizing 
that pushes at the boundaries of ideal theory.
~  ~
The gap between theory and practice is one that I think philosophers cannot afford 
to ignore if we are serious about developing a coherent theory of CSR that can 
guide corporate action. In this chapter, I explained what non-ideal theory was, 
what the CSR dilemma was, why it was a non-ideal problem, and why I thought 
that non-ideal theorizing of the business case for CSR could step in to close the 
abovesaid gap. However, I recognised that deploying non-ideal theory in this 
context might require a leap of faith on the part of those who had traditionally used 
it to challenge institutionalised oppression. Here, non-ideal theory was used as an 
argument not to challenge, but to keep, the capitalist status quo of our institutions -  
on the grounds that, if we did not accept it or if we did not normatively address the 
non-ideal fiduciary constraints on CSR that corporations face in the real world, the 
outcome was worse off for the poor. I then addressed in more detail how I thought 
such non-ideal theorizing should be done.
In the final analysis, these are the type of questions that make the CSR 
dilemma so compelling, I think, because it involves not merely a matter of 
resolving conflicting claims, but represents a wider indictment of how we should 
do normative theory. Ultimately, it amounts to a statement of belief that political 
philosophy can have great practical relevance, as Avner de-Shalit put it, an 
unequivocal acknowledgement that “the moral dilemma is political and should be 
solved within the realm of the political” (2004: 804). In this chapter, I have set out
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the problem of the CSR dilemma, and also attempted to set the methodological 
direction for solving the problem. Theorizing about the role of corporations in 
global justice, I conclude, is about theorizing the non-ideal. Taking this up in the 
next chapter, I offer a comparative examination of how some economists and 
business practitioners have attempted to resolve the CSR dilemma by arguing the 
business case for CSR, and attempt to draw some insights for theorizing this non­
ideal structure within the domain of political philosophy.
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6The business case for CSR: Lessons from some non­
idealists
“CSR is not a separate or parallel business... it is ultimately driven by the
belief that CSR creates shareholder value.” (Stafford, 2006)
In the previous chapter, the need to acknowledge and address the existence of what 
was described as the ‘CSR dilemma’ was argued. It was suggested that the failure 
to do so -  that is, the almost exclusive focus on the “moral” aspect of CSR by 
theorists of global justice, and their alleged failure to address the “strictly 
business” aspect of CSR -  had led to a historical and ideational exclusion of 
corporations in global justice. This, it was argued, was an unnecessary (and 
ultimately unjust) outcome, as there were cases in which the two apparently 
opposite interests overlapped. In other words, there were conditions under which a 
company could do well (in the “business” sense) by doing good (in the “moral” 
sense). A non-ideal approach to theorizing what I called the ‘business case for 
CSR’ was then proposed.
In this chapter, I provide a descriptive account of the business case for 
CSR from the point of view of some non-idealists, that is, theorists (mostly 
economists and CSR and business practitioners) who have done extensive 
empirical research on how CSR and the economic performance of firms are linked. 
I believe that this account, although descriptive, is important for our normative 
theorizing, because it (1) provides empirical support for the need to theorize the 
business case for CSR in particular, and (2) offers empirical evidence for the need 
to theorize about the role of corporations in global justice in general. Hence, this 
concluding chapter is devoted to the task of laying an empirical foundation for the 
theory of CSR developed in this thesis.
The body of CSR literature is vast, diverse and unwieldy. In this chapter, 
what I have done is to draw together the available and pertinent information, and to 
structure it into an account of how the business case for CSR has evolved. I begin
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in section 6.1 with the regulatory environment for CSR. I argue against the 
regulation of social responsibility, and explain why I think CSR has or should 
move beyond mere regulatory compliance. I go on to explain what has been called 
the ‘CSR value curve’, that is, the continuum beyond compliance where CSR is
1 70regarded as an opportunity for corporate growth instead. There are two waves m 
this CSR value curve: Firstly, there is the wave of ‘strategic philanthropy’ 
described in section 6.2, which aligns CSR activities with issues that support 
companies’ business objectives. Secondly, there is the wave after that, where 
companies move on to what has been called ‘value-based self-regulation’. As 
explained in section 6.3, this is where companies start to “achieve cost-savings 
through win-win situations” and may eventually “gain access to new markets or 
partnerships due to revenue-generating innovation”.171 The difference between the 
first and second waves is that, while CSR in the former is led by the social causes 
in question, CSR in the latter is led by the companies’ own initiatives to maximise 
profits through social action. This second wave is, in turn, attributable to the 
changing nature of markets and profits as well as companies’ recognition that they 
need to adapt their business models in the face of new challenges, while the first 
wave is more the result of pressure from civil society actors like NGOs and 
consumers that compel companies to respond to the social-environmental concerns 
of these lobby groups. Together, however, they provide a picture of how 
corporations have had to adapt their understanding and thinking about business, in 
particular, the ways in which business is increasingly aligned with social 
responsibility and vice versa. In other words, they provide an account of the 
business case for CSR.
6.1 Moving beyond regulatory compliance
One of the most straightforward ways for government to promote CSR within the 
business community is to legislate for it. Noreena Hertz (2001; 2004) is a vocal
170 Survey by IBM regarding the business case for CSR, as reported in a newspaper article in the 
Business Times (Singapore) by Matthew Phan entitled Firms See Growth Areas In CSR Efforts: 
Study (25th February 2008).
171 Ibid.
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advocate for stronger regulatory measures that force greater disclosure by 
corporations and compliance with international standards. She gives several 
arguments. Firstly, regulation creates a level playing field because it catches all 
corporations -  including those invisible brands, secondary goods producers, 
smaller multinationals and corporations that are not brand-dependent, and who 
tend to slip under the radar -  not just the visible brands. Secondly, regulation 
ensures that unpopular social concerns and unattractive causes do not get pushed 
aside by market forces and trends, especially during an economic downturn when 
customers’ priorities are inclined towards cost cutting rather than social justice. 
Thirdly, regulation will ensure more transparency and disclosure from corporations 
about their environmental and social record. Lastly, Hertz argues that corporations 
should welcome regulation, as it sets an objective standard for what constitutes 
acceptable practice, without which corporations will always be at the mercy of 
their critics. Elsewhere, she also points out that forward-looking companies are 
better off anticipating rules instead of fighting them since, without some form of 
standardization, firms will always be subject to criticism and bear the burden of 
how to respond (Hertz, 2003). For all these reasons, Hertz recommends that 
governments make international standards on the environment and human rights 
mandatory, that executive directors be held personally liable for corporate breaches 
of these laws, and that the corporate veil be lifted so that parent corporations can 
be held accountable for the actions of their overseas subsidiaries -  in addition to 
tax and other incentives.
I think the advantages of regulation enumerated by Hertz are exaggerated. 
Firstly, the recommended strategy for encouraging CSR is, in contrast to Hertz’s 
suggestion, not to level the playing field or “capture” every single corporation, 
large or small, but precisely to target visible corporations that are brand-dependent. 
The strategy is to reach out to these key agents, who are in turn able to set 
behavioural cues for the rest of their industry or their sub-contractors. 
Sociologically-speaking, norms and behaviours are more successfully spread by 
such targeted intentional strategies, rather than a “scattergun” approach. Hence, 
one of the criticisms of the UN Global Compact is that it commits the error of 
over-inclusion, that is, focusing on maximising the number of corporations signing
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on, rather than “obtaining agreement from certain corporations in certain sectors on 
more specific norms” (Kuper, 2005d: 367). Andrew Kuper has compared the UN 
approach to the approach adopted by Global Witness, an international NGO 
campaigning to restrict trade in conflict diamonds. It did so, not by lobbying all 
diamond producers, but by convincing De Beers -  the largest producer of 
diamonds in the world -  that conflict diamonds were bad for business. De Beers in 
turn corralled its competitors, affiliates and states to agree to a system of limiting 
trade in conflict diamonds (Kuper, 2005d).
Secondly, many social concerns involve trade-offs. It is true that some 
unpopular social causes get pushed aside by the market, because they are not as 
reputation-enhancing as other causes from the business point of view, for example. 
Regulation may help to level the playing field in this regard. However, it is also 
true that some social causes are not supported by the market because they are 
either unsustainable or bad for other segments of society. For example, 
environmentalists have been critical of China for opening one coal-fired power 
plant every week. On the other hand, such coal-powered development helps 
developing countries like China to retain access to affordable electricity for 
development. This has lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens out of 
entrenched poverty in the last few decades -  this is the other side of the 
environmentalists’ story that “demonizes” China’s aggressive push for coal 
power.172 So the question that blanket environmental regulation cannot answer is 
this: Why is climate change a greater injustice than entrenched poverty and 
inequality? Of course, it may be that we think that it is not. But the point here is 
that the free market is better positioned to adjust to public opinion on this matter. 
Obviously, this is not the case in every situation, but it does go to demonstrate the 
limitations of regulation.
Thirdly, regulation is not necessary for transparency. Nor is it necessary for 
industry standardization. In some cases, the profusion of rules and standards can 
create great confusion as well as the opportunity for deliberate obfuscation, given 
that there are multiple ways, not just one way, of measuring CSR (Oliveiro &
172 For details o f the debate, see for example:
http://thebreakthrough.Org/blog//2008/05/carbon capture solution or sca_l-print.html
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Simmons, 2002). In other cases, regulation does not help because the situation is a 
“no-win” situation. For example, companies face a tough dilemma in Zimbabwe
1 7 ^after its sham elections in 2008. On the one hand, there is great pressure to 
impose economic sanctions on the incumbent regime, in order to end the escalating 
political crisis there. On the other hand, economic withdrawal can hurt ordinary 
people and deprive them of the means of feeding their families, while having little 
impact on the government. It may also delay recovery when democracy is 
eventually restored, especially if the withdrawal of Western companies is simply 
filled by other (for example, Chinese) businesses, which was what happened in 
Sudan. The dilemma about Zimbabwe is demonstrated by the different responses it 
has invoked from large corporations. Tesco, German bank note printer Giesecke & 
Devrient, and marketing services company WPP, have pulled out, while Waitrose, 
Unilever, mining companies like Anglo American, Barclays and Standard 
Chartered, whose Zimbabwean subsidiaries are among the largest banks in the 
country, have continued their operations there. Regulation, in this case, is almost 
impossible. Hence, it is notable that there have been no calls for an across-the- 
board trade boycott of Zimbabwe from the EU or the UN. The UK foreign office 
has also, in July 2008, said that it was not calling for commercial sanctions except 
where the trade supported Mr Mugabe’s regime or benefited its members.
Fourthly, it is not entirely true to suggest that corporations would welcome 
more government regulation because it sets up everyone’s expectations. The 
evidence shows, in fact, that corporations prefer voluntary programs to mandatory 
ones. One reason is that self-regulation can be a non-market strategy designed to 
influence public policy. The argument is that industry self-regulation can 
sometimes pre-empt or stave off the imposition of mandatory regulation. And even 
when legislation cannot be pre-empted, it can still be influenced through corporate 
actions (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004). Hence, it is not surprising that, in many cases, 
self-regulation remains paramount from the corporation’s point of view.
173 John Willman. 2008. Mangetout And Mugabe. The Financial Times (5th- 6th July 2008).
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But if a counter-argument to regulation was needed, it is this: that using the 
law to hold corporations accountable should always be a last resort. Running fast 
and loose with the law pre-emptively excludes non-legal and often cheaper 
alternatives like voluntary negotiated agreements between government and 
industry -  a government-sponsored program that companies can voluntarily choose 
to participate in -  and other forms of self-regulation. Voluntary negotiated 
agreements have in fact worked very well in Europe and Japan. In an analytical 
study on corporate environmentalism conducted by Lyon and Maxwell (2005), it 
was shown that negotiated agreements between government and industry, which 
are increasingly common in Europe and Japan, can work well if their goals are 
clear, performance is monitored closely, and there is a credible regulatory threat in 
the background. Empirical studies have shown that regulatory pressures, as 
perceived by firms, are important in motivating unilateral corporate initiatives. 
There is a large gap between threatening to legislate regulation and actually 
legislating regulation. The argument for government regulation fails to recognise 
that certain corporate environments are conducive to voluntary cooperation while 
preserving the role of the state. Moreover, forcing corporations to be socially 
responsible presumes that they are not capable of being good global citizens on 
their own without even first giving them a chance to be one. More importantly, it 
poses an obstacle to learning and understanding how corporations really make 
decisions. For example, those who emphasize the importance of norms in 
governing behaviour argue that one does not become a good citizen because there 
are laws that mandate one’s behaviour, but because, prior to the law, there is a 
culture that requires the assumption of civic responsibility and punishes those who 
violate shared social principles. This is not to say that regulation is not needed at 
all, simply that it should not be a frontline measure.
In recent years, governments around the world have shifted towards non- 
coercive means of pursuing social and environmental objectives. Programs to 
facilitate negotiated agreements between government and industry reflect a 
growing awareness that traditional regulatory measures can be costly, ineffective, 
or politically infeasible tools for certain types of environmental problems. 
Mandatory regulations are notoriously difficult to formulate, implement and
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enforce when their benefits or costs are poorly understood, or when the sources of 
the social problems they are intended to address are numerous and diverse such 
that monitoring them is prohibitively costly. Conversely, voluntary initiatives 
benefit regulators, because they allow them regulatory flexibility to pursue the 
issues they consider to be of greatest importance and to target corporations that are 
the largest perpetrators of unsocial behaviour. Regulation, on the other hand, forces 
the hands of government once they are on the books, and makes them vulnerable to 
lawsuits from non-governmental organisations, since activists can always sue for 
the strict enforcement of the legislative language.
The point is, there is more than one way government can encourage CSR, 
and suggesting regulation as a public policy excludes other more viable approaches 
to corporate social responsibility. Although it is true that corporations belonging to 
highly regulated industries are more likely to adopt a socially responsible 
management system (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004), this is not proof of the opposite, 
that is, that the absence of CSR-specific regulation leads to a lower level of 
engagement in social responsibility by corporations.
Moving beyond regulatory compliance then, we turn to other motivations 
for CSR -  specifically, the business case for CSR. The business case for CSR 
refers to CSR which is not mandated by law, and which is posited as part of 
companies’ business strategy and wider corporate governance system, rather than 
something “extracurricular” that corporations do. It has been described in terms of 
a continuum beyond compliance known as the ‘CSR value curve’. There are two 
identifiable waves in this continuum: The first treats CSR as strategic philanthropy 
(section 6.2), and the second treats CSR as value-based self-regulation (section 
6.3). Setting aside the argument for CSR as regulatory compliance then, we turn 
now to the business case for CSR.
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6.2 CSR as ‘strategic philanthropy’174
CSR as strategic philanthropy refers to CSR that is primarily motivated by external 
public pressure rather than by opportunities for financial savings or competitive 
advantage. Empirical data shows that corporations that engage in CSR are 
responding to an increasing amount of external pressure from NGOs and 
consumers to do so. In a 1999 poll of 25,000 citizens in twenty-three countries, it 
was found that two-thirds of those surveyed expected companies to do more than 
simply make a profit and obey the law (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004). NGOs are the 
organizations who lobby and bring together this body of consumer support for 
their causes. For example, in 1991, UK retailers like B&Q, Texas Homecare and 
Homebase committed to stop selling environmentally damaging tropical rainforest 
timber directly as a result of considerable media and public attention roused by 
Friends of the Earth groups. In another example, the FoulBall Campaign was 
launched in the US by the International Labor Rights Fund to target soccer balls 
originating from countries like Pakistan, China and Indonesia, which it claimed 
used child labourers extensively. The campaign focused and succeeded in getting 
its message across to the so-called soccer mums who were accompanying their 
children to community soccer programmes, which led eventually to measures 
being taken by large multinational sports goods corporations like Nike and Reebok 
to alleviate the exploitation of child labour in Pakistan. Hence, CSR is nowadays 
less about legal compliance and more about ‘civil regulation’. Civil regulation 
occurs where organisations of civil society, such as NGOs and consumers, set the 
standards for business behaviour. For those companies that choose not to adopt 
these standards, NGOs have at their disposal the confrontational tools of consumer 
politics.
Murphy and Bendell (1999) argue that civil society organizations like these 
are playing increasingly significant roles in promoting environmental and social 
management, and that their focus is on corporate practice rather than governments.
174 The term ‘strategic philanthropy’ was popularized by Harvard business professor and guru, 
Michael Porter, and Mark Kramer. The sense in which they use the term, however, refers to the 
company-led business competitive strategy o f investing in CSR initiatives in order to improve long­
term business prospects. This is covered in section 6.3 below under the heading ‘CSR as value- 
based self-regulation’. Here, however, I have used it to describe cause-related marketing, which is 
intended primarily to increase a company’s visibility in response to NGO and consumer pressure.
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This, they argue, has a lot to do with the emergence of the global economy and the 
perceived decline in the role of the nation state. They argue that, with a huge 
expansion of many economies during the twentieth century, governments pursuing 
neo-liberal policies are rolling back the state, both internally and externally, and 
promoting international free trade. As capital and industry become increasingly 
large and mobile, the power of many governments to set their own policy agenda 
has been weakened. In a global market, if a TNC does not favour the policies of a 
particular government, it may vote with its feet. If the international money markets 
anticipate a withdrawal by a number of TNCs, then confidence in a country’s 
economic performance and therefore its currency may decline, leading to an 
economic downturn. Consequently, governments have been involved in a process 
of competitive deregulation. This, coupled with the growing iconic nature of major 
corporations and brand names, as well as the advancements in telecommunications 
and information, has led to the growing drive and capacity on the part of NGOs to 
lobby corporations instead of governments on environmental and social 
responsibility issues. Hence, NGOs have been described as civil society 
organisations “that have as their primary purpose the promotion of social and/or 
environmental goals rather than the achievement of economic power in the 
marketplace or political power through the electoral process”. (Murphy & Bendell, 
1999: 6) In his historical narrative of the rise of the CSR movement, Geoffrey 
Owen (2002) also concludes that a major causal factor for the rise of corporate 
social responsibility is the rise of campaigning bodies, both national and 
international, actively representing the interests of individuals, consumer 
associations, charities, single-interest groups and NGOs. These bodies, 
increasingly well-organised and with a growing international membership and 
greater media coverage, have become a very real force in trying to lobby or compel 
corporations to cooperate in advancing their particular causes.
The interaction between NGOs and corporations has changed over the 
years, from one of anarchy to partnership. The road to partnership began with deep 
conflict stretching from the 1960s to the 1990s, with the tools NGOs used to 
change corporate policy reflecting this, running from direct action protests to 
corporate boycotts. The 1995 confrontation between Shell and Greenpeace over
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the disposal of the Brent Spar offshore oil installation into the North Atlantic only 
“confirmed the long-standing image of two tribes engaged in perpetual war over 
values, words and ideas” (Murphy & Bendell, 1999: 2). Some of these conflicts 
have resulted in horrific human rights abuses, even murder. But, since the early 
1990s, we have seen a gradual transition from conflict to partnership. Increasingly, 
NGOs are using the tools of dialogue and collaboration to engage corporations 
instead. Observers have differed in their opinions as to whether this phenomenon 
of “ethical” cooperation on the part of corporations is genuine or not -  some say 
that it is nothing but a public relations exercise; others say that it is a rational 
business response which leads to a “win-win” situation for all parties concerned. 
However, virtually everyone agrees that corporations have responded largely as a 
result of the commercial pressure applied by NGOs, and that NGOs have been key 
in setting the political agenda for change. Indeed, by the end of 1996, Shell UK’s 
chairman Chris Fay was quoted as saying that his company “had no option but to 
pursue the goal of sustainable development”. (Murphy & Bendell, 1999: 2, 
emphasis is my own)
The case of Nike in Pakistan illustrates the transition from anarchy to 
partnership. It revolves around the issue of child labour. In 1992, the ILO 
established its International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour 
(IPEC), with the aim of working towards the progressive elimination of child 
labour by collaborating with corporations and other parties to prevent child labour, 
withdraw children from hazardous work, offer alternatives and, in the interim, to 
improve existing working conditions for children. However, cooperation at an 
intergovernmental level was largely lacklustre. As of 1999, the ILO estimated that 
some 250 million children are currently working worldwide. The specific focus on 
the soccer ball industry originated in the USA. In 1992, US Senator Tom Harkin 
introduced a bill that would place import restrictions on products manufactured by 
child workers, which garnered media coverage. In particular, attention focused on 
Iqbal Masih, a Pakistani who was sold into slavery in 1986 for a mere US$16, 
when he was only four years old. After Masih escaped from the carpet factory he 
was working in 1992, he became a champion of child workers, speaking at 
international labour conferences and helping to close several Pakistani carpet
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factories. In 1995, after numerous death threats, he was shot dead in his home 
village. Masih’s murder drew worldwide attention to child labour in Pakistan. The 
story attracted massive attention from foreign journalists, especially in the Sialkot 
district, where the Pakistani soccer ball industry is based. The news reports from 
Pakistan led to growing consumer and political pressure upon the soccer ball 
industry and individual companies like Nike, particularly in the USA. In 1996, the 
FoulBall Campaign was launched by the International Labour Rights Fund (ILRF), 
targeting soccer balls manufactured in Pakistan, China and Indonesia, which 
countries they claimed used child labour extensively. Their tactics were at the 
grassroots, engaging consumers like the so-called “soccer mums” who were 
accompanying their children to community soccer programmes. In the UK, three 
trade unions launched a similar initiative with FIFA (the international football 
association) in 1996, to coincide with the European Cup hosted by the UK, 
targeting the soccer ball industry. The campaign was intended to raise spectator 
awareness of the child labour issue and to get FIFA to phase out the use of soccer 
balls produced by child labour.
By the end of 1996, the soccer ball industry began to feel the pressure of 
the various NGO campaigns. Trade associations such as World Federation of the 
Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI) and the Soccer Industry Council of America 
(SICA) became increasingly concerned about the impact on the industry’s image 
and the potential loss of markets. In November that year, the WFSGI organised a 
business-led conference in London, bringing together industry representatives, its 
critics and other interested parties. Following the London conference, Save the 
Children-UK (SCF), the UK’s largest international NGO for children’s rights and 
welfare, agreed to undertake a detailed situational analysis in Sialkot. In February 
1997, after formal negotiations with various international organisations and local 
business associations, the WFSGI announced the launch of the Project to Eliminate 
Child Labour in the Pakistan Soccer Ball Industry, in cooperation with the Sialkot 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and UNICEF, and with the ILO designated as 
an external monitor. This example of the evolution from conflict to partnership 
between NGOs and TNCs demonstrates that, while NGO pressure remains a key
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reason for CSR engagement on the part of large corporations, the tools of civil 
society politics have changed.
A few further insights can also be drawn from the above case study. Firstly, 
it is important to note that none of the arguments privileging the role of NGOs in 
the rise of CSR, or tracking the development from conflict to partnership between 
NGOs and corporations, exclude the commercial “win-win” arguments for CSR. 
While it is true that NGO pressure has been key in getting corporations to pay 
attention to socio-environmental issues, corporations respond because it is in their 
self-interest to do so. The advantages of partnership for corporations include 
avoiding the costs of confrontation, which can be very high, cultivating and 
maintaining a good public image among their consumers, and in some cases, 
benefiting from the financial and natural resource savings (or eco-efficiencies) that 
come from engaging in CSR. For these reasons, many practitioners consider that 
there is a well-established and strong business case for CSR. In other words, the 
business motive is privileged here as a primary driver for corporations engaging in 
CSR. Specifically, it is a economic interest in avoiding conflict and preserving 
peace with NGOs -  whether as a resolutive or a pre-emptive measure -  that drives 
corporations to engage in partnership with them.
Secondly, self-interest runs in the opposite direction as well. NGOs have 
vested interests in campaigning for particular socio-environmental concerns, and 
they choose to engage corporations in partnership over these concerns because it is 
in their interests to do so as well. There are several advantages of partnership for 
NGOs. Firstly, partnership often leads to ethical codes for business that are agreed 
by the various stakeholders and can be independently verified. Secondly, it opens a 
door for NGOs to play a role in restoring consumer confidence in (ethical) 
products and consumers’ sense of agency when they work with businesses to 
promote positive change, and this results in “a more sustainable form of 
consumerism” (Murphy & Bendell, 1999: 51). Thirdly, dialogue and partnership 
with business is also more effective in terms of educating the public, since many 
corporations have wider reach and influence. Fourthly, demonstrating that 
partnership solutions work may encourage governments to pursue innovative 
policy alternatives based on partnership as well. Finally, in an article
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commissioned by management consultancy McKinsey & Co., Cogman & 
Oppenheim (2002) point out that both sides benefit from the free exchange of 
information -  what they call a kind of “cross pollination”. For example, 
environmental NGOs are able to tap companies’ unrivalled expertise in the 
ecological impact of industrial operations. Conversely, companies are also able to 
receive advice and leam from their critics, as demonstrated by the existence 
nowadays of training courses for executives in business ethics which are conducted 
by activists.
On the other hand, the vested interest in partnership seems more 
compelling for corporations than it does for NGOs at the moment. Business-NGO 
partnerships as they stand now “present a number of strategic problems for NGOs” 
(Murphy & Bendell, 1999: 52). Firstly, the main quantitative analyses of NGO 
success remain based on membership levels and extent of media coverage. What is 
needed in order to truly know the full benefits of partnership, however, are systems 
to evaluate the partnership’s direct contribution to the achievement of specific 
social/environmental goals -  suggested indicators include “the percentage 
reduction in waste per dollar spent” or “the acres of forest saved per dollar 
invested” -  but there have been almost no attempts to develop these systems. 
Secondly, there is the question of NGO independence. Businesses seek NGO 
endorsement in order to lend legitimacy to their ethically certified product, which 
in turn boosts their public image. However, there is a concern that such single­
issue partnerships may prevent an NGO from publicly criticizing their business 
partner on other social/environmental matters. Thirdly, there is a concern that 
NGOs may spend time and finance working with business at the expense of 
achieving their social/environmental goals through other means. These can add up 
to potentially a vicious cycle. So long as the concerns about business-NGO 
partnerships are not addressed, grassroots action will remain an important tool for 
lobbying businesses. Moreover, because the tools of conflict are crucial for 
empowerment and for catalysing change, NGOs will continue using direct action 
protests against corporations anyway, and it is unclear how this affects the will for 
and/or effectiveness of partnership. These points of concern must be addressed if a 
stronger NGO rationale for partnership is to be established.
- 197-
Moreover, there are other concerns about civil society regulation. Firstly, 
there is the worry that political expediency rather than environmental or social 
necessity governs CSR, and that harnessing market mechanisms to promote social- 
environmental causes fails to address the underlying causes of these issues. 
Secondly, sustainable development based on self-interest is potentially 
unsustainable. Because it is ultimately profit-led, it involves among other things a 
“race to the bottom” where good governance is concerned. Thirdly, many of the 
issues are complex and do not have straightforward solutions. For example, in the 
case of child labour, many Pakistanis who depend on their children’s income 
actually challenge anti-child labour campaigns. In the words of the father of a child 
stitcher: “It is not good for children to work, but if they don’t, how shall we live?”. 
Banned child labourers often end up being forced to take on harmful, less well paid 
work, including prostitution. Moreover, the child labour issue is also tied up with 
other vested interests. Local manufacturers also complain that anti-child labour 
campaigns have the underlying agenda of promoting adult labour unions 
internationally. This adds to the problem of identifying who the parties to global 
justice are -  should such parties with secondary interests in the issue at hand be 
included in a corporation’s just considerations? The issue is not always clear-cut. 
Finally, the enforcement of partnership measures is also a huge problem, since the 
hand-stitching of soccer balls forms an informal sector, with a lot of the work 
being home-based. Sustainable solutions, therefore, need to address these issues as 
well.
Regardless of the pros and cons of civil society regulation, it is clear that 
pressure from civil society members such as NGOs have and continue to play a 
large part in encouraging corporations to engage in CSR -  whether this is achieved 
by using the tools of confrontation or partnership. In regard to partnership, as we 
have shown here, corporations have vested interests in pursuing partnership 
options with NGOs, even if there are residual issues to be sorted out. Hence, CSR 
is strategic philanthropy because there are cost-savings and profit-incentives 
involved in engaging with civil society regulation and pursuing partnership with 
NGOs.
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6.3 CSR as ‘value-based self-regulation’
Some companies have moved on from strategic philanthropy to see CSR as value- 
based self-regulation. In other words, rather than responding to external pressures, 
they are keen to create or exploit opportunities for profit through engaging in CSR. 
Such innovation is in part the result of more sophisticated business strategies, and 
in part the result of changes in the nature of markets and profits which have created 
opportunities for businesses.
Michael Porter and Mark Kramer (2002) were among the first to popularize 
the idea of ‘value-based self-regulation’.175 Value-based self-regulation is 
philanthropy that improves a corporation’s long-term business prospects, which in 
turn motivates corporations to be philanthropic. Such strategic giving addresses 
important social and economic goals simultaneously, targeting areas of 
competitive context where both the corporation and society benefit. The firm 
brings unique assets and expertise in support of a charitable cause, while doing so 
improves a corporation’s competitive context and the quality of the business 
environment in the location(s) where it operates. For example, Cisco System’s 
Networking Academy trains and certifies secondary and post-secondary school 
students from “empowerment zones” in the US and some developing countries, 
designated by the federal government as among the most economically challenged 
communities in the country or world, in network administration. The program has 
not only brought the possibility of technology careers, and the technology itself, to 
men and women in some of the most economically depressed regions in the US 
and around the world, it has also enlarged Cisco’s market share and improved the 
sophistication of its users by helping customers obtain well-trained network 
administrators. Cisco has also attracted international recognition for this program, 
generating increased employee morale, goodwill among its partners, and a 
reputation for leadership in philanthropy. “It is only where corporate expenditures 
produce simultaneous social and economic gains that corporate philanthropy and 
shareholder interests converge... It is here that philanthropy is truly strategic” 
(Porter and Kramer, 2002: 7).
175 See fn 174.
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There are several advantages to treating CSR as value-based self- 
regulation. By taking the lead in social causes, corporations can intensify market 
competition and make it more difficult for their rivals to compete. Among the 
familiar market strategies that may be employed are product differentiation, 
attempts to raise rivals’ costs, cost leadership and quality leadership. However, 
sceptics have argued that the business opportunities in CSR are rapidly being 
exhausted. Indeed, environmental consultants at McKinsey & Co. believe that, in 
the field of environmental economics at least, “win-win situations... are very rare 
and will likely be overshadowed by the total cost of a company’s environmental 
program” (Walley and Whitehead, 1994). Furthermore, there is the puzzle why 
there should be any sudden surge in opportunities for doing well by doing good in 
the first place? Were corporations previously sloppy in ignoring these profit- 
making opportunities? Has technological change presented new opportunities for 
competition and profit? Have workers’ attitudes shifted, so that employee morale 
now depends on corporate social performance?
For some answers, we need to analyse the paradigms of change in the 
corporation’s business environment. Here, the dramatic changes that are underway 
in three areas that characterize the external environment of the public corporation 
are highlighted: (1) the nature of profits, (2) the capital market, and (3) the product 
market.
6.3.1 Changes in the nature of profits
Engaging in CSR can help corporations maximise profits and shareholder value in 
straightforward ways. As a brief overview, I highlight eight main areas in which
1 l f \CSR can provide business benefits:
(i) Reputation management. Reputation management concerns the relationship 
between a corporation vis-a-vis various stakeholders like its customers, investors, 
employees, the media and the community at large. It is significant because the 
corporation is dependent on the support of each stakeholder for the achievement of
176 These eight points were first enumerated in a paper published by management consultancy 
Arthur D. Little (World Economic Forum GCCI, 2002) and are expanded on here.
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its strategic objectives, and this means taking into account the social issues that 
they may be concerned about. Thus, CSR is one way in which corporations can 
maintain their reputations with these stakeholders whom they are commercially 
dependent on in one way or another.
(ii) Risk management. Risk management is about identifying long-term risks 
and opportunities -  in business parlance, to identify “torpedoes” -  and to adjust 
business practices now in order to exploit these “torpedoes” in the future (UBS, 
2003). Well-known examples include legislative trends with respect to pension 
fund liabilities and regulating obesity, and the proposed EU scheme for carbon 
trading which is likely to have a profound effect on the UK power market and the 
companies that operate within it. Identifying and anticipating these “torpedoes” 
puts corporations ahead of the game, as they are able to adjust their business 
models to manage the risks. For example, British Petroleum have long invested 
hundreds of millions of dollars in producing de-carbonised fuel, in anticipation of a 
potential future market for carbon-free fuel (Graham Baxter, in Stafford et al, 
2006). By doing so, they have a market lead if and when such a future market does 
materialize.
(iii) Employee relations. Employee relations concerns the relationship between 
a corporation and its employees. In a paper published by management consultancy 
Arthur D. Little for Business in the Community (BITC) entitled The Business Case 
For Corporate Responsibility (BITC, 2003), employee relations was cited as one 
of the significant considerations in CSR. Because business is dependent on its 
employees, understanding the ethical values of its employees and aligning them 
with its business values produces engaged, motivated and inspired employees. This 
in turn feeds back on business success.
(iv) Investor relations. Investor relations concerns the relationship between a 
corporation and its investors. It is significant because it affects a business’ access 
to capital, and as the discussion on socially responsible investment below suggests,
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today’s investment community is more likely to regard CSR as a proxy of a 
company’s quality of management. This is discussed further below.
(v) Learning and innovation. CSR is also beneficial because it stimulates 
creativity and learning in the marketplace, and opens up doors for companies to 
partner with external innovators in joint ventures that harness societal and 
technological change. For example, Nike has programmes with six of its material 
suppliers to collect 100% of their scrap and recycle it for the next round of 
products, hence reducing both waste and production costs (BITC, 2003). In another 
example, a major chemicals company teamed up with an agricultural and industrial 
products firm to produce fibres made entirely from renewable resources, which led 
to the creation of an award-winning new polymer made entirely from agricultural 
crops, with applications for packaging, fabrics and furniture (World Economic 
Forum GCCI, 2002).
(vi) Competitiveness and market positioning. Competitiveness and market 
positioning is concerned with delivering what customers want. In other words, it is 
concerned again with the relationship between a corporation and consumers. It is 
significant because almost all surveys show that CSR is an important factor in 
consumers’ purchase practices. In the UK, for example, research undertaken by the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) showed that 41% 
of customers say that CSR influences their purchasing decisions (World Economic 
Forum GCCI, 2002). These attitudes are replicated across the world. In the most 
comprehensive survey of consumer attitudes towards CSR, involving 25,000 
individuals in 26 countries, it was found that more consumers (almost 60%) form 
their impression of a company based on their CSR practices rather than brand 
reputation or financial factors (World Economic Forum GCCI, 2002).
(vii) Operational efficiency. Operational efficiency here concerns the direct 
improvement of the bottom-line that results from taking CSR seriously. This does 
not just relate to eco-efficient practices. In their book Built To Last, Collins and 
Porras (2000) show that the key characteristic which distinguishes “visionary”
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companies from their peers is that visionary companies have a core purpose 
beyond making money, and that this is the key factor that enables them achieve far 
greater long term financial performance than their peers.
(viii) Licence to operate. The licence to operate concerns the perceptions that 
others have of a company’s CSR performance, which can affect the smooth 
operation of a company’s business, even its share price. When companies are 
perceived to take the particular social or environmental issues seriously, their 
critics are generally more willing to engage in dialogue. Moreover, the good 
reputation of a company means that it is more likely to be given a second chance in 
the event of problems. For example, when several people died after a best-selling 
product produced by a large pharmaceutical company was tampered with, the 
company responded immediately by removing every item of that product from the 
shelves. The company’s long history of good corporate citizenship also helped the 
quick recovery of its share price, and ensured that there was no lasting damage to 
its reputation or financial performance. (World Economic Forum GCCI, 2002)
The brief introduction to the various arms of the business case for CSR 
suffice to demonstrate that CSR is no longer something extracurricular to business, 
but forms part of a corporation’s wider corporate governance system -  in the sense 
that, because a company’s CSR engagement (or not) affects its bottom-line, CSR 
becomes an issue of maximising profits and shareholder value. As the following 
discussions about the changes in the capital market and product market also show, 
not only have the business stakes changed in terms of how profit is made, they 
have also changed in their scope and are increasingly global. Thus, not only is 
there a need to theorize about the business case for CSR in particular, there is also 
a need to theorize about the role of corporations in global justice in general.
6.3.2 Changes in the capital market
According to Bradley et al (1999), three broad areas of change stand out when 
considering contemporary changes in the capital market: (1) the emergence of an 
international capital market, (2) the rise of the institutional investor, and (3) the
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unprecedented proliferation of financial products. In the following discussion, I 
consider these areas of change in relation to the discussion about CSR.
1. International capital markets
Market capitalisation (or “market cap”) refers to the value of a company as 
measured by the aggregate market values of its securities traded on the stock 
exchange, which may include stocks, bonds and options. It is calculated by 
multiplying its current share price by the number of shares in issue. Market cap is 
important because it is the way public companies raise large amounts of funds and 
capital, that is, through the sale of its securities. A company’s share price is an 
indicator of investors’ confidence in the company’s growth versus risk potential 
(although it may not reflect the company’s actual size). One of the primary focuses 
of corporate managers, therefore, is to maximise the share price in order to attract 
investors.
Nowadays, it is not unusual for a company’s securities to be listed and 
traded on several stock exchanges all over the world. Indeed, “[t]he most profound 
change in the capital market over the past two decades has been its transformation 
from a conglomeration of regionally and nationally segmented markets into one 
integrated, international market.” (Bradley et al, 1999: 18) So the first major 
change in the capital market is financial globalisation, that is, the globalisation of 
capital markets. Financial globalisation has accelerated noticeably since the early 
1990s, with the decline in information costs, domestic financial liberalisation, 
growth in global trade (real globalisation), and the ascent of transnational 
corporations (IMF, 2005). International capital flows grew dramatically between 
1990 and 1998, with assets managed by mature market institutional investors more 
than doubling to over US$30 trillion, which is about equal to world GDP (IMF, 
2001). A survey of the major capital markets in the world also tracks this trend. In 
the USA, record levels of net inflows exceeding US$400 billion, particularly 
through gross foreign purchases of US equities, which on its own could nearly 
have financed the US current account deficit. In Europe, euro-area investors 
sharply increased their net purchases of foreign portfolio assets, particularly in 
equities, which rose by 85%. In Japan, both net capital outflows and inflows
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picked up in 2000, with Japanese purchases of foreign bonds reaching their highest 
level in March 2001 (IMF, 2001).
This investment trend is accompanied by the rapid simultaneous increase in 
many countries’ foreign assets and liabilities (IMF, 2005). Between 1980 and 
2003, external assets of industrial countries grew from US$2,287 billion to 
US$36,039 billion, with external liabilities also growing from US$2,485 billion to 
US$39,039 billion (IMF, 2005). In the US, overseas portfolio investment grew as a 
percentage of domestic market capitalisation from 1.5% to 7.4% between 1970 to 
2003; in the UK, from 9.5% to 48.1%; and in Japan, from 1.3% to 16.7% between 
1975 and 2003 (IMF, 2005). The IMF summarizes the explanation for this trend as 
follows: “Overall, financial globalisation has created an environment where net 
external borrowing and lending are less restricted, and where maintaining larger 
net foreign liabilities appears to involve relatively lower costs” (IMF, 2005: 117).
Emerging market access to international capital markets is also a key 
characteristic of financial globalisation (IMF, 2001). Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows and outflows are good indicators of the increasingly international 
nature of firms (IMF, 2005). Between 2003 and 2004, inflows of FDI to 
developing countries surged by 40% to US$233 billion, surpassing other private 
capital flows as well as flows of official development assistance (ODA); in 2004, it 
accounted for more than half of all resource flows to developing countries 
(UNCTAD, 2005). Much of this phenomenon was driven by the 
internationalisation of research and development (R&D) by TNCs, particularly 
into developing countries. Firms have long since tried to capture the competitive 
advantage of dividing their production process into multiple steps in different 
locations to take advantage of location-specific advantages in each step (for 
example, low labour costs, skill specialisation). That R&D should follow 
eventually was only to be expected. The internationalisation of R&D into 
developing countries, in turn, highlights the cross-border nature of corporations’ 
business operations. It also facilitates the development of international networks of 
innovation and the transfer of new technologies necessary for the economic growth 
and development of the emerging host countries. With respect to financial 
globalisation, it represents a strong driver for increased FDI capital flows.
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The implication of financial globalisation is that corporations are 
increasingly operating on a global level. This has several aspects. Firstly, the fact 
that corporations operate across borders and that their shares are traded in different 
stock markets around the world means that their decision-making process is 
ultimately influenced not only by immediate and local conditions, but by, among 
other things, long-term growth prospects, inflation expectations, interest rates and 
monetary policy elsewhere. This, in turn, means that the decision to engage in CSR 
is more complex, because there are more factors to take into consideration now. It 
also means that TNCs are exposed on more fronts where their role as global just 
agents is demanded. Indeed, the opportunities for CSR initiatives are multiplied 
simply because the structure of companies’ operations, and their impacts, are more 
globalised. Secondly, the reality in the contemporary business world is that trends 
in one economy can affect the entire global economy, and spillover shocks from 
one region to other world regions are very common -  take the 1997 Asian 
economic crisis for example. In 2005, disappointing retail sales, inflation and 
consumer sentiment numbers in the U.S and Europe, as well as rising political 
tensions between Japan and China, also caused world equity markets to stumble 
(BIS, 2005). In early 2003, sharply rising oil prices ahead of the Iraq war caused 
major equity indices in both the US and Europe to turn sharply negative (BIS, 
2005). These are just a few examples. For this reason, TNCs have a more 
compelling reason to be pro-active in practising good corporate governance and 
managing any risks, because the consequences of not doing so could have very 
wide reverberations. Thirdly, global economic conditions are additionally affected 
by investment trends. Because investment portfolios are so large and so global, 
proportionally small portfolio adjustments by global investors can have a powerful 
impact not only on the volume, pricing and direction of international capital flows, 
but also on domestic and international markets (IMF, 2001). This, as we shall see 
next, can have a big impact on CSR and the business case for CSR.
2. Rise of the institutional investor
Institutional investors are distinguished from individual investors. They are not 
individuals, but consist principally of occupational pension funds and life
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insurance companies, and to a smaller extent, pooled investment vehicles such as 
unit trusts (collective investment schemes constituted under the terms of a trust 
deed) and open-ended investment companies (collective investment schemes 
taking a corporate rather than trust form). Other institutional investors include 
registered charities and other endowments with significant funds to invest, 
educational institutions and banks. Institutional investment offers many 
advantages. For the individual investor, risk pooling (for example, under a unit 
trust portfolio) means one’s investment is collectively invested with that of others 
under the direction of specialist managers. Institutional investment can also offer 
substantial tax savings -  for example, pension fund investments are free of capital 
gains tax, and contributions to pensions are made out of pre-tax income. Financial 
globalisation, it so happens, is an important driver of the “institutionalisation” of 
equity markets. For example, in 1999, overseas investors provided over 70% of the 
UK private equity industry’s funding, and investment by overseas pension funds in 
UK private equity has more than tripled since 1996 (Myners Report, 2001).
A major change in the capital market over the past twenty years has been 
the rise of the institutional investor. Between 1990 and 1998, assets managed by 
mature market institutional investors more than doubled to over US$30 trillion, 
about equal to world GDP (IMF, 2001). In the UK, the equity market has become 
steadily dominated by institutional investors since the early 1960s. As of 31st 
December 2001, institutional investors in the UK -  primarily insurance and 
pension funds -  collectively own 50% of UK shares totalling £776.3 billion, in 
comparison to UK individuals, who only own 14.8% of UK shares totalling £229.9 
billion directly (UKSIF). In the USA, the same trend is being witnessed. 
According to a 1997 census conducted by the US Department of Commerce, 
institutional investors hold slightly less than 50% of the outstanding equity of all 
American corporations, but even more impressively, account for more than 80% of 
all shares traded (Bradley et al, 1999).
The direct implication of “institutionalisation” is that, in the contemporary 
business world, corporations are faced not only with a global playing field, but also 
different types of players. In the global business arena, the players are less likely to 
be individuals, but are increasingly made up of non-persons like corporations and
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institutional investors. Although at a micro-level, these entities are technically 
collectives of many individuals players, on a global level, they behave as a single 
organic entity separate from their constituent members.
The ascent of socially responsible investment (SRI) marks this 
institutionalisation. SRI is an investment process that considers the social and 
environmental consequences of investments, both positive and negative. In other 
words, it includes extra-financial criteria falling under the realm of CSR within the 
context of rigorous financial analysis, and is a process of identifying and investing
1 77in companies that meet these criteria. The SRI market is split between retail 
investment, which covers individual savings and investments, and institutional 
investment, which dominates the SRI market. In Europe, institutional SRI 
amounted to approximately €336 billion in 2003, with the UK as the most 
developed institutional SRI market in Europe. (Eurosif, 2003) As of 2001, 
institutional investors collectively owned £776.3 billion in UK shares, compared to 
the £229.9 billion owned by individual investors. (UKSIF website) Moreover, the 
figure has been doubling every two years. (EIRIS, 2001) In the USA, a total of 
US$2.16 trillion in assets -  that is, more than one out of every nine dollars -  was 
identified in professionally managed portfolios as using one or more SRI strategies 
in 2003, representing a growth of more than 240% from 1995 to 2003. (SIF, 2003) 
Investment by pension funds and trade unions are the biggest drivers of SRI 
market growth. (Eurosif, 2003)
Institutional investment has taken the lead in the SRI market for various 
reasons. On the demand-side, the first movers on the SRI market were historically 
institutions with strong identification with their values, such as religious groups
177 In the USA, SRI is defined by three strategies -  screening (the practice o f including/excluding 
publicly traded securities from investment portfolios based on social and/or environmental criteria), 
shareholder advocacy (including dialoguing with companies and filing/voting on proxy resolutions 
on social and corporate governance issues of concern), and community investing (where investors 
invest a percentage of their portfolios into community development financial institutions in order to 
provide access to credit, equity, capital and basic banking products to communities that they would 
otherwise not have). (SIF, 2003)
In Europe, there is no single definition o f SRI. Instead, SRI is loosely differentiated into three 
layers: the core made up o f screening practices, a second layer made up o f simple exclusions 
(negative screening, typically for tobacco or activity in Myanmar), and a third layer consisting of 
engagement practices, that is, practices involving the exertion o f one’s power at the corporate 
governance level to push for CR issues. (Eurosif, 2003)
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and trade unions; on the supply-side, the offer of SRI products by asset managers 
has grown rapidly in volume as well as in diversity (Eurosif, 2003). Legal and 
regulatory developments have also pushed institutional investors to be active on 
the SRI front. For example, investments by fund managers are now subject to more 
stringent disclosure policies, as in the case of the Statement of Investment 
Principles (SIP) in the UK, so institutional investors as a whole are more sensitive 
to SRI indices. In the Netherlands and France, more powers given to unions in 
pension investment policies has led to unions using this power to create dedicated 
investment policies reflecting their SRI interests (Eurosif, 2003). In the final 
analysis, the fact that SRI and sound corporate governance enhances a company’s 
long-term performance fits in with the long-term view that institutional investors 
usually take in the way they manage their money. Hence, it is not surprising that 
the rise of the institutional investor should also be paralleled by corresponding 
growth in the market for SRI by institutions.
3. Proliferation of financial products
A third major change in the capital market is the proliferation of financial products. 
I wish to say something briefly about this, even though it has no direct impact on 
CSR, because I think that it reinforces the global and diverse nature of business 
today, and the imperative therefore for TNCs to take the lead in CSR initiatives.
Between 1973 and 1991 alone, sixty major innovations in securities offered 
by corporations were identified -  for example, debt instruments including 
adjustable rate notes, bonds linked to commodity prices, collaterised mortgage 
obligations, commercial real estate-backed bonds, credit card receivable-backed 
bonds, global bonds, pay-in-kind debentures, puttable bonds, stripped mortgage- 
backed securities, and variable coupon renewable notes; equity innovations 
including callable common stock, supershares, and unbundled stock units -  and 
many more have been added since then -  for example, targeted stock and other 
forms of project-based financing (Bradley et al, 1999). As Merton H. Miller 
colourfully puts it:
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“The wonderment of Rip Van Winkle, awakening after his sleep of 20 
years to a changed world, would pale in comparison to that felt by one of 
his descendants in the banking or financial services industry falling asleep 
(presumably at his desk) in 1970 and waking two decades later. So rapid 
has been the pace of innovation in financial instruments and institutions 
over the last 20 years that nothing could have prepared him to understand 
such now common-place notions as swaps and swaptions, index futures, 
program trading, butterfly spreads, puttable bonds, Eurobonds, 
collateralized-mortgage bonds, zero-coupon bonds, portfolio insurance, or 
synthetic cash -  to name just a few of the more exotic ones. No 20-year 
period has witnessed such a burst of innovative activity.” (Miller, 1992: 4)
Several explanations have been offered for the sudden burst of financial 
innovations since the 1970s. Some argue that when the tie of the dollar to gold was 
cut then, it led to wide fluctuations in exchange rates and the development of 
exchange-traded foreign-exchange futures contracts -  an innovation that in turn 
spawned a host of subsequent products; others say that the revolution in computers 
and information technology drove innovation. Taking a historical approach, Miller
(1992) finds most persuasive the link between innovation and world economic 
growth. He argues that the burst of innovation was merely a “delayed return to the 
long-run growth path of financial improvement” (6), stimulated by regulation and 
deregulation after World War II.
The implication of the proliferation of financial products is that, while the 
financial markets are becoming more institutionalised and homogeneous 
worldwide, financial instruments are being transformed from the generic and 
standardized to the specific and customised (Bradley et al, 1992). Moreover, the 
volume of transactions is immense. In the most significant area of financial 
innovation -  derivatives securities -  growth in global over-the-counter derivatives 
activity went up by 17% to US$95 trillion in the 18 months to December 2000 
(IMF, 2001). Needless to say, this represents a huge global market which 
companies must navigate.
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6.3.3 Changes in the product market
Corporate product market globalisation is the process by which activity in markets 
for goods and services becomes worldwide in scope. This is measured by volume 
of global trade, which is defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services (IMF, 2005). Although corporate product-market globalisation is itself no 
longer news, what is surprising is the rate of change of the phenomenon (Bradley 
et al, 1992). From the early 1970s to 2003, global trade as a percentage of GDP 
increased from some 20% to about 55% (IMF, 2005). Historically, the current era 
of corporate product-market globalisation began earlier than financial 
globalisation, given that liberalisation of external trade regimes started in the 1950s 
(IMF, 2005). Its acceleration has been attributed to a combination of key factors, 
including declines in transport costs, costs of information gathering and sharing, 
and continued decreases in government-imposed trade barriers such as tariffs 
(IMF, 2005). Moreover, the geographical patterns of trade have also changed, with 
emerging market economies (for example, in Asia) growing in importance in world 
trade relative to industrial countries (IMF, 2005).
The implications of corporate product-market globalisation encapsulate the 
implications of globalisation in general. As we have seen before, in the 
contemporary business world, corporations are faced with a different playing field 
and different players that demand a shift in how they view business vis-a-vis CSR. 
Firstly, corporations are increasingly operating in different worldwide locations, 
and the way the production process has developed has implications on the nature 
of global trade itself. In order to take advantage of declining trading costs and 
location-specific advantages (for example, low labour costs, specialised skills), 
corporations are increasingly dividing their production process into multiple steps. 
Because this involves imports and exports of parts and intermediate goods leading 
up to the final assembly of a particular product, this means that cross-border 
manufacturing trade has increased dramatically. This means that, although TNCs 
tend to be more geographically diversified, they tend also to be more invested in 
any one location. Moreover, the bulk of international trade now takes place within, 
not across, industries, as countries tend to specialise in terms of level of production 
(for example, producing a variety of goods on the level of final or intermediate
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goods) rather than in a particular industry (IMF, 2005). This means that the new 
global playing field corporations face tends to be confined within narrow industry 
categories rather than across different industries as before, at least in respect of 
global trade.
Secondly, spillover effects from market to market are likely to be large, 
since an adjustment in any stage of the production process will trigger an “domino 
effect” on trade flows all along the production chain. For example, a drop in 
demand for a particular final good will trigger a contraction in demand for all 
intermediate inputs. Since the production process is global, the contraction effect is 
likely to be magnified, because it will affect every subsequent stage of the 
production line on a worldwide scale. In other words, global trade flows will be 
“more elastic with respect to demand changes” in general (IMF, 2005: 131).178
Thirdly, operating on a more global scale means that corporations will also 
have to face new issues and new stakeholders in CSR, many of whom will be 
institutions, as discussed before. This includes institutional shareholders and other 
institutional stakeholders -  for example, other companies, the industry as a whole, 
other state governments and regulatory bodies where parts of their production 
process are located, as well as individual consumers from all parts of the world.
~  ~
The above discussion has been extensive in its detail. To recap: I started out in 
section 6.1 by arguing that the analysis of CSR and its drivers should and has 
moved beyond mere regulatory compliance. With regard to the argument in 
chapter 5 for the need to theorize the business case for CSR, I went on to present 
an account of how companies could do well by doing good in support of that 
argument. I presented this in terms of a CSR value curve, and identified two waves 
in that curve: Firstly, in section 6.2, I explained how CSR could be regarded as 
strategic philanthropy, that is, how corporations could benefit by addressing the 
concerns of NGOs and consumers and, in particular, partnering with NGOs to 
tackle various issues of global justice. As an example, I highlighted the case of
178 For other effects of the globalisation o f trade, in particular, how globalisation has affected 
external trade imbalances and adjustment, see IMF (2005).
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Nike and child labour in Pakistan. I then went on in section 6.3 to explain the next 
stage of the CSR value curve, that is, CSR as value-based self-regulation. Here, I 
described how corporations could benefit by taking the lead in CSR initiatives (as 
opposed to responding to external pressures). However, I also explained how this 
was in part a result of changes in the nature of profits and the capital and product 
markets.
This last account demonstrates two things: One, that in today’s 
contemporary business environment, companies are increasingly dealing with a 
global playing field; two, that they are also facing new (global) players like 
institutional and socially-responsible investors. The implications of this on CSR 
and the business case for CSR is that companies need to adjust their business 
models and understanding of the various factors that affect their bottom-lines in the 
light of these changes. On the other hand, changes are also accompanied by new 
opportunities. These winds of change bring about new ways which companies can 
do well by doing good, hence reinforcing the business case for CSR. As a CSR 
researcher once put it: “We must look, without prejudice, at the opportunities and 
risks that the new situation presents, and pose the question of sustainability in the 
face of new emerging economic and social paradigms.” (Dal Mason and Bedini,
2004)
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Conclusion
This thesis began with abstract reflections about the normative reasoning behind 
the proposition that TNCs ought to play a role in global justice, and ended with an 
empirical account of the new challenges with regard to CSR that TNCs face in an 
increasingly globalised world. But “[a] single text is a small torch for illuminating 
this long path” (Kuper, 2004a: 191) -  in this case, the path of constructing a theory 
of CSR that provides a normative account of both the basis for, and the constraints 
on, CSR. Both challenges must be addressed by any theory of CSR; despite its 
normative intentions, a theory of CSR cannot offer action-guiding principles unless 
it takes into account the realities of the business constraints that corporations work 
under.
Instead of laboriously recapitulating every step of the argument in 
conclusion, I shall highlight the key features of the theory of CSR developed in 
these pages and illustrate how they have responded to the two challenges to 
developing a theory of CSR raised in the Introduction, namely: breaking past the 
methodologically individualistic way of understanding agency in political theory, 
and reconciling the conception of corporations as just agents with the prevailing 
understanding of corporations as non-moral business entities. The key features are: 
the theory of CSR (1) as a constructed theory, (2) as a non-individualistic theory, 
and (3) analysed in terms of ideal/non-ideal theory. Under each heading, I shall 
provide a chapter-by-chapter summary of the argument for the feature in question.
1. The theory of CSR as a constructed theory
With the advent of new actors like TNCs on the global world stage that have the 
visibility, capabilities and the will to address our global social ills and influence 
our politics, I believe that we must move beyond thinking about international 
relations and a just global order as the prevail of states and state action alone. 
Hence, this thesis took up the challenge of developing a theory of CSR that 
considers the role of TNCs in global justice.
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As we saw in chapter 1, addressing the question of corporate just agency 
prima facie involved moving away from the traditional state-centric theories of 
global justice to a cosmopolitan brand of global justice more conducive to 
discussing the role of non-state actors like TNCs. Cosmopolitan global justice, in 
this case, was presented as a particular conception of global justice that advocates a 
pluralized understanding of just agency which is essentially non-state-centric. That 
is, what was envisioned was an ideal global just order that included actors other 
than states, like TNCs. In chapter 1, three cosmopolitan approaches were 
presented: the ‘extreme cosmopolitanism’ position, the ‘strong cosmopolitanism’ 
position and the ‘weak cosmopolitanism’ position. The first posited the claim that 
cosmopolitanism results in a non-state-based world order, the second that global 
justice is achieved through radical reforms to create a ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ 
composed of state and non-state actors, and the third that a cosmopolitan 
conception of global just agency entails a balance between our special 
responsibilities and global responsibilities.
Each of the three cosmopolitan approaches offered an ideal picture of 
how a just global order should be structured, what political actors it should consist 
of, so as to best further the claims of each and every human being as free and equal 
individuals -  and why. The central issue was about just agency -  specifically, the 
normative reasoning that motivates the identification of different basic political 
units, which in turn generates theories with different normative content. Each 
approach offered their own perfectionistic conception of an ideal just global order 
consisting of certain political institutions that achieve the political ideals that they 
upheld. The question, then, was how TNCs “fitted into” the respective ideal 
pictures. The extreme position, advocated by Kevin Jackson, argued for a non­
state-based world governing body to oversee and adjudicate wrongdoing on the 
part of TNCs. It was “extreme” because it rejected any involvement of states in the 
picture. The strong position, advocated by Andrew Kuper, proposed radical 
reforms to the structure of the UN to include both states and certain non-state 
actors like TNCs. It was “strong” rather than “extreme” because it presented a 
model of ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ and ‘responsive democracy’ that goes beyond 
the traditional electoralist and statist models, but does not reject the involvement of
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states tout court. Finally, the weak position, advocated by Samuel Scheffler, 
suggested that a balance must be struck between our global responsibilities and our 
special responsibilities. It was “weak” because, contrary to the radical revisionist 
propositions of the extreme and strong positions, it was more cautious about 
suggesting that cosmopolitanism has any ready answers about how a just global 
order should be structured, let alone the question of TNCs’ role in global justice.
I argued that the strategy of laying out “grand theories” of what an ideal 
global just order looks like, and then trying to posit the role of TNCs in the models 
presented, was questionable for several reasons. Firstly, the three cosmopolitan 
approaches presented were only ‘thinly cosmopolitan’ because (1) in the case of 
weak cosmopolitanism, it was not genuinely “cosmopolitan” because it did not 
move away enough from a formally statist position that allows no place for 
corporations as agents of global justice in their own right, or otherwise had no 
story to tell about TNCs, (2) in the case of strong cosmopolitanism, it was not 
sufficiently “cosmopolitan” because it could not move away from a formally statist 
position without placing a wider, empirically-contingent restriction on the domain 
of global just agency; hence it could not provide principles for the inclusion of 
TNCs that were also generalisable to all non-state actors, and (3) in the case of 
extreme cosmopolitanism, the model of a supra-state cosmopolitan court for 
transnational wrongdoing was simply unnecessary and impracticable, and denied 
any value to state sovereignty.
Given these problems with the cosmopolitan approaches, one had to ask: 
Why should cosmopolitan global justice be constructed in this way -  that is, as an 
extension from the statist position -  in the first place? Why not, instead of 
imposing a big-picture conception of an ideal cosmopolitan just global order on the 
question of CSR, construct a set of duty-prescribing principles from ground up, 
based on the particular agent in question themselves and the values reflected in 
political reality? That is to say, instead of staking our claim on various versions of 
cosmopolitan global justice, I argued that an alternative (constructivist) approach 
might lie in asking more basic general questions, for example, ‘What is 
responsibility?’ first, and then test the conception of responsibility out to see how it 
applied to TNCs in particular, if at all. The reasoning here being that, only when
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we had a rigorous conception of what responsibility is, would we be able to 
construct an agent-centred account of who is responsible. Only then, would we be 
able to give an answer to the question ‘Why TNCs?’.
Taking up the suggestion for a fresh (constructivist) approach, I then went 
on in chapter 3 to develop such a conception of global responsibility -  one based 
on the capabilities argument -  after making an extended argument in chapter 2 for 
a conception of ‘global justice as duty’ (that is, rather than a matter of ‘human 
rights’). The capabilities argument supplemented the idea that TNCs ought to be 
responsible in a general sense for the consequences resulting directly from their 
actions, and additionally suggested that TNCs may also be attributed with a 
responsibility to act on cases of global injustice where they were more capable 
than individuals to do so. The argument was that TNCs ought to be responsible for 
global justice because they could -  that is, they were more capable than individuals 
and, in many cases, states, to foresee and prevent the risks of global injustice as 
well as to address or remedy any unjust situations. The normative challenge here 
was to make an argument for the transition from can to ought. This challenge was 
taken up in chapter 3, where a theory of CSR based on capabilities was fleshed out.
2. The theory of CSR as a non-individualistic theory
It became obvious in the course of the narrative that, in considering the moral 
agency of TNCs, the traditionally methodologically individualistic way of 
conceiving moral agency had to be addressed. Methodological individualism, to re­
state it here, is the doctrine that privileges individual action. Theorizing the role of 
TNCs in global justice involved not only moving away from thinking about states 
as the primary agents of justice, it also involved moving away from thinking about 
the pursuit of global justice and a just global order in terms of individuals and 
individual action.
There were two distinct issues: Firstly, whether or not the corporation could 
be considered as an entity in itself, separate from its individual members; and 
secondly, even if so, whether or not moral agency could attach, not just to 
individuals, but also to corporate entities. As the thesis unfolded, these two issues 
were addressed.
- 2 1 7 -
In chapter 1, it was explained that one of the reasons for situating the issue 
of CSR firmly in the context of global justice rather than business ethics was 
precisely to shift the normative focus away from questions about the ontology and 
metaphysics of the corporate form, in order to address what I thought was the more 
compelling question of what TNCs should, can and are already doing for the global 
poor. Moreover, I offered several reasons why a “commonsense” approach to 
corporate agency should be adopted. Hence, instead of asking the question what 
duties TNCs . owe to the distant poor, ethically-speaking, the question posed by 
global justice asked why, on principle and given a particular ideal of a just global 
order, TNCs ought to be agents of justice. As one philosopher observed, “a 
corporation does not turn into a moral person simply because one recognises its 
obligations of justice” (Kreide, 2007b: 14).
Nonetheless, it appeared that even some of the theories of cosmopolitan 
global justice -  cosmopolitan because they advocated a pluralized understanding of 
agency in global justice which included actors other than states and individuals, 
like TNCs -  fell into an individualistic mindset. To recall the three cosmopolitan 
approaches presented in chapter 1: What was also distinctive about them was that, 
while the weak cosmopolitan position focused on the individual agent (who had to 
balance between his global and special responsibilities), the strong cosmopolitan 
position and the extreme cosmopolitan position assumed that it was quite natural to 
talk about institutional agents. So even between cosmopolitan theorists, we saw 
that there were already distinctively different conceptions of agency -  that is, 
whether a conception of individual agency or institutional agency was adopted.
Some of the cosmopolitan (non-state-centric) theories of global justice that 
explicitly purported to talk about institutional agency and the role of TNCs in 
global justice specifically, also turned out themselves to be essentially 
individualistic. Three such cosmopolitan theories were critically analysed in this 
thesis. Firstly, in chapter 2, Henry Shue’s conception of the role of TNCs in global 
justice as mediators of the ethical relationship between individual right-holders and 
duty-bearers was explained as part of my extended argument against the rights- 
based approach to global justice. Secondly, in chapter 3, we saw a similar notion 
put forward by Iris Marion Young, where institutions like TNCs were mediators of
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what she called a ‘social connection’ between individuals and the distant poor 
through the a complex global structure and process -  for example, through the 
processes of production, investment and trade etc.179 Finally, in chapter 4, as part 
of the argument for the scope of corporate agency, I also presented Thomas 
Pogge’s argument that TNCs were part of an unjust global institutional order that 
causes, perpetuates, and sustains poverty, and which individuals were complicit in 
(for example, by being shareholders or consumers of the “tainted” products that 
these companies produce).
Despite explicitly discussing the role of institutional actors like TNCs in 
global justice, closer scrutiny revealed these cosmopolitan theories to be 
essentially individualistic. Rather than making the argument for corporate just 
agency, we saw that the interposition of TNCs in the cosmopolitan picture was 
actually intended to expand the boundaries of the individual's responsibility so 
that, although the individual himself did not directly cause the harm in question, he 
was seen to play a strategic role in a process of events that led to the harm. In other 
words, TNCs “globalised” the individual’s scope of responsibilities (in Shue, 
Young and Pogge’s theories at least) -  either by extrapolating an ethical 
relationship between him and the victim (for example, if the individual buys from 
the company a product produced by a distant poor person under unjust 
circumstances), or by showing that he can be attributed with causing more harm 
than he thinks (for example, by buying the product, the individual is personally 
endorsing the company’s participation in a global trading system that causes and 
perpetuates such injustice, and the system itself). Hence, the role of TNCs here was 
secondary, in the sense that the sole moral agent that this sort of political theory 
was concerned about was the individual. In an individualistic scheme, TNCs 
merely played an instrumental function, that is, in expanding the scope of the 
individual’s responsibility as described. They were not, as it were, agents of justice 
in their own right.
179 Although it was noted that Young’s conception o f the role o f TNCs in global justice differed 
from Shue’s in one respect: In the social connection model, the ethical relationship is “prior to” the 
institution in the sense that it exists independently o f any political institutions. Institutions like 
TNCs do not mediate or bring about these ethical relationships; they (merely) regulate the fairness 
of the social contract and provide the means through which the obligations under the social contract 
can be discharged.
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So again, we find that the strategy of positing TNCs in “grand theories” of 
cosmopolitan global justice was problematic for a theory of CSR -  in this case, 
because of its dogged methodological individualism. Among other things, I argued 
that such an individualistic understanding of just agency failed to capture the real- 
life needs of global justice and the reality of what TNCs are doing in the real-world 
international political order. In chapter 3, I demonstrated why an individualistic 
understanding of agency was inadequate for understanding corporate responsibility 
and regulating large-scale global problems. Using the case study of child slavery in 
the cocoa industry, I showed that it was the large chocolate companies, rather than 
individual agents or governments, that had the resources and knowledge needed to 
implement the changes needed. In many global situations, it was also large 
corporations, not individual agents, who were making a difference -  as Onora 
O’Neill (2001) demonstrated. Given the increasing and potential role of TNCs in 
global justice as agents in their own right, I argued that a new normative argument 
for CSR was needed -  one that talked about corporate agency rather than the 
individual’s expanded responsibility (through the conceptual intervention of 
TNCs). That is to say, instead of trying to position a cosmopolitan theory of global 
justice that presented TNCs as just agents in the spectrum, there was a need for a 
fresh conception of global agency -  one that posited TNCs as one of the basic 
political units that legitimately make up a just global order and form the basis of 
modem political theory and political science. As we saw earlier, the task fell on 
developing an alternative conception of corporate agency -  in this case, one based 
on the concept of responsibility. This was taken up in chapter 3.
3. The theory of CSR analysed in terms of ideal/non-ideal theory
The discussion of Pogge’s cosmopolitan theory of global justice in the context of 
trying to determine the scope of corporate responsibility also threw up another 
challenge. It was argued in chapter 4 that the scope of corporate responsibility was 
not determined by the ideal distinctions between institutionalism and 
interactionalism that Pogge’s theory made (which were problematic in 
themselves), but by the business considerations that constrain what companies can 
and cannot do outside their business mandate. These business considerations
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consisted of companies’ fiduciary duties to their shareholders to maximise profits 
and shareholder value. They were non-ideal, it was claimed, because they posed an 
obstruction to the full realisation of the ideal that we had constructed so far: the 
argument that TNCs had responsibilities in global justice as a matter of duty. I 
concluded, therefore, that the active distinction was in fact not between 
institutionalism and interactionalism, but between ideal and non-ideal conceptions 
of the CSR agenda.
The conclusion arrived at the end of this normative discussion actually 
captured a question that would have been nagging the reader throughout, that is: If 
the business of business is business, why should it care about global justice? The 
intuition here was that TNCs faced what was described in chapter 5 as the ‘CSR 
dilemma’, that is: On the one hand, we agree with the “moral” view that TNCs 
ought to be responsible for some of the global injustices in the world, and like in 
this thesis, make an impassioned argument for them to do more to deliver on 
human rights. On the other hand, we also recognise the “strictly business” view 
that the sole or primary responsibility of a company is, as Milton Friedman 
famously put it, “to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits” (Friedman, 1970: 42). Hence, we had two opposite views of where 
corporate priority should lie, and had to balance the demands of global justice on a 
corporation on the one hand, and the primacy of its fiduciary duties towards its 
shareholders on the other. The normative challenge for political theory, therefore, 
was to find a way of theorizing about both the “moral” and “strictly business” 
views together.
In chapter 5, then, I suggested that the solution to the dilemma lay in 
theorizing what I called the ‘business case for CSR’, that is, where both the 
“moral” and “strictly business” views overlapped. This had the advantage of 
reflecting what was happening in practice as well since, as we saw in many global 
situations nowadays, TNCs which were thought to have fiduciary duties that 
prevented them from being agents of justice at all were in fact engaging in various 
issues of global justice, because doing so served a business purpose. In other 
words, the empirical evidence -  fleshed out in chapter 6 -  was that TNCs were 
doing well (in the business sense) by doing good (in the moral sense). The question
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then was how global justice should go about theorizing the business case for CSR 
in a way that reflected the social reality of what TNCs were doing. Privileging the 
need for a theory of CSR to produce principles or policies that were capable of 
being action-guiding for companies, I argued that the problem was best located at 
the site of the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory. Chapter 5 then explained 
what non-ideal theory is and why I thought it was the best methodology for 
theorizing the business case for CSR. Theorizing about the role of corporations in 
global justice, I concluded, involves theorizing the non-ideal.
Clearly, non-ideal theorization is not the only method for theorizing the 
business case for CSR. For example, economists and political philosophers alike 
have long argued that “doing well by doing good” is but a case of ‘enlightened self 
interest’ -  that is, the self-interested individual’s commitment to an institutional 
system of moral rules because it sustains and promotes economic activities. 
However, I argued that applying ‘enlightened self-interest’ to explain corporations’ 
moral choices was problematic because, among other things, it was usually applied 
to individuals and individual choices. So applying it to corporations encountered 
the same objection about the moral agency of corporate entities and what sort of 
entity the corporation is (for example, whether it is a collective of individuals or a 
real separate legal entity with its own personality).
In the final analysis, I find it puzzling why we should find it necessary to 
“squeeze” what are essentially non-moral (business) considerations into our moral 
theory. Of course, the rational choice theorist would disagree with this 
characterization; for them, the business considerations are “moral” because they 
constitute one of corporate entity’s valued ends. In other words, the need to 
maximise profits and shareholder value goes to the content of the company’s 
preferences and therefore influences the choices -  including the moral choices -  
that it makes. But I find this attempt to “moralize” the business practice of 
companies tenuous and unnecessary. I do not think that arguments based on 
enlightened self-interest or other rational choice explanations are sufficient to 
explain the phenomenal rise in the number of corporations engaged in socially 
responsible activities. Was it that these ethical concerns did not exist before? 
Unlikely. Could it be that the advancement of telecommunications and information
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has made corporations more visible in society, so that more than ever they have to 
be seen to be doing good on top of doing well? Perhaps. But then this does not 
account for smaller companies that “fall under the radar”, so to speak -  firms 
which do not possess so big a brand name as to make it worth their while to engage 
in such public relations exercises, but who nonetheless display socially responsible 
behaviour. For these reasons, I am uncomfortable with treating CSR as part of the 
utility function of an “enlightened” agent. I think that the dichotomy faced by 
corporations between their moral social responsibilities to the global poor and their 
non-moral fiduciary duties to their shareholders -  as represented by the CSR 
dilemma - is better captured in terms of a mediation between ideal and non-ideal 
theory.
~  ~
Not all of the answers arrived at in this conclusion were expected, nor are they 
unequivocal. In this thesis, we took existing theories and perspectives of global 
justice and tested them out on a potential new actor, the TNC. The results 
compelled us to reconsider some of our current positions and find new or 
alternative approaches to the question of corporate just agency: from the attempt to 
analyse CSR through the lens of global justice, to positing a constructivist 
approach to the question ‘Why TNCs?’ and challenging the stranglehold of human 
rights over the way we conceive global justice, arguing instead for a duty-driven 
conception of corporate responsibility based on capabilities. Considering the 
corporate entity as a potential agent of global justice also raised some new issues, 
namely, the need to address the question of motivation and the real-life business 
constraints that TNCs face which individual agents do not, and more importantly, 
how to tackle these issues from a philosophical point of view. Together, the 
answers to these questions formed the foundations of a coherent theory of CSR 
which provided the normative reasoning that motivates the identification of new 
basic political units -  in this case the TNC -  and which in turn generated a theory 
with different normative content. More generally, it also refreshed the way we 
understand agency and the basic political units that legitimately make up a just 
global order and form the basis of modem political theory and political science.
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The response to the challenges of thinking about corporations that have as 
their constitutive aim the maximisation of profits as agents of global justice should 
not be political ambivalence. We should not be under the illusion that world 
poverty, child labour or the other global injustices of our time will be eradicated by 
positing new agents of justice. But neither can we ignore the capabilities and 
indeed, as we have seen in many cases, the will of TNCs to address these issues. 
We are suspicious of their motives and, from a philosophical point of view, maybe 
cautious about the theoretical tools and strategies that are being deployed to put 
them up as moral agents. But, in the light of what TNCs can and are doing in 
specific cases to address global injustice in the world, we cannot allow our mental 
barriers to perpetuate the historical and ideational exclusion of corporations in our 
theories of global justice. Rather, justice compels us to yield theories that are real 
and action-guiding.
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